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Introduction
This thesis is a collection of four empirical studies. Three of them investigate topics
related to industrial organization and one analyzes cooperation in a social dilemma
game. Two-stage investment games are investigated in the first three chapters. Each
of these chapters addresses a different question, Chapter 1 focuses on the strategic
investment incentive which is a driving source for choices made in two-stage games.
Chapter 2 analyzes the relationship between competition and investment in R&D
and Chapter 3 investigates the investment incentives induced by patent protection
or subsidization of R&D investments.
The analysis of Chapter 1 shows that subjects react to strategic investment incen-
tives, in particular their reaction depends on the strategic environment, i.e., whether
the choice variables are strategic substitutes or complements. Further their reac-
tion depends on the externality imposed by their choice in the second stage, i.e.,
the externality on the other subject’s profit can be positive or negative. The the-
oretical framework used in the experimental study is a two-stage game in which
two firms make a stochastic investment in the first stage and compete in a market
stage afterward. The treatments are varied with respect to three dimensions, (i) the
strategic relation of the second stage choices is switched between complements and
substitutes, (ii) the choice in the second stage imposes either a positive or negative
externality on the other firm’s profit, and (iii) the extent of information provided to
the subjects is varied.
The main result of this study is that there is no significant deviation from the pre-
dicted subgame perfect equilibrium investment in three of four strategic substitutes
treatments. But in all strategic complements treatments overinvestment is signif-
icant with respect to the predicted equilibrium investment. This finding can be
partly explained by subjects’ behavior in the second stage, namely subjects are not
taking the outcome of the other subject’s first stage choice into account when mak-
ing their second stage decision. Only in the setting of strategic complements and
negative externalities they do account for it. This result is supported by the finding
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of no significant deviations from the predicted second stage choices in the nega-
tive externality treatments, but of significant deviations in the positive externality
treatments. Further support is provided by the fact that there are no significant
deviations from the predicted Nash equilibrium as well as from the predicted non-
strategic equilibrium investment in the first stage for the negative externality and
strategic substitutes treatments. Concerning the treatment variation with respect
to information, it can be shown that there are significant differences and that they
depend on the strategic relation, the externality setting, and the outcome of the
first stage.
Chapter 2 focuses on the effects of more intense competition on firms’ investments
in process innovations. More intense competition corresponds to an increase in the
number of firms or a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition. The model
implemented in the laboratory is a two-stage game, where R&D investment choices
are followed by product market competition. The treatment variations are (i) the
number of firms in the market, (i) the kind of competition, Bertrand or Cournot, in
the market stage, and (iii) whether the game is implemented as a two-stage or as a
one-stage game. The main findings are that an increase in the number of firms from
two to four reduces investments, whereas a switch from Cournot to Bertrand in-
creases investments, even though theory predicts a negative effect in the four-player
case. The results arise both in treatments in which both stages are implemented
and in treatments in which only one stage is implemented. However, the positive
effect of moving from Cournot to Bertrand competition is more pronounced in the
former case.
Two well known policy instruments, patent protection and subsidization of R&D
expenditures, are under investigation in Chapter 3. In particular, the effects of
the two instruments on R&D investment decisions are analyzed. The theoretical
framework is, as in the previous two chapters, a two-stage game consisting of an
investment and a market stage. In equilibrium, both patents and subsidies induce
the same amount of R&D investment, which is higher than the investment without
governmental incentives. In the first stage, the firms can invest in a stochastic R&D
project which might lead to a reduction of the marginal production costs and in the
second stage, the firms face price competition. Both stages of the game are imple-
mented in a laboratory experiment and the obtained results support the theoretical
predictions. Patents and subsidies increase investment in R&D and the observed
amounts of investment in the patent and subsidy treatment do not differ signif-
icantly across both instruments. However, we observe overinvestment in all three
treatments. Observed prices in the market stage converge to equilibrium price levels.
3In the final chapter I turn to a rather different topic, namely to cooperative be-
havior in a social dilemma. In Chapter 4 data from the British television game show
“Golden Balls” is used to analyze behavior in a prisoner’s dilemma game with high
stakes, face-to-face communication, and two rounds of pre-play. The stake size in
this game show is on average £13,300 and ranges from £3 to £100,150. During the
pre-play the two final contestants are endogenously selected via a voting process.
The main results are a unilateral cooperation rate of 55% and a mutual cooper-
ation rate of 33%. The analysis shows that both stake size and communication
have a significant impact on the player’s likelihood to cooperate. In particular, a
negative correlation between stake size and cooperation is observed. Also certain
gestures, such as handshakes, decrease the likelihood to cooperate. But, if players
mutually promise each other to cooperate and in addition shake hands on it, the
cooperation rate increases. Further, it is shown that a player’s expectation about
the stake size matters and that there is a strong link between contestant’s pre-play
behavior and the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma. Players who contribute more
to the stake size are less likely to cooperate, even though each player’s contribution
is determined by a random process. Addressing the partner selection process, the
contestant’s voting decisions are based on objective criteria, i.e., their opponent’s
monetary contribution to the stake size, as well as on subjective personal charac-
teristics. Players strategically select their partner for the prisoner’s dilemma, e.g.,
they bear in mind whether contestants lied.

Chapter 1
Strategic Investment Incentives in
Two-Stage Games: Substitutes
versus Complements
1 Introduction
Utility maximizing economic agents have to take the reaction of other agents to
their own actions into account when interacting with other agents. Thus, it is cru-
cial for them to understand the effect of their own actions on the others’ actions.
For instance, in a market of two firms and homogeneous goods, a rise of the price
by one firm usually induces the other firm to do the same. In this case the choice
variables of the game are strategic complements since the impact on the other firm’s
marginal profit or on the other individual’s utility is positive. The choices would
be strategic substitutes, if an increase of the choice variable has a negative impact
on the other firm’s marginal profit or on the other individual’s marginal utility. In
other words the sign of the reaction function determines whether the choices are
strategic substitutes or complements.
This paper investigates strategic investment incentives. These incentives arise in
two-stage games in which a choice made in the first stage influences the decision in
the second stage. A classic example for such a game is a two-stage investment game
in industrial organization. There firms can invest in the first stage, for instance in
a cost reducing technology, and compete in a market in the second stage. Thus,
strategic investment incentives arise out of the impact of the own investment on the
other firm’s second stage choice. Strategic investment incentives exist in addition
to the effect arising out of the impact of the own investment on the own choice in
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the second stage. The seminal papers by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Bulow,
Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) are the first to categorize strategic investment
incentives by the kind of investment and the strategic relation between second stage
choices and their implication for market-entry decisions. The investment choice in-
fluences the firm’s choice in the second stage where the choices are either strategic
substitutes or complements. The effect driving the investment decision in the first
stage is the strategic investment incentive.
In order to systematically investigate the strategic investment incentive, I develop
a static two-stage investment game. The basic idea is simple: I set up a model
that yields the same subgame perfect Nash equilibrium investment independent of
the strategic setting in the second stage. The second stage follows the model used
by Potters and Suetens (2009) and thus allows me also to control for the framing
effect which might arise out of the kind of externality imposed by the second stage
choice. In the first stage firms can make a stochastic investment which increases
a parameter in the profit function and thereby influences the own and the other
firm’s equilibrium choice in the second stage. I use a stochastic investment in the
first stage in order to avoid a whole range of otherwise possible outcomes in the
second stage as it would be the case with a continuous deterministic investment. In
addition to the variation of the sign of the externality and the strategic relationship
in the second stage, I implement a third treatment variation with respect to the
amount of information a subject receives after the first stage. A subject is informed
either about the outcome of its own and the other subject’s investment or also about
the investment choice of the other subject. This variation has no influence on the
choices made by the firms in the first and in the second stage but allows me to
control for whether subjects are using their first stage choice to, for instance, signal
something about their second stage choice.1
Compared to the existing literature this paper is to the best of my knowledge the
first to systematically test how the strategic investment incentive performs in the
laboratory. Of course, there are other experimental studies which involve strategic
investment incentives and in which the treatments differ with respect to the strategic
relation of the choice variables, but the treatments differ in other dimensions as well
(e.g., Sacco and Schmutzler (2011) and Chapter 2). The results of these studies pro-
vide first insights that there might be a connection between the observed deviations
from the theoretically predicted investment choice and whether the choices at the
second stage are strategic complements or substitutes. For instance, in Chapter 2 we
find significant overinvestment with respect to predicted equilibrium investment in
1Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2000) have shown that providing additional information about
individual choices of firms in Cournot and Bertrand markets increases the competition in these
markets in the laboratory.
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all Bertrand treatments, but not in the Cournot treatments. A clear-cut comparison
of the strategic investment incentives with regard to the strategic environment is,
however, not possible in these studies because other treatment variations are made
at the same time.
Investment games are not the only two-stage games in which strategic incentives
play a decisive role. Instead of investing in cost reduction, the first stage decision
could be how much to spend for advertising, which product standard is used, or
which location should be chosen for production. There are experimental studies in-
vestigating strategic incentives in such different contexts. Engelmann and Normann
(2007) study a strategic trade policy model where in the first stage the government
can choose to subsidize domestic firms which then compete in Cournot market in
the second stage. The results show that the first-period actions are not as high as
predicted by theory. Oechssler and Schuhmacher (2004) analyze whether firms with
limited liability use debt to commit to aggressive behavior in Cournot markets as
predicted by the model of Brander and Lewis (1986). They find that subjects do
so, but to a lower degree than predicted by the model. While addressing strategic
delegation from firm owners to mangers in a Cournot duopoly, Huck, Mu¨ller, and
Normann (2004) show that the predicted contract of output-based payment is only
rarely chosen. In contrast to this paper, none of the three studies does systemati-
cally vary the strategic incentives influencing the decision made in the first stage.
The impact of the strategic environment on choices made in one-stage games is
analyzed among others by Fehr and Tyran (2005) and Camerer and Fehr (2006).
They provide experimental evidence that the strategic relation is an important de-
terminant of aggregate outcomes. In particular, they show that a small amount of
individual irrationality is more likely to lead to deviations from predicted rational
outcomes under strategic complements than under strategic substitutes. Further, a
small group of rational agents suffices to reach predicted outcomes under strategic
substitutability. This follows the idea of the models of Haltiwanger and Waldman
(1989) and Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985) who show that the impact of a given
number of irrational agents on the aggregate outcome is different under strategic
substitutes and complements. It is larger under strategic complements since ratio-
nal agents have an incentive to follow the deviation of an irrational player in such
an environment.
Experiments on non-differentiated2 Bertrand and Cournot markets have shown that
collusive outcomes are more often observed in Bertrand than in Cournot markets, see
Suetens and Potters (2007) for an overview of the results of four experimental stud-
ies. As price choices in homogeneous Bertrand markets are strategic complements
and quantity choices in homogeneous Cournot markets are strategic substitutes it
2In differentiated markets the evidence is not so clear: Davis (2010) finds that Bertrand markets
with goods being close substitutes converge faster to Nash predictions than Cournot markets.
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suggests itself that there might be a connection between the observed deviations
from equilibrium in Bertrand games and the property of strategic complements.
Potters and Suetens (2009) systematically analyze the effect of switching the strate-
gic relation between the choice variables on the likelihood of collusive outcomes. In
addition they vary the treatments with respect to the externality imposed by the
choice variable on the other firm’s profit, i.e., the externality can be positive or neg-
ative. They implement this additional feature to control for framing effects which
are known as a source of influence on experimental outcomes (see e.g., Hoffman,
McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994)).
The main result of this paper is that the strategic investment incentive plays a role
in the decision making in the first stage, but not in all treatments. In three of four
strategic substitutes treatments I find no significant deviation from the predicted
subgame perfect equilibrium investment. In all strategic complements treatments I
find significant overinvestment with respect to the predicted equilibrium investment.
This observation can be partly explained by subjects’ behavior in the second stage,
namely subjects are not taking the other subject’s first stage choice into account
when making their second stage decision. This result depends on the strategic envi-
ronment and the externality framing. Only in the setting of strategic complements
and negative externalities they do account for the other subject’s first stage choice.
This result is supported by the finding of no significant deviations from the pre-
dicted second stage choices in the negative externality treatments, but of significant
deviations in the positive externality treatments. Further support is provided by the
fact that I cannot report significant deviations from the predicted Nash equilibrium
as well as from the predicted non-strategic equilibrium investment in the first stage
for the negative externality and strategic substitutes treatments. Concerning the
treatment variation with respect to information, I show that there are significant
differences and that they depend on the strategic relation, the externality setting,
and the outcome of the first stage. In the information treatments the second stage
choice is significantly positively correlated with the first stage choice, even if the in-
vestment has not been successful in the first stage. The correlation is not significant
if no information about the other subjects’ investment choice is provided.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I introduce the theoretical frame-
work, the parameterization of the model and derive the main hypotheses. The design
of the experiment is described in Section 3, followed by a presentation of the analysis
and the results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
Before I present the model, I will briefly define the object of investigation of this
paper, the strategic investment incentive.
Consider a simple static two-stage game in which two firms compete in a market
after both firms had the possibility to invest in a profit-enhancing technology in the
first stage. Each firm i with i ∈ {1, 2} can reduce its marginal costs by investing
ri.
3 The cost reduction induces a change in the firm’s strategy ai in the market
stage. The investment incentive of firm i can be expressed as the derivative of firm
i’s profit Πi(ai, aj , ri) with respect to the investment ri:
dΠi(ai, aj , ri)
dri
=
∂Πi
∂ri︸︷︷︸
I
+
∂Πi
∂ai
dai
dri︸ ︷︷ ︸
II
+
∂Πi
∂aj
daj
dri︸ ︷︷ ︸
strategic effect
(1)
with j 6= i. Thus, the investment incentive of firm i consists of three parts, a direct
and two indirect investment incentives. The first term (I) in equation (1) describes
the direct effect of an investment ri on firm i’s profit, whereas the second and third
term present indirect effects of investment. The investment changes firm i’s choice ai
and firm j’s choice aj, but the effect on ai (II) equals zero in equilibrium since firm i
chooses ai according to the first order condition. The effect of the investment on aj
is the strategic effect of investment. Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) show under which
circumstances firms “overinvest” (“underinvest”) in equilibrium compared to the
mere direct investment incentive. They strategically overinvest (underinvest) if the
strategic effect is positive (negative). The sign of the strategic effect is determined
by the strategic relation of ai and aj and by the externality imposed by ai on Πj :
sign
(
∂Πi
∂aj
daj
dri
)
= sign
(
∂Πj
∂ai
dai
dri
)
sign
(
daj
dai
)
(2)
For this decomposition to hold, it has to be assumed that the externality of firm i’s
choice ai on firm j’s profit Πj is of the same sign as the externality of firm j’s choice
aj on firm i’s profit Πi (sign(
∂Πi
∂aj
) = sign(
∂Πj
∂ai
)). The effect of firm i’s investment
ri on firm j’s choice aj can be rewritten as
daj
dri
=
daj
dai
dai
dri
. Hence, the sign of the
strategic effect depends on the the strategic relation between ai and aj (
daj
dai
) and the
“kind” of investment (
dΠj
dri
). In terms of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) an investment
can be of two different kinds: It is either “tough” or makes firm i “tough” if
dΠj
dri
< 0,
or it is “soft” if
dΠj
dri
> 0. Which of the two is the case is determined by the effect
3For this introductory example, I use a deterministic investment. Of course, the investment
incentives could also be defined in expectations, if the investment is stochastic and reduces the
marginal costs only with a certain probability.
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of the investment ri on ai and the externality imposed by ai on πj , e.g., if
dΠj
dai
> 0
and dai
dri
> 0 the investment is soft.
In the following I present the model which will then be used to derive the hy-
potheses tested in the experiment. The model allows for strategic substitutes or
complements as well as for positive or negative externalities of the second stage
choice while keeping the investment in the first stage fixed to be of soft kind.
2.1 The Model
In my two-stage model, an investment stage precedes a product market competition
stage. As backward induction is used to solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium
investment, I present the market stage first and the investment stage afterward.
The model used in the market stage follows the framework of Potters and Suetens
(2009). In particular, I use their reduced-form payoff function because it allows me
to independently vary the sign of the externality imposed by the choice variable on
the other firms’s profit and the sign of the reaction function. This is very convenient
with respect to an implementation in the laboratory.
2.1.1 Market Stage
The profit function πi of firm i ∈ {1, 2}, is given in reduced form as follows:
πi(xi, xj , bi) = a+ bixi + cxj − dx
2
i + ex
2
j + fxixj (3)
with i 6= j, j ∈ {1, 2} and a, bi, c, d > 0, e, xi, xj ≥ 0, and f 6= 0. The underlying
demand system and production technology is not further specified, but depending
on the choice of parameters the profit function can be generated for instance by
a linear demand and cost function in which case it is equal to a profit function
of a standard Cournot duopoly (see Potters and Suetens (2009)). The sign of the
f -parameter defines the strategic relationship between xi and xj . If f is positive,
xi and xj are strategic complements (
∂2pi(xi,xj)
∂xi∂xj
> 0) and if it is negative they are
strategic substitutes (
∂2pi(xi,xj)
∂xi∂xj
< 0). Further, xi imposes a positive externality on
firm j, i.e., firm j’s profit is increasing in xi, if
∂pij
∂xi
> 0 holds. Following Potters and
Suetens (2009), the case of negative externalities is implemented by redefining the
choice variable xi to (m−yi). Thus an increase of yi has to lead to a decrease of firm
j’s profit (
∂pij
∂yi
< 0).4 Hence, there is no difference in the equilibria of the positive
and negative externality cases, but the constant m. I distinguish the two cases to
4In this case the profit function is given by:
πi(yi, yj , bi) = a+ bi(m− yi) + c(m− yj)− d(m− yi)
2 + e(m− yj)
2 + f(m− yi)(m− yj). The
parameters have to be chosen such that
∂pij
∂xi
= c+ 2exi + fxj is always positive and
∂pij
∂yi
= −c− 2e(m− yi)− f(m− yj) is always negative.
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control for framing effects which are possibly arising by the difference in choosing
xi or yi.
There exists a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium in each of the four cases.
In the positive externality case the equilibirium is given by
x∗i (bi, bj) =
2dbi + fbj
4d2 − f 2
, (4)
and in the negative externality case by
y∗i (bi, bj) = m−
2dbi + fbj
4d2 − f 2
. (5)
If f > 0, xi and xj or yi and yj are strategic complements and if f < 0, they are
strategic substitutes. As will be shown in the next section, the investment influences
the b-parameter and thus it influences the equilibrium choice of the second stage.
2.1.2 Investment Stage
Each firm can invest ki with ki ∈ [0, K). The investment is stochastic with a
success probability of ski with s > 0. In case of success bi = bh > 0 and otherwise
bi = bl < bh with bl > 0. Thus the higher the investment, the higher is the probability
of bi = bh. The cost of investment is assumed to be quadratic (C(ki) = tk
2
i with
t ≥ 0) in the investment. Four different outcomes can arise in the market, because
each firm’s b-parameter can either take on the value of bl or bh. Hence, the second-
stage equilibrium profits are either πi(x
∗
i (bl, bl), x
∗
j(bl, bl)), πi(x
∗
i (bh, bh), x
∗
j (bh, bh)),
πi(x
∗
i (bh, bl), x
∗
j (bl, bh)), or πi(x
∗
i (bl, bh), x
∗
j (bh, bl)). The expected profit E[Πi(ki, kj)]
is then given by the sum of the equilibrium profits net of investment costs and
weighted with the probability of occurrence:
E[Πi(ki, kj)] = ski
(
skjπ
hh
i + (1− skj)π
hl
i
)
+ (1− ski)
(
skjπ
lh
i + (1− skj)π
ll
i
)
− tk2i . (6)
Maximizing the expected profit E[Πi(ki, kj)] with respect to ki yields the sym-
metric subgame perfect equilibrium investment k∗i as follows:
k∗i =
s(πhli − π
ll
i )
s2(πhli − π
ll
i + π
lh
i − π
hh
i ) + 2t
=
(bh − bl) (4(bh + bl)d
3 + 4d(cd+ bl(d+ e))f + (bh + bl)ef
2 − cf 3) s
2 (−4d2 + f 2)2 t− 4(bh − bl)2d(d+ e)fs2
(7)
The subgame perfect equilibrium investment k∗i is the same for both positive and
negative externalities and depends among others on the parameter f . The sign of f
determines whether xi and xj or yi and yj are strategic substitutes or complements
and thus changes k∗i ceteris paribus. Thus, the equilibrium investment is determined
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by the profit differences of the four outcomes. The investment choices ki and kj are
strategic complements ( dki
dkj
> 0) if the second stage choices are strategic comple-
ments and they are strategic substitutes ( dki
dkj
< 0) if the second stage choices are
strategic substitutes.5
Table 1: Strategic incentive effects for the soft investment ki
Strategic Complements Strategic Substitutes
Externality (
dyj
dyi
> 0, f > 0) (
dyj
dyi
< 0, f < 0)
Positive ki →
1bi ↑ → xi ↑ ki → bi ↑ → xi ↑
(
dpij
dxi
> 0) overinvestment underinvestment
Negative ki → bi ↑ → yi ↓ ki → bi ↑ → yi ↓
(
dpij
dyi
< 0) overinvestment underinvestment
1 Note that the relation between ki and bi is stochastic.
Since E[xi] increases and E[yi] decreases with an increase of ki, the investment
is soft (
∂pij
∂ki
> 0) for both positive and negative externalities and for both strategic
substitutes and complements. It is important to keep that property in mind be-
cause in most two-stage investment games analyzed in the literature, the kind of
investment is tough and not soft. The sign of the strategic effect and thereby the
prediction of over- or underinvestment compared to the investment incentive from
the direct effect, however, depends on the strategic relation between xi (yi) and xj
(yj). In case of strategic substitutes the strategic investment incentive is negative
and the prediction is underinvestment and in case of strategic complements it is
the other way around and the prediction is overinvestment. Fudenberg and Tirole
(1984) refer to the strategy of a firm as being “lean and hungry” if the choices are
strategic substitutes and the investment makes the firms soft. The soft investment
weakens the position of the firm in the market and thus the firm will underinvest.
If the choices are strategic complements the strategy is called “fat cat” because the
soft investment implies a friendly reaction by the competitor and thus induces the
firm to overinvest in the first place. The sign of the strategic investment incentive
is independent of the sign of the externality, see Table 1 for an overview.
In addition to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium investment level, I compute
the investment level that firms would choose in absence of the strategic investment
incentive discussed in equation (2). This level will be used as the benchmark which I
will refer as the direct investment incentive. Compared to the equilibrium prediction
derived in equation (7) this prediction will result in underinvestment in case of
strategic substitutes and in overinvestment in case of strategic complements. In
5In case of a tough investment, e.g., an investment that increases d, the strategic relation of the
first stage choices could be contrary to the strategic relation of the second stage choices depending
on the choice of parameters.
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order to eliminate the strategic investment incentive of the objective function of firm
i, I fix firm j’s second-stage choice variable at the expectation E[xj(bj(kj), bi(ki))]
arising if firms invest ki = kj = k
∗ and firm j’s first-stage investment at kj = k
∗.
E[Πi(ki)] = a + E[bi(ki)xi(bi(ki), bj(k
∗)) + cxj(bj(k
∗), bi(k
∗))
− dxi(bi(ki), bj(k
∗))2 + exj(bj(k
∗), bi(k
∗))2 (8)
+ fxi(bi(ki), bj(k
∗))xj(bj(k
∗), bi(k
∗))]− C(ki)
Maximizing the expected profit with respect to ki, yields the equilibrium invest-
ment of firm i, k∗i
∣∣∣kj=k∗j ,E[xj(bj(k∗),bi(k∗))] ≡ k∗i ∣∣∣k∗j ,E[x∗j ] , which is conditional on the
profit maximizing behavior of firm j in the first stage and on the expected profit
maximizing behavior in the second stage:
k∗i
∣∣∣k∗j ,E[x∗j ] = (bh − bl)(8bld3 − 8xjd3f − 4bldf 2 + (bj + 2xjd)f 3)s2(−4d2 + f 2)2t− 4(bh − bl)2d(2d2 − f 2)s2 and (9)
k∗i
∣∣∣k∗j ,E[x∗j ] = (bh − bl)s(bl(8d3 − 4df 2)− f(bjf 2 − 2d(2d− f)(2d+ f)(m− yj)))2(−4d2 + f 2)2t− 4(bh − bl)2d(2d2 − f 2)s2 (10)
for the negative externality case.
2.2 Parameterization and Hypotheses
In order to be able to test whether there are differences in the performance and
perception of the investment incentive between the four settings, I will set the pa-
rameters such that the subgame perfect equilibrium investment k∗i is the same in
all four settings. In the following I will refer to the four situations as SP, SN, CP,
and CN which stand for “strategic substitutes with positive externalities”, “strate-
gic substitutes with negative externalities”, “strategic complements with positive
externalities”, and “strategic complements with negative externalities”.
In the second stage the slopes of the reaction functions are equal in absolute value.
In addition, in the second stage of the SP and CP condition, the equilibrium choices
xi(bl, bl) = xi(βl, βl) := xll, and thus the equilibrium profits π
∗
i (xll, xll) are equal if
both firms are not successful in the first stage (see Figure 1 at Cll = Sll). The same
holds for the negative externality condition. It however is impossible to equalize
the equilibrium choices for all four outcomes of the first stage at the same time
without letting go the property of strategic complements and substitutes. Figure 1
illustrates the reaction functions and equilibiria in the second stage for the SP (thin
black lines) and the CP (thick gray lines) condition.
To equalize equilibrium investments I use the same parameters for a, c, d, e, m, s,
and t in all four settings. The f parameter is the same in absolute value for strategic
substitutes and complements, but differs in its sign. The parameters are set as fol-
lows: a = −30, c = 2.515, d = 0.278, e = 0.0055, f = 0.0825, ζ = −0.0825, m = 30,
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Figure 1: Best-response functions for CP and SP
s = 0.2, and t = 1.2 .6 For the chosen parameterization xi (yi) imposes always a
positive (negative) externality on πj, independent of xj ∈ (0, 30) (yj ∈ (0, 30)). The
parameters bl and bh are used to compensate the difference arising from the opposite
signs of the f parameter and the thereby caused differences in profits (see Footnote
6). Therefore the two parameters are different for the strategic complements and
substitutes setting. In CP and CN they are set to be bl = 4.735 and bh = 6.629
and in SP and SN they are chosen to equal βl ≈ 6.385 and βh ≈ 8.555. With the
chosen parameterization of the model the theoretical predictions can be calculated,
the results are presented in Table 2.
Finally, the hypotheses for the experiment can be derived from the theoretical
predictions:
Hypothesis 2.1. Independent of the sign of externality and independent of the
strategic relation of the choice variables in the second stage, the subgame perfect
equilibrium investment is k∗i = 2.04.
Hypothesis 2.2. The subgame perfect equilibrium choice equals x∗i under the con-
dition of positive externalities and y∗i under the condition of negative externalities,
further x∗i equals m− y
∗
i in the corresponding strategic setting. x
∗
i and y
∗
i depend on
the outcome of the first stage.
6In the following Greek letters will be used to denote parameters in the strategic substitutes
setting that are different from the parameters in the strategic complements setting. Note, that the
chosen parameterization follows Potters and Suetens (2009) in some parts.
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Table 2: Theoretical predictions for CP, CN, SP, and SN
Strategic Complements
Positive Externality Negative Externality
Slope xi(xj) 0.1484 0.1484 Slope yi(yj)
x∗i (bl, bl) 10 20 y
∗
i (bl, bl)
x∗i (bh, bh) 14 16 y
∗
i (bh, bh)
x∗i (bl, bh) 10.5168 19.4832 y
∗
i (bl, bh)
x∗i (bh, bl) 13.4832 16.5168 y
∗
i (bh, bl)
π∗i (xll, xll) 23.5 23.5 π
∗
i (yll, yll)
π∗i (xhh, xll) 60.776 60.776 π
∗
i (yhh, yhh)
π∗i (xlh, xhl) 35.6579 35.6579 π
∗
i (ylh, yhl)
π∗i (xhl, xlh) 47.5474 47.5974 π
∗
i (yhl, ylh)
k∗i 2.0429 2.0429 k
∗
i
E[x∗i ] 11.6343 18.3657 E[y
∗
i ]
E[π∗i ] 33.4754 33.4754 E[π
∗
i ]
k∗i
∣∣∣k∗
j
,E[x∗
j
] 1.8114 1.8114 k
∗
i
∣∣∣k∗
j
,E[x∗
j
]
Strategic Substitutes
Positive Externality Negative Externality
Slope xi(xj) -0.1484 -0.1484 Slope yi(yj)
x∗i (βl, βl) 10 20 y
∗
i (βl, βl)
x∗i (βh, βh) 13.3984 16.6016 y
∗
i (βh, βh)
x∗i (βl, βh) 9.4079 20.5921 y
∗
i (βl, βh)
x∗i (βh, βl) 13.9905 16.0095 y
∗
i (βh, βl)
π∗i (xll, xll) 23.5 23.5 π
∗
i (yll, yll)
π∗i (xhh, xll) 54.59 54.59 π
∗
i (yhh, yhh)
π∗i (xlh, xhl) 30.868 30.868 π
∗
i (ylh, yhl)
π∗i (xhl, xlh) 48.5618 48.5618 π
∗
i (yhl, ylh)
k∗i 2.0429 2.0429 k
∗
i
E[x∗i ] 11.3885 18.6115 E[y
∗
i ]
E[π∗i ] 31.5183 31.5183 E[π
∗
i ]
k∗i
∣∣∣k∗
j
,E[x∗
j
] 2.062 2.062 k
∗
i
∣∣∣k∗
j
,E[x∗
j
]
With an equilibrium investment of k∗i = 2.04, the probability of a single firm being successful
is 48.33 %, of both firms being successful is 16.69 % and of none of the firms being successful is 34.98 %.
3 Experimental Design
With the theoretical framework described in the previous section, I can test the fol-
lowing four conditions of the two-stage investment game (see Table 3). Apart from
the four treatments that arise naturally due to the setup of the model, namely the
SP, SN, CP, and CN treatment, I run four additional treatments which differ with
respect to the information given to the subjects. These treatments are called SPi,
SNi, CPi, and CNi.
For all treatments both stages are implemented in the laboratory. Subjects are
informed about the outcome of the first stage and the second stage. After the first
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Table 3: Overview of the treatments
Strat. Complements (
dxj
dxi
> 0) Strat. Substitutes (
dxj
dxi
< 0)
Pos. Externality soft investment, soft investment,
(
dpij
dxi
> 0) overinvestment (SP, SPi) underinvestment (CP, CPi)
Neg. Externality soft investment, soft investment,
(
dpij
dxi
< 0) overinvestment (SN, SNi) underinvestment (CN, CNi)
stage they get to know whether they and their opponent have been successful or
not, i.e., whether they and their opponent have bl (βl) or bh (βh). In the information
treatments they are not only informed about the outcome of the first stage, but also
about the investment level chosen by their opponent. In the following I will refer
to these treatments as “information” and “no-k-information” treatments. After the
second stage subjects are informed about their own and their opponent’s choice as
well as their own profit. The instructions are not framed, i.e., the subjects are not
referred to as firms and the second stage choice is not attached a label such as price
or quantity. Further the investment is explained to determine the type of the sub-
ject, i.e., a subject having the low b (β)-value is of type A and a subject having the
high value is of type B.7
Whether subjects are merely informed about the outcome of the first stage or as
well informed about the investment choice should have no influence on the second
stage choice. However, one could imagine that subjects use the first stage choice
as a signaling device for the second stage choice, i.e., a low (high) first stage choice
could signal a low (high) second stage choice. Thus, I state a third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.1. The investment k∗ and the second stage choice x∗ or y∗ are the
same in the corresponding treatments independent of the information condition.
The experiment was run in the experimental laboratory of the University of Zurich
in November 2010.8 Altogether 184 subjects were recruited and the number of sub-
jects per treatment varied between 12 and 32. The subjects were mostly students
from the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich.
The subjects’ average earnings were lowest in the SNi treatment with CHF 31.55
and highest in the CPi treatment with CHF 33.01 (see Table 9 in Appendix A.2 for
detailed information).
Each treatment was conducted in a separate session and stranger matching was
used within groups of four subjects. Thus, subjects were matched to new pairs after
7See Appendix A.3 for the instructions.
8The subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner (2004)) and the experiment was pro-
grammed with z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).
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each period within a matching group, but not between matching groups. Therefore,
each matching group represents an independent observation. The two-stage game
was played for 15 periods, however in some sessions only fewer periods could be
played due to the time constraint of 90 minutes per session. The subjects were
given the instructions on paper and after reading them they had to answer control
questions in order to make sure that they understood the instructions. The subjects
were given payoff tables that displayed their earnings in the second stage for integer
x or y choices and tables displaying the investment costs and the success proba-
bilities for some choices of k. In addition they could use calculators provided on
the computer screen during the experiment to calculate their investment costs and
success probabilities in the first stage as well as their profits and their opponent’s
profit in the second stage. There the calculation cloud be done at a precision of
0.01 points of the choice variables. Therefore, it is reasonable to use the continuous
predictions of the model as theoretical benchmarks.
4 Analysis and Results
First I present the results concerning the investment stage and secondly the ones
concerning the market stage.
4.1 Investment Stage
Figure 2 provides a first overview of the observed investment choices in the eight
conducted treatments. The boxplots show that the within-treatment dispersion of
the observed investment data is rather large and only noticeably smaller in the CPi
and CNi treatments. In those two treatments the median value of investment is also
higher than in the other treatments. Among the no-k-information treatments only
the SP treatment has an equally high median value and a smaller dispersion of the
data. The distribution of chosen investment levels for all treatments is depicted in
Figure 7 in Appendix A.1.
In order to test for significant differences between the treatments, non-parametric
tests are used.9 A first analysis of the investment decisions shows that the aggre-
gated observations could have all been drawn from the same distribution.10 However,
there are significant differences between treatments. Separating the observations on
the basis of the information condition shows that the observed average investment
levels of the four information treatments (CPi, CNi, SPi, and SNi) cannot have
9All non-parametric tests in this paper are computed on the basis of matching group averages.
10Using a Kruskal-Wallis test reveals that the null hypothesis of no differences between the
matching group averages cannot be rejected (p=0.121).
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Figure 2: Boxplots of observed investments
0
1
2
3
4
5
in
ve
st
m
en
t
CPi CNi SPi SNi CP CN SP SN
been drawn from the same distribution (p=0.040). The treatments from the no-
k-information condition (CP, CN, SP, and SN) are not significantly different from
each other (p=0.359). There are two additional dimensions that can be used to sep-
arate the observations, one is the strategic relation between the second stage choices
and one is the externality imposed by this choice. Using the strategic relation re-
veals that there is neither a significant difference between the four complements
treatments (p=0.166) nor between the four substitutes treatments (p=0.148). Sep-
arating the data by the sign of the externality shows that the null hypothesis of
no difference between the four treatments can be rejected for the positive external-
ity treatments (p=0.034), but not for the negative externality treatments (p=0.621).
Figure 3 illustrates the results of two-sided Mann-Whitney-U tests between the
eight treatments. As one can immediately see, the null hypothesis of no difference
between the treatments can only be rejected for SP vs. SPi (p=0.035) and for SPi
vs. CPi (p=0.004). Thus, there is no significant difference between treatments if
the negative vs. the according positive externality treatment is tested. These first
results suggest that the observed investment level is influenced by the treatment
variations with respect to the strategic relation and the information provision. The
differences within the information and the positive externality treatments might be
driven by the significant bilateral differences.
4.1.1 Deviations from k∗i
Apart from the differences of observed investments between treatments, Figure 2
reveals that the median investment levels lie above the predicted equilibrium invest-
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Figure 3: Results of two-sided Mann-Whitney-U tests
ment level depicted as a solid line at 2.04. To test for significant differences between
the observed and predicted investment levels, I use OLS regressions
∆ki,t = ki,t − k
∗
i,t = α + ǫi,t (11)
with k∗i,t = 2.0429 standing for the predicted equilibrium investment. If the devi-
ation from equilibrium is significant the estimated constant α will be significantly
different from zero. Table 11 in Appendix A.2 shows that the deviations are sig-
nificant for all complements treatments (CPi, CNi, CP, and CN), but only for one
of the four substitutes treatments, the SP treatment. The average overinvestment
compared to the predicted equilibrium investment is between 19.55% and 39.80%
in the complements treatments.11 Recall that the sign of the strategic investment
incentive is positive in the complements treatments and negative in the substitutes
treatments independent of the sign of the externality. Thus, subjects might be over-
or underestimating the strategic effect. Using OLS regressions to test for signifi-
cant deviations from the non-strategic investment incentives increases (decreases),
as expected, the estimated constant in the complements (substitutes) treatments
and increases the significance levels.12 Hence, subjects seem to underestimate the
strategic investment incentive in the complements treatments and are thus investing
significantly more than predicted.
Result 4.1. The observed investment level is above the predicted equilibrium invest-
ment in all complements and the SP treatment. The same holds with respect to the
predicted non-strategic equilibrium investment.
11See Table 10 in Appendix A.2 for average deviations from equilibrium for each treatment.
12See Table 12 in Appendix A.2 for the regression results of ∆k
over/under
i,t = α+ ǫi,t with
k∗i,t = 1.8114 for the complementes, and k
∗
i,t = 2.062 for the substitutes treatments, and with
∆k
over/under
i,t = ki,t − k
∗
i,t
∣∣∣k∗
j
,E[x∗
j
] .
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4.1.2 Influences of the Treatment Variations on Observed Investment
Further, it is interesting to see how the investment choices developed over time.
Figure 4 shows the average investment levels for all treatments from the first to the
last period.
Figure 4: Time series of observed investments by treatment
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The predicted equilibrium investment level is depicted as a solid line at 2.04 in
each graph. Except for the SPi and the SNi treatment, the average investment never
drops below the equilibrium prediction, but remains above the prediction. The ma-
jority of the time series graphs reveals an initial decline in the investment choices.
Whether this effect is significant can be tested by running regressions including
dummy variables for being in the first half of the periods and by controlling at the
same time for other treatment variations. I run separate regressions for each treat-
ment condition, e.g., I separate the data on the basis of the information property
and control for being in a strategic substitutes treatment or in a positive external-
ity treatment. If I separate the data by the strategic relation or the externality
condition, I include a dummy for being in an information treatment:
ki,t = α+ β1 firsthalfi,t + β2 substitutesi,t + β3 posexti,t + ǫi,t
ki,t = α+ β1 firsthalfi,t + β2 informationi,t + β3 posexti,t + ǫi,t (12)
ki,t = α+ β1 firsthalfi,t + β2 informationi,t + β3 substitutesi,t + ǫi,t
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Table 4: OLS regression results on investment
Treatments Separated by: Information
ki,t Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
firsthalf 0.025 0.144∗∗ 0.025 0.140∗∗
(0.065) (0.062) (0.065) (0.061)
substitutes -0.539∗∗∗ 0.269 -0.478∗ 0.057
(0.134) (0.223) (0.256) (0.416)
posext 0.018 0.231 0.070 0.068
(0.149) (0.224) (0.189) (0.201)
subst posext -0.101 0.367
(0.295) (0.474)
Constant 2.807∗∗∗ 2.285∗∗∗ 2.774∗∗∗ 2.372∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.155) (0.189) (0.138)
R2 0.064 0.022 0.064 0.026
N 968 1484 968 1484
No. of clusters 19 27 19 27
Data from: CPi, CNi, SPi, SNi CP, CN, SP, SN CPi, CNi, SPi, SNi CP, CN, SP, SN
Treatments Separated by: Strategic Relation
ki,t Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
firsthalf 0.049 0.137∗∗ 0.049 0.137∗∗
(0.063) (0.065) (0.063) (0.064)
information -0.468∗∗ 0.349∗∗ -0.187 0.348
(0.222) (0.132) (0.434) (0.225)
posext 0.238 0.069 0.436 0.068
(0.271) (0.146) (0.431) (0.201)
inf posext -0.467 0.002
(0.486) (0.275)
Constant 2.594∗∗∗ 2.374∗∗∗ 2.472∗∗∗ 2.374∗∗∗
(0.308) (0.126) (0.397) (0.138)
R2 0.043 0.024 0.050 0.024
N 1168 1284 1168 1284
No. of clusters 23 23 23 23
Data from: SPi, SP, SNi, SN CPi, CP, CNi, CN SPi, SP, SNi, SN CPi, CP, CNi, CN
Treatments Separated by: Externality
ki,t Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
firsthalf 0.086 0.088 0.094 0.096
(0.065) (0.063) (0.066) (0.060)
information -0.146 0.090 0.350∗∗ 0.347
(0.172) (0.250) (0.159) (0.225)
substitutes 0.011 -0.148 0.425∗ 0.056
(0.178) (0.284) (0.228) (0.419)
inf subst -1.006∗∗∗ -0.536
(0.270) (0.490)
Constant 2.673∗∗∗ 2.481∗∗∗ 2.462∗∗∗ 2.394∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.149) (0.161) (0.137)
R2 0.005 0.006 0.045 0.016
N 1428 1024 1428 1024
No. of clusters 25 21 25 21
Data from: CPi, CP, SPi, SP CNi, CN, SNi, SN CPi, CP, SPi, SP CNi, CN, SNi, SN
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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In addition I include interaction variables of the two treatment dummies to test
whether the conditions interact with each other. Then the regression equations in-
clude an additional term, either β4 subst posexti,t, β4 inf posexti,t, or β4 inf substi,t.
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 4. Being in the first half
of the periods has a significantly positive effect in the no-k-information treatments
and in the complements treatments. Further, the impact of being in an information
treatment on investment is twofold: It has a significantly negative effect in the sub-
stitutes treatments and a significantly positive effect in the complements treatments.
Considering the positive externality treatments, being in the SPi treatment signif-
icantly decreases investment corroborating the results of the non-parametric tests.
The strategic relation matters in the information, but not in the no-k-information
treatments. Being in a strategic substitutes treatment decreases investment signif-
icantly in the information treatments, but it has a significantly positive effect on
investment in the positive externality treatments if I control for an interaction effect
with the information treatment. Being in a positive externality treatment has no
significant effect in any of the models.
Result 4.2. The observed investment level is significantly influenced by the infor-
mation condition and the strategic relation of the second stage choice variables. The
sign of the externality in the second stage seems to have no influence on the choice
in the first stage. Further investment levels decrease in the second half of the periods
in some of the treatments.
4.1.3 Distribution of Outcomes of the First Stage
I will briefly analyze the distribution of outcomes of the investment stage. If the
equilibrium investment k∗ is chosen the number of successful firms are distributed
as follows: In 48.33% of the cases one of the firms is successful and the other is
not, in 16.69% both firms are successful, and in 34.98% neither firm is successful.
Table 5 shows the observed distributions of outcomes of the first stage for the eight
treatments. One can see that the share of only one firm being successful is rather
similar for all treatments and also similar compared to the equilibrium prediction; it
varies between 45% and 54% percent. In contrast the shares of the other outcomes
show large variations between treatments: The fraction of outcomes in which none
of the firms is successful varies between 11% and 29% and the fraction of outcomes
in which both firms are successful varies between 17% and 43%. Using χ2-tests
to test for significant differences between the observed and predicted distribution
reveals that all observed distributions are significantly different, but the one of the
SPi and SNi treatment.13 This is in line with this finding that, the investment levels
13The χ2-test statistics are CPi: 86.05, CNi: 27.45, SPi: 2.22, SNi: 2.80, CP: 18.96, CN: 28.15,
SP: 65.67, SN: 12.07 with χ2(0.9, 2) = 4.61, χ2(0.95, 2) = 5.99, and χ2(0.99, 2) = 9.21.
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in these two treatments are not significantly different from the predicted equilibrium
investment choice.
Table 5: Observed distribution of outcomes of the first stage
Number of Successful Firms
Treatment 0 1 2 Total
CPi 32 10.67% 140 46.67% 128 42.67% 300 100%
CP 100 23.81% 210 50.00% 110 26.19% 420 100%
CNi 24 13.33% 96 53.33% 60 33.33% 180 100%
CN 74 19.27% 204 53.13% 106 27.60% 384 100%
SPi 84 29.17% 154 53.47% 50 17.36% 288 100%
SP 70 16.67% 200 47.62% 150 35.71% 420 100%
SNi 54 27.00% 108 54.00% 38 19.00% 200 100%
SN 70 26.92% 118 45.38% 72 27.69% 260 100%
Total 508 20.72% 1230 50.16% 714 29.12% 2452 100%
In the next section I focus on the observed choices in the second stage and show
the connection to the outcome of the first stage.
4.2 Market Stage
Subjects’ choice in the second stage should depend on the outcome of the first stage.
But before I disaggregate the data by the outcome of the first stage, I will take a
brief look at the aggregate data. Figure 5 depicts boxplots of the observed second
stage choices.14 The mass of the data is distributed similarly within the positive
and negative externality treatments. But the median values are rather different,
i.e., within the positive externality treatments they vary between 11.5 (SPi) and 14
(CPi), and within the negative externality treatments they vary between 16 (CNi)
and 19 (SNi). If one recalculates the x-choice from the y-choice, i.e., subtracts the
y-choice from m = 30, one sees that the median values differ at most by one between
the positive and the negative externality treatment. In the following I denote the
recalculated x-choice by x′ (x′ = m− y).
As mentioned, the choices of x and y depend on the outcome of the first stage
and the observed averages of those choices depend in addition on the distribution
of outcomes of the first stage. Therefore I will analyze the data separately for each
outcome of the first stage. I denote the outcome under consideration in parentheses
after the treatment, e.g., CP(0) stands for the data of the CP treatment and the
case of no successful firm or subject15.
14The distribution of the observed x and y is presented in Figure 8 in Appendix A.1.
15The expressions “firm” and “subject” are interchangeably used in the following analysis, but
I want to point out that the expression “firm” is not used in the instructions.
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Figure 5: Boxplots of observed market stage choices
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Two-sided Mann-Whitney-U tests reveal that the null hypothesis of no differences
between the information and the corresponding no-k-information treatment can only
be rejected in three of twelve cases. The difference is significant between CPi(0) and
CP(0), CPi(1) and CP(1), and between SPi(1) and SP(1).16 Using x′ to test for
differences between the corresponding positive and negative externality treatment
shows that there are significant differences between CP(0) and CN(0), SPi(0) and
SNi(0), and CP(1) and CN(1). Interestingly, there are no significant differences with
respect to the externality and the information condition if both firms are successful.
Addressing the strategic relation, the null hypothesis of no differences cannot be
rejected if none of the firms has been successful.17
4.2.1 Deviations from x∗i and y
∗
i
The gray line in Figure 6 corresponds to the average x or y which should be observed
if subjects make their choices in line with the equilibrium prediction in the according
subgame. Since the distribution of first stage outcome differs from period to period
the average equilibrium x or y differs as well. So far I have shown that there are
differences in the second stage choices between the treatments and the effect of the
16The p-values are p=0.048(CPi(0) vs. CP(0)), p=0.003 (CPi(1) vs. CP(1)), and p=0.035
(SPi(1) vs. SP(1)).
17For the cases of at least one successful firms, I use one-sided Mann-Whitney-U tests since
the theoretical predictions are not equal. There I find significant differences between CPi(1) and
SPi(1) with p=0.009, CP(1,2) and SP(1,2) with p=0.012 and p=0.045, and CNi(1,2) and SNi(1,2)
with p=0.071 and p=0.089.
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treatment condition seems to depend on the outcome of the first stage. But this
does not necessarily imply that the equilibrium predictions perform well. The me-
dian choices depicted in Figure 5 seem to be quite close to the expected aggregate
equilibrium choices (indicated by solid lines (strategic substitutes) and dashed lines
(strategic complements); the lower lines correspond to the positive externality and
the upper ones to the negative externality treatments) in some of the treatments.
Also Figure 6 reveals that there are differences between the observed and predicted
aggregate equilibrium choices. The observed average x-choices are above the ex-
pected equilibrium x∗ (solid line at 11.63 in the strategic complements and at 11.39
in the strategic substitutes treatments) and the average y-choices are below the ex-
pected equilibrium y∗ (solid line at 18.37 in the strategic complements and at 18.61
in the strategic substitutes treatments) in almost all periods. The average deviation
from the equilibrium choice in the positive externality treatments varies between
4.18% and 13.76% and in the negative externality treatments between -8.31% and
-1.06% (see Table 10 in Appendix A.2).
Running OLS regressions on the difference between the observed choice and the
predicted choice allows me to test whether the deviations are significant, i.e., in that
case the coefficient of the constant will be significantly different from zero.
∆xi,t = xi,t − x
∗
i,t = α + ǫi,t or (13)
∆yi,t = yi,t − y
∗
i,t = α + ǫi,t (14)
x∗i,t and y
∗
i,t are the predictions presented in Table 2 for the according outcome of
the first stage. The results of the regressions are reported in Table 14 in Appendix
A.2. They show that the difference between the observed and predicted equilibrium
choices are not significant in all four negative externality treatments and significant
in all four positive externality treatments. The deviation in these treatments is
positive and not significantly different between the information treatments (CPi vs.
SPi, t=0.151), but strongly significant between the no-k-information treatments (CP
and SP, t=2.167).
Result 4.3. In all positive externality treatments the observed x-choices are sig-
nificantly higher than predicted by theory, but in the negative externality treatment
the y-choices are not significantly different from the predicted equilibrium choices.
Thus, deviations from the equilibrium in the first stage can partly be explained by
deviations from the equilibrium in the second stage. In three treatments (CPi, CP,
and SP) I find significant deviations in both stages.
4.2.2 Influences of the Treatment Variations on xi- and yi-choices
In addition to comparing the second stage choices to the equilibrium predictions, it is
interesting to take a look at the development of the average choices over time. Figure
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6 reveals that there are fluctuations, but overall there seems to be no substantial
effect of the period in which the subjects are.
Figure 6: Time series of observed market stage choices
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This observation is supported by results of OLS regressions18. The regression
results are reported in Tables 6 and 13 in Appendix A.2 where the latter includes in
addition to the former interaction terms between the different treatment variations.19
Being in the first half of the periods played has a significantly positive effect on the
choice of x and y if no firm has been successful in the first stage and all complements
treatments are considered. The effect is also significantly positive if one firm has
been successful and the positive externality or the no-k-information treatments are
analyzed. In case of two successful firms the effect is significantly negative, but only
for the negative externality treatments. Thus, I do not find a systematic influence
of being in the first or second half of the periods.
18The regressions include the same explanatory variables as the regres-
sions used for analyzing the investment decisions (see equations (12)),
xi,t = α+ β1 firsthalfi,t + β2 informationi,t + β3 posexti,t + ǫi,t with the second and third
term being dummy variables for the two varying treatment conditions, depending of the subset of
the data one of them is exchanged with the dummy for being in a strategic substitutes treatment.
The same regressions are run with yi,t as the dependent variable.
19The regression equation includes then in addition β4subst posexti,t, β4inf posexti,t, or
β4inf substi,t depending on the data under consideration.
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Table 6: OLS regression results on market stage choices
Number of Successful Firms: 0
xi,t or yi,t Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
firsthalf 0.228 0.367 -0.062 0.781∗∗∗ 0.401 0.137
(0.311) (0.232) (0.217) (0.256) (0.245) (0.267)
posext -8.938∗∗∗ -8.064∗∗∗ -9.334∗∗∗ -7.276∗∗∗
(0.508) (0.520) (0.464) (0.393)
substitutes 0.669 -0.461 -0.937∗ 0.985∗
(0.544) (0.555) (0.470) (0.498)
information 0.015 -1.230∗∗ -0.609 -0.211
(0.446) (0.466) (0.409) (0.578)
Constant 19.101∗∗∗ 19.748∗∗∗ 20.130∗∗∗ 19.104∗∗∗ 11.862∗∗∗ 19.144∗∗∗
(0.655) (0.352) (0.433) (0.239) (0.337) (0.272)
R2 0.796 0.707 0.835 0.637 0.069 0.040
N 194 314 278 230 286 222
No. of clusters 19 27 23 23 25 21
Number of Successful Firms: 1
xi,t or yi,t Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
firsthalf -0.125 0.340∗∗ 0.241 0.045 0.442∗∗∗ -0.217
(0.177) (0.165) (0.161) (0.193) (0.106) (0.221)
posext -6.026∗∗∗ -5.159∗∗∗ -6.077∗∗∗ -5.040∗∗∗
(0.258) (0.250) (0.262) (0.224)
substitutes 0.034 -0.366 -0.614∗∗∗ 0.353
(0.238) (0.245) (0.166) (0.292)
information -0.167 -0.520∗∗ -0.677∗∗∗ 0.092
(0.241) (0.204) (0.154) (0.285)
Constant 17.974∗∗∗ 17.756∗∗∗ 18.014∗∗∗ 17.832∗∗∗ 12.672∗∗∗ 17.756∗∗∗
(0.243) (0.232) (0.268) (0.231) (0.136) (0.243)
R2 0.588 0.483 0.545 0.505 0.037 0.006
N 498 732 580 650 704 526
No. of clusters 19 27 23 23 25 21
Number of Successful Firms: 2
xi,t or yi,t Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
firsthalf -0.455 -0.208 -0.350 -0.159 0.163 -0.909∗∗
(0.484) (0.243) (0.312) (0.336) (0.272) (0.370)
posext -0.955∗ -1.740∗∗∗ -2.463∗∗∗ -0.678
(0.457) (0.454) (0.311) (0.432)
substitutes 0.339 -0.004 -0.568 1.058∗∗
(0.504) (0.410) (0.374) (0.390)
information 0.053 -0.306 0.051 -0.556
(0.464) (0.407) (0.406) (0.457)
Constant 15.592∗∗∗ 16.134∗∗∗ 16.685∗∗∗ 15.567∗∗∗ 14.549∗∗∗ 16.091∗∗∗
(0.393) (0.452) (0.325) (0.458) (0.371) (0.456)
R2 0.035 0.089 0.151 0.020 0.015 0.058
N 276 438 310 404 438 276
No. of clusters 19 26 22 23 25 20
Data from: CPi, CNi, SPi, SNi CP, CN, SP, SN SPi, SP, SNi, SN CPi, CP, CNi, CN CPi, CP, SPi, SP CNi, CN, SNi, SN
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Being in the positive externality treatment significantly decreases the second stage
choice. The coefficients are relatively close to the predicted ones (see Table 7 for the
predictions). Only in case of two successful firms the effect is not significant for the
complements treatments. The effect of changing the strategic relation is significant
as well. In case of no successful firm the effect is weakly significant and negative
for the positive externality treatments, but positive for the negative externality
treatments, even though the predicted effect is zero. If one firm has been successful,
the effect is significantly negative, as predicted, but only for the positive externality
treatments. Considering the negative externality treatments the effect is positive,
as expected, but only significant if both firms have been successful. The interaction
effect of being in the SPi or SP treatment is significant and independent of the
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outcome of the first stage. The impact of the information condition is negative in
the positive externality treatments, but not if two firms have been successful.
The regression result corroborate the results of the non-parametric tests that the
effect of the treatment conditions depends on the outcome of the first stage.
Table 7: Predicted regression coefficients
Number of xi(SP, SP i) xi(CP,CPi) xi(SP, SP i) yi(SN, SNi)
Successful Firms −yi(SN, SNi) −yi(CN,CNi) −xi(CP,CPi) −yi(CN,CNi)
0 -10 -10 0 0
1 -6.6 -6 -0.3 0.3
2 -3.2 -2 -0.6 0.6
The equilibrium values of xi and yi are taken from Table 2.
I varied the treatments with respect to the provided information, because I sur-
mised that the first stage choice could serve as a signaling device, e.g., a high first
stage choice signals a high second stage choice. Testing for correlation between the
first and second stage choices for subjects being not successful in the first stage
shows that the correlation is low, but positive (ρ = 0.0975) and significant at the
5% level (p=0.0401) in the information treatments and that there is no significant
correlation in the no-k-information treatments. Thus in treatments in which the
investment choice can be observed a relatively large (small) investment, on average,
corresponds to a relatively large (small) choice in the second stage. Further, I find
a significantly positive correlation between the other subject’s investment and the
own choice of x′ (ρ = 0.1147, p=0.0707) in the information treatments, if the own
investment was successful and the one of the other firm not.
Result 4.4. Being in the first half of the periods and being in an information treat-
ment plays a significant role in some of the treatments, depending on the outcome of
the first stage. The effect of the treatment conditions with respect to the sign of the
externality and the strategic relation are significant and roughly equal the predicted
effects.
4.2.3 The Strategic Effect of Investment
A strategic investment incentive can only be present if the other subject’s investment
or the outcome of the investment respectively is taken into account in making the
decision in the second stage. The predicted influence of bi and bj or βi and βj on xi
and xj and on yi and yj is as as follows:
xi(bi, bj) = 1.839bi + 0.273bj and yi(bi, bj) = 30− 1.839bi − 0.273bj (15)
xi(βi, βj) = 1.839βi − 0.273βj and yi(βi, βj) = 30− 1.839βi + 0.273βj. (16)
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To test whether the parameters correspond to the predictions, I regress the second
stage choice on bi and bj or βi and βj respectively using OLS regressions. The results,
reported in Table 15 in Appendix A.2, reveal that the own parameter bi or βi has a
significantly positive impact on the market stage choice in all treatments, but the bj
or βj parameter has no influence in neither treatment.
20 The sign of the coefficient
of bi or βi is as expected and also its size is relatively close to the prediction of 1.839.
Pooling the data of the according information and no-k-information treatment
and controlling for the effect of being in the information treatment and in the first
half of the periods played (see Table 8 for the regression results) supports the find-
ings of the regressions per treatment. The effect of the own parameter is significant
in all treatments, but only in the negative externality and strategic complements
treatment, the effect of the other subject’s parameter is significant as well. The
effects are in sign as expected and also the size fits the prediction relatively well. In
addition the controls for being in the first half of the periods or being in an infor-
mation treatment are significant in the strategic complements treatments.
These results partly corroborate the evidence that there is no significant deviation
from the equilibrium prediction of the second stage choice in the negative externality
treatments. The reasoning is as follows, in all but in CN and CNi subjects do not take
the outcome of other subject’s investment into account when making their second
stage decision and thus the observed outcome has to deviate from the predicted x∗i
or y∗i . In the CN and CNi treatment subjects do consider the outcome of the other
subject’s investment and even attach about the predicted weight to it, thus it is not
surprising that I find no significant deviation from the predicted y∗i in those two
treatments.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I systematically investigate how strategic investment incentives per-
form in the laboratory. The used theoretical setup is a two-stage game where two
firms make a stochastic investment in the first stage and compete in a market in the
second stage. The treatments are varied with respect to three dimensions, (i) the
strategic relation of the second stage choices is switched between complements and
substitutes, (ii) the choice in the second stage imposes either a positive or negative
externality on the other firm’s profit, and (iii) the extent of information provided
20The regression equation is xi,t = α+ β1bi,t + β2bj,t + ǫi,t for the positive externality and strate-
gic complements treatments. The second and third term are replaced by βi,t and βj,t for the
strategic substitutes treatments and the dependent variable is yi,t for the negative externality
treatments.
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Table 8: The effect of bi, βi, bj , and βj on xi and yi
xi,t Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
bi or βi 1.610
∗∗∗ -1.820∗∗∗ 1.626∗∗∗ -1.526∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.142) (0.125) (0.163)
bj or βj 0.050 -0.180
∗∗ -0.116 -0.119
(0.107) (0.080) (0.077) (0.134)
information -0.661∗∗ -0.412 -0.248 0.152
(0.252) (0.476) (0.256) (0.306)
firsthalf 0.590∗∗∗ -0.525∗ 0.084 -0.129
(0.147) (0.284) (0.164) (0.197)
Constant 3.493∗∗ 29.236∗∗∗ 0.986 30.478∗∗∗
(1.291) (0.907) (1.536) (1.964)
R2 0.321 0.314 0.387 0.330
N 720 564 708 460
No. of clusters 12 11 13 10
Data from CPi, CP CNi, CN SPi, SP SNi, SN
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
to the subjects is varied. All three conditions are chosen such that they have no
influence on the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium investment in the first stage.
The equilibrium in the second stage varies with the first two treatment conditions,
depending on the outcome of the first stage. The third treatment variation has no
influence on the equilibrium choices in the second stage.
Summarizing the main results, concerning the first stage choice I find that sub-
jects overinvest with respect to the predicted equilibrium in all strategic comple-
ments treatments, independent of the externality and the information condition as
well as in the strategic substitutes treatment with positive externality and without
additional information provision. In the second stage I observe significantly posi-
tive deviations from the predicted equilibrium choice of the according subgame for
all positive externality treatments, independent of the strategic relation and the
information condition. Most interestingly, I can show that in all but the strategic
complements treatments with negative externality, subjects do only take the out-
come of their own first stage choice into account and not the one of the other subject
when making their decision in the second stage. Using the logic of backward induc-
tion, this result suggests that a strategic investment incentive cannot exist in the
strategic substitutes treatments and strategic complements with positive externality
treatments. In line with this conclusion are the non-significant deviations from the
predicted equilibrium investment induced by the direct investment incentive in the
strategic substitutes with negative externality treatments and the strategic substi-
tutes treatment with positive externality and information provision. In the other
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five treatments subjects overinvest significantly compared to the equilibrium predic-
tion. Hence, subjects seem to overestimate the strategic investment incentive in the
strategic complements treatments.
Furthermore the results show that the information condition plays a role for deci-
sion making in the first and second stage. In the first stage being in an information
treatment significantly decreases the investment in the substitutes treatments, but
significantly increases the investment in the strategic complements treatments. In
the second stage the effect of the information condition depends on the outcome of
the first stage. The results on overinvestment compared to the investment predicted
in equilibrium corroborate earlier findings, e.g., in Chapter 2 we find significant
overinvestment in the Bertrand, but not in the Cournot treatments.
This paper has shown that the presence of strategic investment incentives in a
two-stage game with a soft investment in the first stage depends on the strategic
relation between the choice variables and on the externality framing in the second
stage. For further research it would be interesting to investigate whether the results
are robust to a change of the strategic relation between the first and second stage
choices. This additional variation could be achieved within the proposed theoretical
framework by implementing a “tough” investment.
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Appendix
A.1 Figures
Figure 7: Histogram of observed investments by treatment
0
5
10
15
20
25
0
5
10
15
20
25
0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
CPi CNi SPi SNi
CP CN SP SNPe
rc
en
t
investment
Figure 8: Histogram of observed x- and y-choices by treatment
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A.2 Tables
Table 9: Number of subjects and average earnings by treatment
Treatment No. of Subjects1 Av. Earnings in CHF No. of Periods Played
CPi 20 (5) 33.01 15
CNi 12 (3) 32.92 12
SPi 24 (6) 31.84 12
SNi 20 (5) 31.55 10
CP 28 (7) 32.77 15
CN 32 (8) 32.24 12
SP 28 (7) 32.33 15
SN 20 (5) 31.94 13
1 The number in parentheses indicated the number of matching groups and thereby the num-
ber of independent observations used for the non-parametric tests.
Table 10: Deviations from eq. investment and eq. market stage choices
Dev. from x∗, y∗ by
Mean Dev. from Mean Dev. from Number of Successful Firms Dev. from
Treatment k k∗ x, y x∗, y∗ 0 1 2 x∗|(bi, bj)
CPi 2.86 39.80% 13.04 12.08% 8.75% 1.43% 3.79% 3.16%
CNi 2.79 36.37% 16.84 -8.31% -7.92% -2.72% -5.42% -4.32%
SPi 2.28 11.51% 11.86 4.18% 6.90% -0.37% 8.07% 3.18%
SNi 2.31 13.03% 18.42 -1.06% 1.30% 0.08% -3.15% -0.12%
CP 2.51 22.65% 13.24 13.76% 22.40% 7.46% 5.65% 9.86%
CN 2.44 19.55% 17.45 -4.96% -3.04% -1.28% -3.15% -2.12%
SP 2.93 43.44% 12.62 10.77% 8.79% 4.58% 3.99% 4.93%
SN 2.49 22.09% 18.11 -2.69% -0.07% -2.71% 1.13% -0.97%
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Table 11: OLS regression results for the difference between observed and predicted
investment
(CPi) (CNi) (SPi) (SNi) (CP) (CN) (SP) (SN)
∆ki,t ∆ki,t ∆ki,t ∆ki,t ∆ki,t ∆ki,t ∆ki,t ∆ki,t
Constant 0.813∗∗∗ 0.743∗ 0.235 0.266 0.463∗∗ 0.399∗∗ 0.887∗∗∗ 0.451
(0.063) (0.213) (0.141) (0.200) (0.156) (0.144) (0.183) (0.431)
N 300 180 288 200 420 384 420 260
No. of clusters 5 3 6 5 7 8 7 5
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 12: OLS regression results for the difference between observed and predicted
non-strategic investment
(CPi) (CNi) (SPi) (SNi) (CP) (CN) (SP) (SN)
∆koveri,t ∆k
over
i,t ∆k
under
i,t ∆k
under
i,t ∆k
over
i,t ∆k
over
i,t ∆k
under
i,t ∆k
under
i,t
Constant 1.044∗∗∗ 0.975∗∗ 0.216 0.247 0.694∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗ 0.432
(0.063) (0.213) (0.141) (0.200) (0.156) (0.144) (0.183) (0.431)
N 300 180 288 200 420 384 420 260
No. of clusters 5 3 6 5 7 8 7 5
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 13: OLS regression results on market stage choices II
Number of Successful Firms: 0
xi,t or yi,t Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
firsthalf 0.226 0.349 -0.086 0.772∗∗∗ 0.413 0.158
(0.282) (0.239) (0.210) (0.263) (0.255) (0.257)
posext -7.509∗∗∗ -7.186∗∗∗ -9.104∗∗∗ -7.226∗∗∗
(0.907) (0.427) (0.782) (0.434)
substitutes 1.849∗ 0.576 -1.367∗∗ 0.586
(0.964) (0.593) (0.662) (0.598)
information 0.281 -1.113 -1.339∗∗ -1.004
(0.777) (0.832) (0.522) (0.851)
subst posext -2.026∗ -1.943∗∗
(1.023) (0.886)
inf posext -0.478 -0.203
(0.946) (0.988)
inf subst 1.196 1.261
(0.749) (1.136)
Constant 18.285∗∗∗ 19.251∗∗∗ 20.026∗∗∗ 19.080∗∗∗ 12.034∗∗∗ 19.328∗∗∗
(0.890) (0.197) (0.555) (0.206) (0.390) (0.213)
R2 0.804 0.717 0.836 0.638 0.081 0.054
N 194 314 278 230 286 222
No. of clusters 19 27 23 23 25 21
Number of Successful Firms: 1
xi,t or yi,t Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
firsthalf -0.139 0.346∗∗ 0.252 0.059 0.441∗∗∗ -0.240
(0.176) (0.165) (0.161) (0.190) (0.108) (0.219)
posext -5.326∗∗∗ -4.864∗∗∗ -5.571∗∗∗ -4.873∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.295) (0.379) (0.295)
substitutes 0.819∗∗ 0.043 -0.665∗∗ 0.030
(0.371) (0.399) (0.267) (0.406)
information 0.499 -0.254 -0.740∗∗∗ -0.280
(0.408) (0.369) (0.188) (0.367)
subst posext -1.326∗∗∗ -0.707
(0.400) (0.478)
inf posext -1.100∗∗ -0.471
(0.476) (0.410)
inf subst 0.123 0.799
(0.307) (0.546)
Constant 17.566∗∗∗ 17.603∗∗∗ 17.690∗∗∗ 17.741∗∗∗ 12.697∗∗∗ 17.885∗∗∗
(0.283) (0.256) (0.328) (0.260) (0.166) (0.264)
R2 0.595 0.485 0.550 0.506 0.037 0.012
N 498 732 580 650 704 526
No. of clusters 19 27 23 23 25 21
Number of Successful Firms: 2
xi,t or yi,t Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
firsthalf -0.421 -0.151 -0.380 -0.160 0.148 -0.907∗∗
(0.479) (0.232) (0.301) (0.338) (0.265) (0.369)
posext -0.636 -0.724 -2.863∗∗∗ -0.725
(0.544) (0.649) (0.185) (0.651)
substitutes 0.898∗ 1.274∗∗ -0.855∗∗ 1.174∗∗
(0.513) (0.553) (0.394) (0.535)
information -0.729∗∗ -0.373 -0.257 -0.426
(0.294) (0.702) (0.491) (0.731)
subst posext -0.921 -2.135∗∗∗
(0.876) (0.676)
inf posext 1.302∗ 0.110
(0.727) (0.850)
inf subst 0.794 -0.331
(0.824) (0.772)
Constant 15.358∗∗∗ 15.586∗∗∗ 16.968∗∗∗ 15.592∗∗∗ 14.721∗∗∗ 16.043∗∗∗
(0.402) (0.539) (0.184) (0.558) (0.395) (0.533)
R2 0.040 0.122 0.160 0.021 0.020 0.059
N 276 438 310 404 438 276
No. of clusters 19 26 220 23 25 20
Data from: CPi, CNi, SPi, SNi CP, CN, SP, SN SPi, SP, SNi, SN CPi, CP, CNi, CN CPi, CP, SPi, SP CNi, CN, SNi, SN
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 14: Difference between observed and predicted market stage choices
(CPi) (CNi) (SPi) (SNi) (CP) (CN) (SP) (SN)
∆xi,t ∆yi,t ∆xi,t ∆yi,t ∆xi,t ∆yi,t ∆xi,t ∆yi,t
Constant 0.400∗ -0.761 0.366∗ -0.022 1.188∗∗∗ -0.379 0.593∗∗∗ -0.177
(0.166) (0.405) (0.151) (0.274) (0.228) (0.302) (0.153) (0.182)
N 300 180 288 200 420 384 420 260
No. of clusters 5 3 6 5 7 8 7 5
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 15: Influence of bi, bj , βi, and βj on xi and yi
(CPi) (CNi) (SPi) (SNi) (CP) (CN) (SP) (SN)
xi,t yi,t xi,t yi,t xi,t yi,t xi,t yi,t
bi or βi 1.960
∗∗∗ -1.728∗∗∗ 1.714∗∗∗ -1.529∗∗∗ 1.382∗∗∗ -1.892∗∗∗ 1.566∗∗∗ -1.559∗∗∗
(0.190) (0.242) (0.183) (0.105) (0.145) (0.167) (0.178) (0.297)
bj or βj 0.165 -0.199 -0.087 -0.385 -0.020 -0.199 -0.130 0.089
(0.152) (0.242) (0.118) (0.192) (0.142) (0.121) (0.108) (0.131)
Constant 0.322 28.157∗∗∗ -0.078 32.544∗∗∗ 5.463∗∗∗ 29.499∗∗∗ 1.585 29.107∗∗∗
(1.974) (2.128) (1.927) (2.208) (1.380) (1.199) (2.143) (2.969)
N 300 180 288 200 420 384 420 260
No. of clusters 5 6 5 7 8 7 5
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters in models (1) and (3)-(8).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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A.3 Instructions (Translation from German)
In the following, comments are denoted in italic and have not been part of the instructions
used in the experiment.
Instructions
Welcome the today’s experiment! The aim of the experiment is analyzing individual de-
cision making. Your earnings depend on your decisions, the decisions of the other partic-
ipants, and chance. During the experiment your earnings and expenditures are computed
in points and are accounted for with 100 points equaling CHF 1. At the end of the
experiment your total of points are converted to CHF and payed to you cash. The pay-
ment is anonymous. None of the other participants receives any information about your
payment from our side.
Please bear in mind that you are at no point in time allowed to ask questions
aloud or to communicate with the other participants. Please raise your hand,
if you have a question. An experimenter will then come to you and answer
your question in person.
Course of events:
1. You and all other participants are reading these instructions and answer the control
questions. The instructions are identical for each participant. The control
questions are only used to make sure that all participants understood the instruc-
tions.
2. The experiment described in the instructions is conducted.
3. After the experiment you will fill out a short questionnaire and then receive your
payment.
The Experiment
The experiment consists of 15 periods. You and the other participants start in the first
period with the same initial endowment of 3000 points (CHF 30). In each period you
and all other participants make to decisions. A profit is determined on the basis of the
decisions you make in each period. The profit can be positive or negative. Your total
profit in the experiment is determined by the initial endowment and the profits of each
period.
At the beginning of a period all participants are randomly matched by the computer into
groups of 2 participants, i.e., the composition of the group changes from period to period.
Thus, your group consists of you and one other participant. You will have nothing to do
with participants of other groups in the respective period. Your identity is anonymous
at any point in time during the experiment.
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1. Decision (Determination of Types)
In each period you and the other participant in your group have the possibility to make an
investment. By investing you and the other participant can change its type and thereby
influence your possibility of making profits in the current period. How this works, will
become clear in a moment.
You make your investment decision by choosing a number between 0 and 4.95. Your in-
vestment is only known to you, i.e., the other participant in your group cannot observe
your decision. Investing causes costs of investment. These costs are computed as
follows: costs of investment=1.2 × investment × investment. These costs are sub-
tracted from your profit in this period.
The amount of your investment determines the probability of being type A or B in the
current period. At the beginning of each period all participants are of type A. The type
can only be changed by an investment. It holds that: The higher your investment, the
higher is your probability that you become type B. The probability that you remain type
A is the converse probability of becoming type B. Hence, the lower your investment, the
higher is the probability that you remain type A. The probability of becoming type B is
computed as follows: Probability of type B in %=20 × investment.
At your seat, you find the table “Probability and Costs of Investment” (see Table 16)
which lists the according probabilities and costs of investment for some investment levels.
For example, if you decide to invest 3.75, the probability of becoming type B is 75% and
the costs of investment are 16.88 points.
After you and the other participant in your group have made their investment decisions,
the computer draws separately a random number between 0% and 100%. All numbers
have equal probability of being drawn.
There are two possibilities:
1. Your random number is higher than your probability of becoming type B.
In this case your type does not change, i.e., you make your 2nd decision as type A.
2. Your random number is lower than or equal to your probability of becoming type B.
In this case your type changes to type B, i.e., you make your 2nd decision as type
B.
Again, whether you make your 2nd decision as type A or B is independent of the in-
vestment of the other participant in your group. Whether you are type A or B is only
determined by your own investment, the resulting probability, and chance.
Four different situations can arise:
1. You and the other participant in your group are type B.
2. You and the other participant in your group are type A.
3. You are type B and the other participant in your group is type A.
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4. You are type A and the other participant in your group is type B.
Before making the 2nd decision, you will be informed about the outcome of the first
decision. You are mutually informed of which type you and the other participant in your
group are
The following sentence was only included in the instructions of the information treatments:
In addition you and the other participant in your group are both informed about your
investment decisions.
2. Decision (Choice of Number)
In decision 2 you have to choose a number between 0 and 30. The other participant chooses
a number between 0 and 30 as well. Your profit depends on your chosen number and on
the one of the other participant in your group. At your seat are two different tables, table
A and table B which are relevant for the according type. Your profit is depicted in both
tables for some combinations of your choice of number and the choice of number of the
other participant in your group. Tables A and B are identical for all participants. Which
of the tables are valid in the current period depends on your type. You use
1. Table A, if you are type A.
2. Table B, if you are type B.
The following tables were used: CPi and CP use Table 17 as table A and Table 18 as table
B; CNi and CN use Table 19 as table A and Table 20 as table B; SPi and SP use Table
21 as table A and Table 22 as table B; and SNi and SN use Table 23 as table A and Table
24 as table B.
You can compute your profit and the profit of the other participant in your group for
all possibilities of choices by using the “profit calculator” on your computer screen. There
you enter a hypothetical choice for yourself and for the other participant and get shown
your profit and the one of the other participant in your group.
Example: You are type B and choose the number [P treatments: 5, N treatments: 25]
and the other participant in your group chooses [P treatments: 20, N treatments: 10],
then you receive [C treatments: 56.9, S treatments: 50.1] points; if the other participant
is type B as well, he receives [C treatments: 12.3, S treatments: 34.4] points. Is he type
A, he receives [C treatments: -25.5, S treatments: -9] points. In this case he would incur
a loss.
Profit per Period
Your profit of a period is presented to you after the 2nd decision and is computed as
follows:
- cost of investment
+ profit of the 2nd decision
= profit of the period
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If the profit of the period is positive, it will be added to your current account of points;
if it is negative, it will be subtracted from your initial endowment or from your current
account of point respectively.
Computer Screen 1st Decision
You always see this screen, if you make your first decision of a period. You can enter your
investment in field (1). All numbers between 0 and 4.95 are allowed (0, 0.01, 0.02
... 4.93, 4.94, 4.95). You confirm your entry by clicking the “OK” button. You cannot
change your entry afterwards and you will arrive at the second decision.
If you want to calculate your costs of investment and your probability of becoming type
B before making your final entry, you can make an entry at field (2) and click on the
“calculate!” button. You can always change this entry and let the calculation be done
again.
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Computer Screen 2nd Decision
You always see this screen, if you make your second decision. You can enter your chosen
number in field (3). All numbers between 0 and 30 are allowed (0, 0.01, 0.02 ...
29.98, 29.99, 30). You confirm your entry by clicking the “OK” button. You cannot
change your entry afterwards and you will arrive first at the results of the second decision
and then at the results of the period.
If you want to calculate your profit for a hypothetical choice of the other participant
before making your final entry, you can make an entry in the fields (4) “your hypothetical
choice of number” and (5) “your assumption about the choice of the other player” and
click on the “calculate!” button. You can always change these entries and let the calcula-
tion be done again.
The information screes about the result of your 2nd decision and about the result of
the period are shown to you for 10 seconds before you enter the next period. You can get
earlier to the next period by clicking on the “continue” button.
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Table 16: Probabilities and costs of investment
Investment Probability for Type B in % Costs of Investment
0 0.0% 0.00
0.15 3.0% 0.03
0.3 6.0% 0.11
0.45 9.0% 0.24
0.6 12.0% 0.43
0.75 15.0% 0.68
0.9 18.0% 0.97
1.05 21.0% 1.32
1.2 24.0% 1.73
1.35 27.0% 2.19
1.5 30.0% 2.70
1.65 33.0% 3.27
1.8 36.0% 3.89
1.95 39.0% 4.56
2.1 42.0% 5.29
2.25 45.0% 6.08
2.4 48.0% 6.91
2.55 51.0% 7.80
2.7 54.0% 8.75
2.85 57.0% 9.75
3 60.0% 10.80
3.15 63.0% 11.91
3.3 66.0% 13.07
3.45 69.0% 14.28
3.6 72.0% 15.55
3.75 75.0% 16.88
3.9 78.0% 18.25
4.05 81.0% 19.68
4.2 84.0% 21.17
4.35 87.0% 22.71
4.5 90.0% 24.30
4.65 93.0% 25.95
4.8 96.0% 27.65
4.95 99.0% 29.40
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TABLE A
The choice of the other participant in my group
M
y
c
h
o
i
c
e
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
0 -30.0 -27.5 -24.9 -22.4 -19.9 -17.3 -14.7 -12.1 -9.5 -6.9 -4.3 -1.7 1.0 3.6 6.3 9.0 11.6 14.3 17.1 19.8 22.5 25.2 28.0 30.8 33.5 36.3 39.1 41.9 44.7 47.6 50.4 0
1 -25.5 -22.9 -20.3 -17.7 -15.1 -12.4 -9.8 -7.1 -4.4 -1.7 1.0 3.7 6.4 9.2 11.9 14.7 17.4 20.2 23.0 25.8 28.6 31.4 34.3 37.1 40.0 42.8 45.7 48.6 51.5 54.4 57.3 1
2 -21.6 -19.0 -16.3 -13.6 -10.8 -8.1 -5.4 -2.6 0.2 2.9 5.7 8.5 11.3 14.1 17.0 19.8 22.6 25.5 28.4 31.3 34.2 37.1 40.0 42.9 45.8 48.8 51.8 54.7 57.7 60.7 63.7 2
3 -18.3 -15.5 -12.8 -10.0 -7.2 -4.3 -1.5 1.3 4.2 7.0 9.9 12.8 15.6 18.5 21.5 24.4 27.3 30.3 33.2 36.2 39.2 42.1 45.1 48.2 51.2 54.2 57.2 60.3 63.4 66.4 69.5 3
4 -15.5 -12.7 -9.8 -6.9 -4.0 -1.1 1.8 4.7 7.6 10.5 13.5 16.5 19.4 22.4 25.4 28.4 31.4 34.4 37.5 40.5 43.6 46.7 49.7 52.8 55.9 59.1 62.2 65.3 68.5 71.6 74.8 4
5 -13.3 -10.3 -7.4 -4.4 -1.5 1.5 4.5 7.5 10.5 13.5 16.6 19.6 22.6 25.7 28.8 31.9 35.0 38.1 41.2 44.3 47.5 50.6 53.8 57.0 60.2 63.4 66.6 69.8 73.0 76.2 79.5 5
6 -11.6 -8.6 -5.6 -2.5 0.5 3.6 6.7 9.7 12.8 15.9 19.1 22.2 25.3 28.5 31.6 34.8 38.0 41.2 44.4 47.6 50.8 54.0 57.3 60.5 63.8 67.1 70.4 73.7 77.0 80.3 83.7 6
7 -10.5 -7.4 -4.3 -1.2 2.0 5.1 8.3 11.4 14.6 17.8 21.0 24.2 27.4 30.7 33.9 37.1 40.4 43.7 47.0 50.3 53.6 56.9 60.2 63.6 66.9 70.3 73.6 77.0 80.4 83.8 87.2 7
8 -9.9 -6.7 -3.5 -0.3 2.9 6.1 9.3 12.6 15.8 19.1 22.4 25.7 29.0 32.3 35.6 39.0 42.3 45.7 49.0 52.4 55.8 59.2 62.6 66.0 69.5 72.9 76.4 79.8 83.3 86.8 90.3 8
9 -9.9 -6.6 -3.4 -0.1 3.2 6.5 9.8 13.2 16.5 19.9 23.2 26.6 30.0 33.4 36.8 40.2 43.6 47.1 50.5 54.0 57.4 60.9 64.4 67.9 71.4 75.0 78.5 82.1 85.6 89.2 92.8 9
10 -10.5 -7.1 -3.7 -0.4 3.0 6.4 9.8 13.2 16.6 20.1 23.5 27.0 30.4 33.9 37.4 40.9 44.4 47.9 51.5 55.0 58.6 62.1 65.7 69.3 72.9 76.5 80.1 83.7 87.4 91.0 94.7 10
11 -11.6 -8.1 -4.7 -1.2 2.2 5.7 9.2 12.7 16.2 19.7 23.2 26.8 30.3 33.9 37.4 41.0 44.6 48.2 51.8 55.5 59.1 62.7 66.4 70.1 73.8 77.4 81.2 84.9 88.6 92.3 96.1 11
12 -13.2 -9.7 -6.2 -2.6 0.9 4.5 8.0 11.6 15.2 18.8 22.4 26.0 29.6 33.3 36.9 40.6 44.3 48.0 51.7 55.4 59.1 62.8 66.6 70.3 74.1 77.9 81.6 85.4 89.2 93.1 96.9 12
13 -15.4 -11.8 -8.2 -4.6 -1.0 2.6 6.3 10.0 13.6 17.3 21.0 24.7 28.4 32.1 35.9 39.6 43.4 47.2 50.9 54.7 58.5 62.3 66.2 70.0 73.8 77.7 81.6 85.4 89.3 93.2 97.1 13
14 -18.2 -14.5 -10.8 -7.1 -3.4 0.3 4.0 7.8 11.5 15.3 19.1 22.8 26.6 30.4 34.3 38.1 41.9 45.8 49.6 53.5 57.4 61.3 65.2 69.1 73.1 77.0 80.9 84.9 88.9 92.9 96.9 14
15 -21.5 -17.8 -14.0 -10.2 -6.4 -2.6 1.2 5.0 8.8 12.7 16.6 20.4 24.3 28.2 32.1 36.0 39.9 43.9 47.8 51.8 55.7 59.7 63.7 67.7 71.7 75.7 79.8 83.8 87.9 91.9 96.0 15
16 -25.4 -21.6 -17.7 -13.9 -10.0 -6.1 -2.2 1.7 5.6 9.6 13.5 17.4 21.4 25.4 29.4 33.4 37.4 41.4 45.4 49.4 53.5 57.6 61.6 65.7 69.8 73.9 78.0 82.1 86.3 90.4 94.6 16
17 -29.8 -25.9 -22.0 -18.0 -14.1 -10.1 -6.1 -2.2 1.8 5.9 9.9 13.9 18.0 22.0 26.1 30.2 34.2 38.3 42.5 46.6 50.7 54.8 59.0 63.2 67.3 71.5 75.7 79.9 84.2 88.4 92.6 17
18 -34.8 -30.8 -26.8 -22.8 -18.8 -14.7 -10.6 -6.6 -2.5 1.6 5.7 9.8 14.0 18.1 22.2 26.4 30.6 34.7 38.9 43.1 47.4 51.6 55.8 60.1 64.3 68.6 72.9 77.2 81.5 85.8 90.1 18
19 -40.4 -36.3 -32.2 -28.1 -24.0 -19.8 -15.7 -11.5 -7.4 -3.2 1.0 5.2 9.4 13.6 17.8 22.1 26.3 30.6 34.9 39.2 43.5 47.8 52.1 56.4 60.8 65.1 69.5 73.8 78.2 82.6 87.0 19
20 -46.5 -42.3 -38.1 -34.0 -29.8 -25.5 -21.3 -17.1 -12.8 -8.6 -4.3 0.0 4.3 8.6 12.9 17.2 21.5 25.9 30.3 34.6 39.0 43.4 47.8 52.2 56.6 61.1 65.5 70.0 74.4 78.9 83.4 20
21 -53.2 -48.9 -44.6 -40.4 -36.1 -31.8 -27.5 -23.2 -18.8 -14.5 -10.1 -5.8 -1.4 3.0 7.4 11.8 16.2 20.6 25.1 29.5 34.0 38.5 42.9 47.4 51.9 56.5 61.0 65.5 70.1 74.6 79.2 21
22 -60.4 -56.0 -51.7 -47.3 -43.0 -38.6 -34.2 -29.8 -25.4 -21.0 -16.5 -12.1 -7.6 -3.2 1.3 5.8 10.3 14.8 19.3 23.9 28.4 33.0 37.5 42.1 46.7 51.3 55.9 60.5 65.2 69.8 74.5 22
23 -68.2 -63.7 -59.3 -54.9 -50.4 -46.0 -41.5 -37.0 -32.5 -28.0 -23.5 -19.0 -14.4 -9.9 -5.3 -0.7 3.9 8.4 13.1 17.7 22.3 26.9 31.6 36.2 40.9 45.6 50.3 55.0 59.7 64.4 69.2 23
24 -76.5 -72.0 -67.5 -63.0 -58.4 -53.9 -49.3 -44.8 -40.2 -35.6 -31.0 -26.4 -21.8 -17.1 -12.5 -7.8 -3.2 1.5 6.2 10.9 15.6 20.3 25.1 29.8 34.6 39.3 44.1 48.9 53.7 58.5 63.3 24
25 -85.4 -80.8 -76.2 -71.6 -67.0 -62.4 -57.7 -53.1 -48.4 -43.7 -39.1 -34.4 -29.7 -24.9 -20.2 -15.5 -10.7 -6.0 -1.2 3.6 8.4 13.2 18.0 22.8 27.7 32.5 37.4 42.2 47.1 52.0 56.9 25
26 -94.8 -90.2 -85.5 -80.8 -76.1 -71.4 -66.7 -61.9 -57.2 -52.4 -47.7 -42.9 -38.1 -33.3 -28.5 -23.7 -18.9 -14.0 -9.2 -4.3 0.6 5.5 10.4 15.3 20.2 25.1 30.1 35.0 40.0 44.9 49.9 26
27 -104.8 -100.1 -95.3 -90.5 -85.8 -81.0 -76.2 -71.4 -66.5 -61.7 -56.8 -52.0 -47.1 -42.2 -37.3 -32.4 -27.5 -22.6 -17.7 -12.7 -7.8 -2.8 2.2 7.2 12.2 17.2 22.2 27.2 32.3 37.3 42.4 27
28 -115.4 -110.5 -105.7 -100.8 -96.0 -91.1 -86.2 -81.3 -76.4 -71.5 -66.6 -61.6 -56.7 -51.7 -46.7 -41.8 -36.8 -31.8 -26.7 -21.7 -16.7 -11.6 -6.6 -1.5 3.6 8.7 13.8 18.9 24.0 29.2 34.3 28
29 -126.5 -121.6 -116.6 -111.7 -106.8 -101.8 -96.8 -91.9 -86.9 -81.9 -76.9 -71.8 -66.8 -61.8 -56.7 -51.6 -46.6 -41.5 -36.4 -31.3 -26.1 -21.0 -15.9 -10.7 -5.5 -0.4 4.8 10.0 15.2 20.5 25.7 29
30 -138.2 -133.2 -128.1 -123.1 -118.1 -113.1 -108.0 -103.0 -97.9 -92.8 -87.7 -82.6 -77.5 -72.4 -67.2 -62.1 -56.9 -51.7 -46.5 -41.4 -36.2 -30.9 -25.7 -20.5 -15.2 -10.0 -4.7 0.6 5.9 11.2 16.5 30
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
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TABLE B
The choice of the other participant in my group
M
y
c
h
o
i
c
e
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
0 -30.0 -27.5 -24.9 -22.4 -19.9 -17.3 -14.7 -12.1 -9.5 -6.9 -4.3 -1.7 1.0 3.6 6.3 9.0 11.6 14.3 17.1 19.8 22.5 25.2 28.0 30.8 33.5 36.3 39.1 41.9 44.7 47.6 50.4 0
1 -23.6 -21.0 -18.4 -15.8 -13.2 -10.5 -7.9 -5.2 -2.5 0.2 2.9 5.6 8.3 11.0 13.8 16.6 19.3 22.1 24.9 27.7 30.5 33.3 36.2 39.0 41.9 44.7 47.6 50.5 53.4 56.3 59.2 1
2 -17.9 -15.2 -12.5 -9.8 -7.0 -4.3 -1.6 1.2 3.9 6.7 9.5 12.3 15.1 17.9 20.7 23.6 26.4 29.3 32.2 35.1 37.9 40.9 43.8 46.7 49.6 52.6 55.5 58.5 61.5 64.5 67.5 2
3 -12.6 -9.8 -7.1 -4.3 -1.5 1.3 4.2 7.0 9.8 12.7 15.6 18.4 21.3 24.2 27.1 30.1 33.0 35.9 38.9 41.9 44.8 47.8 50.8 53.8 56.9 59.9 62.9 66.0 69.0 72.1 75.2 3
4 -7.9 -5.1 -2.2 0.7 3.5 6.4 9.3 12.3 15.2 18.1 21.1 24.0 27.0 30.0 33.0 36.0 39.0 42.0 45.1 48.1 51.2 54.2 57.3 60.4 63.5 66.6 69.8 72.9 76.0 79.2 82.4 4
5 -3.8 -0.9 2.1 5.0 8.0 11.0 14.0 17.0 20.0 23.0 26.0 29.1 32.1 35.2 38.3 41.3 44.4 47.6 50.7 53.8 56.9 60.1 63.3 66.4 69.6 72.8 76.0 79.2 82.5 85.7 89.0 5
6 -0.2 2.8 5.8 8.8 11.9 15.0 18.0 21.1 24.2 27.3 30.4 33.5 36.7 39.8 43.0 46.2 49.3 52.5 55.7 58.9 62.2 65.4 68.6 71.9 75.2 78.5 81.7 85.0 88.4 91.7 95.0 6
7 2.8 5.9 9.0 12.1 15.2 18.4 21.5 24.7 27.9 31.1 34.3 37.5 40.7 43.9 47.2 50.4 53.7 56.9 60.2 63.5 66.8 70.1 73.5 76.8 80.2 83.5 86.9 90.3 93.7 97.1 100.5 7
8 5.2 8.4 11.6 14.8 18.0 21.3 24.5 27.7 31.0 34.3 37.5 40.8 44.1 47.4 50.8 54.1 57.4 60.8 64.2 67.6 70.9 74.3 77.8 81.2 84.6 88.1 91.5 95.0 98.5 101.9 105.4 8
9 7.1 10.4 13.7 17.0 20.3 23.6 26.9 30.2 33.6 36.9 40.3 43.6 47.0 50.4 53.8 57.2 60.7 64.1 67.6 71.0 74.5 78.0 81.5 85.0 88.5 92.0 95.6 99.1 102.7 106.2 109.8 9
10 8.5 11.8 15.2 18.6 21.9 25.3 28.7 32.1 35.6 39.0 42.4 45.9 49.4 52.8 56.3 59.8 63.3 66.9 70.4 73.9 77.5 81.1 84.6 88.2 91.8 95.4 99.0 102.7 106.3 110.0 113.6 10
11 9.3 12.7 16.1 19.6 23.1 26.5 30.0 33.5 37.0 40.5 44.1 47.6 51.1 54.7 58.3 61.9 65.4 69.1 72.7 76.3 79.9 83.6 87.2 90.9 94.6 98.3 102.0 105.7 109.4 113.2 116.9 11
12 9.5 13.0 16.5 20.1 23.6 27.2 30.7 34.3 37.9 41.5 45.1 48.7 52.4 56.0 59.7 63.3 67.0 70.7 74.4 78.1 81.8 85.5 89.3 93.0 96.8 100.6 104.4 108.2 112.0 115.8 119.6 12
13 9.2 12.8 16.4 20.0 23.6 27.3 30.9 34.6 38.2 41.9 45.6 49.3 53.0 56.8 60.5 64.2 68.0 71.8 75.6 79.3 83.1 87.0 90.8 94.6 98.5 102.3 106.2 110.1 114.0 117.9 121.8 13
14 8.3 12.0 15.7 19.4 23.1 26.8 30.5 34.3 38.0 41.8 45.6 49.4 53.2 57.0 60.8 64.6 68.4 72.3 76.2 80.0 83.9 87.8 91.7 95.6 99.6 103.5 107.5 111.4 115.4 119.4 123.4 14
15 6.9 10.6 14.4 18.2 22.0 25.8 29.6 33.4 37.3 41.1 45.0 48.8 52.7 56.6 60.5 64.4 68.3 72.3 76.2 80.2 84.1 88.1 92.1 96.1 100.1 104.1 108.2 112.2 116.3 120.3 124.4 15
16 4.9 8.7 12.6 16.5 20.3 24.2 28.1 32.0 35.9 39.9 43.8 47.7 51.7 55.7 59.7 63.7 67.7 71.7 75.7 79.7 83.8 87.9 91.9 96.0 100.1 104.2 108.3 112.5 116.6 120.7 124.9 16
17 2.4 6.3 10.2 14.2 18.1 22.1 26.1 30.0 34.0 38.1 42.1 46.1 50.2 54.2 58.3 62.4 66.4 70.5 74.6 78.8 82.9 87.0 91.2 95.4 99.5 103.7 107.9 112.1 116.4 120.6 124.8 17
18 -0.8 3.3 7.3 11.3 15.3 19.4 23.4 27.5 31.6 35.7 39.8 43.9 48.0 52.2 56.3 60.5 64.7 68.8 73.0 77.2 81.5 85.7 89.9 94.2 98.4 102.7 107.0 111.3 115.6 119.9 124.2 18
19 -4.4 -0.3 3.8 7.9 12.0 16.1 20.3 24.4 28.6 32.8 37.0 41.2 45.4 49.6 53.8 58.1 62.3 66.6 70.9 75.1 79.4 83.8 88.1 92.4 96.7 101.1 105.5 109.8 114.2 118.6 123.0 19
20 -8.6 -4.4 -0.3 3.9 8.1 12.3 16.6 20.8 25.1 29.3 33.6 37.9 42.2 46.5 50.8 55.1 59.4 63.8 68.1 72.5 76.9 81.3 85.7 90.1 94.5 98.9 103.4 107.8 112.3 116.8 121.3 20
21 -13.4 -9.1 -4.9 -0.6 3.7 8.0 12.3 16.6 20.9 25.3 29.6 34.0 38.4 42.8 47.2 51.6 56.0 60.4 64.8 69.3 73.8 78.2 82.7 87.2 91.7 96.2 100.8 105.3 109.9 114.4 119.0 21
22 -18.7 -14.4 -10.0 -5.7 -1.3 3.1 7.5 11.9 16.3 20.7 25.1 29.6 34.0 38.5 43.0 47.5 52.0 56.5 61.0 65.5 70.1 74.6 79.2 83.8 88.4 93.0 97.6 102.2 106.8 111.5 116.1 22
23 -24.6 -20.2 -15.7 -11.3 -6.9 -2.4 2.1 6.6 11.1 15.6 20.1 24.6 29.1 33.7 38.3 42.8 47.4 52.0 56.6 61.2 65.9 70.5 75.1 79.8 84.5 89.2 93.8 98.6 103.3 108.0 112.7 23
24 -31.0 -26.5 -22.0 -17.5 -13.0 -8.4 -3.9 0.7 5.3 9.9 14.5 19.1 23.7 28.3 33.0 37.6 42.3 47.0 51.7 56.4 61.1 65.8 70.5 75.3 80.0 84.8 89.6 94.3 99.1 103.9 108.8 24
25 -38.0 -33.4 -28.8 -24.2 -19.6 -15.0 -10.4 -5.7 -1.1 3.6 8.3 13.0 17.7 22.4 27.1 31.9 36.6 41.4 46.2 50.9 55.7 60.5 65.3 70.2 75.0 79.9 84.7 89.6 94.5 99.3 104.3 25
26 -45.6 -40.9 -36.2 -31.5 -26.8 -22.1 -17.4 -12.7 -7.9 -3.2 1.6 6.4 11.1 15.9 20.7 25.6 30.4 35.2 40.1 45.0 49.8 54.7 59.6 64.5 69.4 74.4 79.3 84.3 89.2 94.2 99.2 26
27 -53.7 -48.9 -44.2 -39.4 -34.6 -29.8 -25.0 -20.2 -15.4 -10.6 -5.7 -0.8 4.0 8.9 13.8 18.7 23.6 28.5 33.5 38.4 43.4 48.3 53.3 58.3 63.3 68.3 73.3 78.4 83.4 88.5 93.5 27
28 -62.3 -57.5 -52.7 -47.8 -43.0 -38.1 -33.2 -28.3 -23.4 -18.5 -13.5 -8.6 -3.6 1.3 6.3 11.3 16.3 21.3 26.3 31.3 36.4 41.4 46.5 51.5 56.6 61.7 66.8 71.9 77.1 82.2 87.4 28
29 -71.6 -66.6 -61.7 -56.8 -51.8 -46.9 -41.9 -36.9 -31.9 -26.9 -21.9 -16.9 -11.9 -6.8 -1.8 3.3 8.4 13.5 18.6 23.7 28.8 33.9 39.1 44.2 49.4 54.6 59.8 65.0 70.2 75.4 80.6 29
30 -81.3 -76.3 -71.3 -66.3 -61.3 -56.2 -51.2 -46.1 -41.1 -36.0 -30.9 -25.8 -20.7 -15.5 -10.4 -5.2 -0.1 5.1 10.3 15.5 20.7 25.9 31.1 36.3 41.6 46.9 52.1 57.4 62.7 68.0 73.3 30
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
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TABLE A
The choice of the other participant in my group
M
y
c
h
o
i
c
e
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
0 16.5 11.2 5.9 0.6 -4.7 -10.0 -15.2 -20.5 -25.7 -30.9 -36.2 -41.4 -46.5 -51.7 -56.9 -62.1 -67.2 -72.4 -77.5 -82.6 -87.7 -92.8 -97.9 -103.0 -108.0 -113.1 -118.1 -123.1 -128.1 -133.2 -138.2 0
1 25.7 20.5 15.2 10.0 4.8 -0.4 -5.5 -10.7 -15.9 -21.0 -26.1 -31.3 -36.4 -41.5 -46.6 -51.6 -56.7 -61.8 -66.8 -71.8 -76.9 -81.9 -86.9 -91.9 -96.8 -101.8 -106.8 -111.7 -116.6 -121.6 -126.5 1
2 34.3 29.2 24.0 18.9 13.8 8.7 3.6 -1.5 -6.6 -11.6 -16.7 -21.7 -26.7 -31.8 -36.8 -41.8 -46.7 -51.7 -56.7 -61.6 -66.6 -71.5 -76.4 -81.3 -86.2 -91.1 -96.0 -100.8 -105.7 -110.5 -115.4 2
3 42.4 37.3 32.3 27.2 22.2 17.2 12.2 7.2 2.2 -2.8 -7.8 -12.7 -17.7 -22.6 -27.5 -32.4 -37.3 -42.2 -47.1 -52.0 -56.8 -61.7 -66.5 -71.4 -76.2 -81.0 -85.8 -90.5 -95.3 -100.1 -104.8 3
4 49.9 44.9 40.0 35.0 30.1 25.1 20.2 15.3 10.4 5.5 0.6 -4.3 -9.2 -14.0 -18.9 -23.7 -28.5 -33.3 -38.1 -42.9 -47.7 -52.4 -57.2 -61.9 -66.7 -71.4 -76.1 -80.8 -85.5 -90.2 -94.8 4
5 56.9 52.0 47.1 42.2 37.4 32.5 27.7 22.8 18.0 13.2 8.4 3.6 -1.2 -6.0 -10.7 -15.5 -20.2 -24.9 -29.7 -34.4 -39.1 -43.7 -48.4 -53.1 -57.7 -62.4 -67.0 -71.6 -76.2 -80.8 -85.4 5
6 63.3 58.5 53.7 48.9 44.1 39.3 34.6 29.8 25.1 20.3 15.6 10.9 6.2 1.5 -3.2 -7.8 -12.5 -17.1 -21.8 -26.4 -31.0 -35.6 -40.2 -44.8 -49.3 -53.9 -58.4 -63.0 -67.5 -72.0 -76.5 6
7 69.2 64.4 59.7 55.0 50.3 45.6 40.9 36.2 31.6 26.9 22.3 17.7 13.1 8.4 3.9 -0.7 -5.3 -9.9 -14.4 -19.0 -23.5 -28.0 -32.5 -37.0 -41.5 -46.0 -50.4 -54.9 -59.3 -63.7 -68.2 7
8 74.5 69.8 65.2 60.5 55.9 51.3 46.7 42.1 37.5 33.0 28.4 23.9 19.3 14.8 10.3 5.8 1.3 -3.2 -7.6 -12.1 -16.5 -21.0 -25.4 -29.8 -34.2 -38.6 -43.0 -47.3 -51.7 -56.0 -60.4 8
9 79.2 74.6 70.1 65.5 61.0 56.5 51.9 47.4 42.9 38.5 34.0 29.5 25.1 20.6 16.2 11.8 7.4 3.0 -1.4 -5.8 -10.1 -14.5 -18.8 -23.2 -27.5 -31.8 -36.1 -40.4 -44.6 -48.9 -53.2 9
10 83.4 78.9 74.4 70.0 65.5 61.1 56.6 52.2 47.8 43.4 39.0 34.6 30.3 25.9 21.5 17.2 12.9 8.6 4.3 0.0 -4.3 -8.6 -12.8 -17.1 -21.3 -25.5 -29.8 -34.0 -38.1 -42.3 -46.5 10
11 87.0 82.6 78.2 73.8 69.5 65.1 60.8 56.4 52.1 47.8 43.5 39.2 34.9 30.6 26.3 22.1 17.8 13.6 9.4 5.2 1.0 -3.2 -7.4 -11.5 -15.7 -19.8 -24.0 -28.1 -32.2 -36.3 -40.4 11
12 90.1 85.8 81.5 77.2 72.9 68.6 64.3 60.1 55.8 51.6 47.4 43.1 38.9 34.7 30.6 26.4 22.2 18.1 14.0 9.8 5.7 1.6 -2.5 -6.6 -10.6 -14.7 -18.8 -22.8 -26.8 -30.8 -34.8 12
13 92.6 88.4 84.2 79.9 75.7 71.5 67.3 63.2 59.0 54.8 50.7 46.6 42.5 38.3 34.2 30.2 26.1 22.0 18.0 13.9 9.9 5.9 1.8 -2.2 -6.1 -10.1 -14.1 -18.0 -22.0 -25.9 -29.8 13
14 94.6 90.4 86.3 82.1 78.0 73.9 69.8 65.7 61.6 57.6 53.5 49.4 45.4 41.4 37.4 33.4 29.4 25.4 21.4 17.4 13.5 9.6 5.6 1.7 -2.2 -6.1 -10.0 -13.9 -17.7 -21.6 -25.4 14
15 96.0 91.9 87.9 83.8 79.8 75.7 71.7 67.7 63.7 59.7 55.7 51.8 47.8 43.9 39.9 36.0 32.1 28.2 24.3 20.4 16.6 12.7 8.8 5.0 1.2 -2.6 -6.4 -10.2 -14.0 -17.8 -21.5 15
16 96.9 92.9 88.9 84.9 80.9 77.0 73.1 69.1 65.2 61.3 57.4 53.5 49.6 45.8 41.9 38.1 34.3 30.4 26.6 22.8 19.1 15.3 11.5 7.8 4.0 0.3 -3.4 -7.1 -10.8 -14.5 -18.2 16
17 97.1 93.2 89.3 85.4 81.6 77.7 73.8 70.0 66.2 62.3 58.5 54.7 50.9 47.2 43.4 39.6 35.9 32.1 28.4 24.7 21.0 17.3 13.6 10.0 6.3 2.6 -1.0 -4.6 -8.2 -11.8 -15.4 17
18 96.9 93.1 89.2 85.4 81.6 77.9 74.1 70.3 66.6 62.8 59.1 55.4 51.7 48.0 44.3 40.6 36.9 33.3 29.6 26.0 22.4 18.8 15.2 11.6 8.0 4.5 0.9 -2.6 -6.2 -9.7 -13.2 18
19 96.1 92.3 88.6 84.9 81.2 77.4 73.8 70.1 66.4 62.7 59.1 55.5 51.8 48.2 44.6 41.0 37.4 33.9 30.3 26.8 23.2 19.7 16.2 12.7 9.2 5.7 2.2 -1.2 -4.7 -8.1 -11.6 19
20 94.7 91.0 87.4 83.7 80.1 76.5 72.9 69.3 65.7 62.1 58.6 55.0 51.5 47.9 44.4 40.9 37.4 33.9 30.4 27.0 23.5 20.1 16.6 13.2 9.8 6.4 3.0 -0.4 -3.7 -7.1 -10.5 20
21 92.8 89.2 85.6 82.1 78.5 75.0 71.4 67.9 64.4 60.9 57.4 54.0 50.5 47.1 43.6 40.2 36.8 33.4 30.0 26.6 23.2 19.9 16.5 13.2 9.8 6.5 3.2 -0.1 -3.4 -6.6 -9.9 21
22 90.3 86.8 83.3 79.8 76.4 72.9 69.5 66.0 62.6 59.2 55.8 52.4 49.0 45.7 42.3 39.0 35.6 32.3 29.0 25.7 22.4 19.1 15.8 12.6 9.3 6.1 2.9 -0.3 -3.5 -6.7 -9.9 22
23 87.2 83.8 80.4 77.0 73.6 70.3 66.9 63.6 60.2 56.9 53.6 50.3 47.0 43.7 40.4 37.1 33.9 30.7 27.4 24.2 21.0 17.8 14.6 11.4 8.3 5.1 2.0 -1.2 -4.3 -7.4 -10.5 23
24 83.7 80.3 77.0 73.7 70.4 67.1 63.8 60.5 57.3 54.0 50.8 47.6 44.4 41.2 38.0 34.8 31.6 28.5 25.3 22.2 19.1 15.9 12.8 9.7 6.7 3.6 0.5 -2.5 -5.6 -8.6 -11.6 24
25 79.5 76.2 73.0 69.8 66.6 63.4 60.2 57.0 53.8 50.6 47.5 44.3 41.2 38.1 35.0 31.9 28.8 25.7 22.6 19.6 16.6 13.5 10.5 7.5 4.5 1.5 -1.5 -4.4 -7.4 -10.3 -13.3 25
26 74.8 71.6 68.5 65.3 62.2 59.1 55.9 52.8 49.7 46.7 43.6 40.5 37.5 34.4 31.4 28.4 25.4 22.4 19.4 16.5 13.5 10.5 7.6 4.7 1.8 -1.1 -4.0 -6.9 -9.8 -12.7 -15.5 26
27 69.5 66.4 63.4 60.3 57.2 54.2 51.2 48.2 45.1 42.1 39.2 36.2 33.2 30.3 27.3 24.4 21.5 18.5 15.6 12.8 9.9 7.0 4.2 1.3 -1.5 -4.3 -7.2 -10.0 -12.8 -15.5 -18.3 27
28 63.7 60.7 57.7 54.7 51.8 48.8 45.8 42.9 40.0 37.1 34.2 31.3 28.4 25.5 22.6 19.8 17.0 14.1 11.3 8.5 5.7 2.9 0.2 -2.6 -5.4 -8.1 -10.8 -13.6 -16.3 -19.0 -21.6 28
29 57.3 54.4 51.5 48.6 45.7 42.8 40.0 37.1 34.3 31.4 28.6 25.8 23.0 20.2 17.4 14.7 11.9 9.2 6.4 3.7 1.0 -1.7 -4.4 -7.1 -9.8 -12.4 -15.1 -17.7 -20.3 -22.9 -25.5 29
30 50.4 47.6 44.7 41.9 39.1 36.3 33.5 30.8 28.0 25.2 22.5 19.8 17.1 14.3 11.6 9.0 6.3 3.6 1.0 -1.7 -4.3 -6.9 -9.5 -12.1 -14.7 -17.3 -19.9 -22.4 -24.9 -27.5 -30.0 30
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
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TABLE B
The choice of the other participant in my group
M
y
c
h
o
i
c
e
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
0 73.3 68.0 62.7 57.4 52.1 46.9 41.6 36.3 31.1 25.9 20.7 15.5 10.3 5.1 -0.1 -5.2 -10.4 -15.5 -20.7 -25.8 -30.9 -36.0 -41.1 -46.1 -51.2 -56.2 -61.3 -66.3 -71.3 -76.3 -81.3 0
1 80.6 75.4 70.2 65.0 59.8 54.6 49.4 44.2 39.1 33.9 28.8 23.7 18.6 13.5 8.4 3.3 -1.8 -6.8 -11.9 -16.9 -21.9 -26.9 -31.9 -36.9 -41.9 -46.9 -51.8 -56.8 -61.7 -66.6 -71.6 1
2 87.4 82.2 77.1 71.9 66.8 61.7 56.6 51.5 46.5 41.4 36.4 31.3 26.3 21.3 16.3 11.3 6.3 1.3 -3.6 -8.6 -13.5 -18.5 -23.4 -28.3 -33.2 -38.1 -43.0 -47.8 -52.7 -57.5 -62.3 2
3 93.5 88.5 83.4 78.4 73.3 68.3 63.3 58.3 53.3 48.3 43.4 38.4 33.5 28.5 23.6 18.7 13.8 8.9 4.0 -0.8 -5.7 -10.6 -15.4 -20.2 -25.0 -29.8 -34.6 -39.4 -44.2 -48.9 -53.7 3
4 99.2 94.2 89.2 84.3 79.3 74.4 69.4 64.5 59.6 54.7 49.8 45.0 40.1 35.2 30.4 25.6 20.7 15.9 11.1 6.4 1.6 -3.2 -7.9 -12.7 -17.4 -22.1 -26.8 -31.5 -36.2 -40.9 -45.6 4
5 104.3 99.3 94.5 89.6 84.7 79.9 75.0 70.2 65.3 60.5 55.7 50.9 46.2 41.4 36.6 31.9 27.1 22.4 17.7 13.0 8.3 3.6 -1.1 -5.7 -10.4 -15.0 -19.6 -24.2 -28.8 -33.4 -38.0 5
6 108.8 103.9 99.1 94.3 89.6 84.8 80.0 75.3 70.5 65.8 61.1 56.4 51.7 47.0 42.3 37.6 33.0 28.3 23.7 19.1 14.5 9.9 5.3 0.7 -3.9 -8.4 -13.0 -17.5 -22.0 -26.5 -31.0 6
7 112.7 108.0 103.3 98.6 93.8 89.2 84.5 79.8 75.1 70.5 65.9 61.2 56.6 52.0 47.4 42.8 38.3 33.7 29.1 24.6 20.1 15.6 11.1 6.6 2.1 -2.4 -6.9 -11.3 -15.7 -20.2 -24.6 7
8 116.1 111.5 106.8 102.2 97.6 93.0 88.4 83.8 79.2 74.6 70.1 65.5 61.0 56.5 52.0 47.5 43.0 38.5 34.0 29.6 25.1 20.7 16.3 11.9 7.5 3.1 -1.3 -5.7 -10.0 -14.4 -18.7 8
9 119.0 114.4 109.9 105.3 100.8 96.2 91.7 87.2 82.7 78.2 73.8 69.3 64.8 60.4 56.0 51.6 47.2 42.8 38.4 34.0 29.6 25.3 20.9 16.6 12.3 8.0 3.7 -0.6 -4.9 -9.1 -13.4 9
10 121.3 116.8 112.3 107.8 103.4 98.9 94.5 90.1 85.7 81.3 76.9 72.5 68.1 63.8 59.4 55.1 50.8 46.5 42.2 37.9 33.6 29.3 25.1 20.8 16.6 12.3 8.1 3.9 -0.3 -4.4 -8.6 10
11 123.0 118.6 114.2 109.8 105.5 101.1 96.7 92.4 88.1 83.8 79.4 75.1 70.9 66.6 62.3 58.1 53.8 49.6 45.4 41.2 37.0 32.8 28.6 24.4 20.3 16.1 12.0 7.9 3.8 -0.3 -4.4 11
12 124.2 119.9 115.6 111.3 107.0 102.7 98.4 94.2 89.9 85.7 81.5 77.2 73.0 68.8 64.7 60.5 56.3 52.2 48.0 43.9 39.8 35.7 31.6 27.5 23.4 19.4 15.3 11.3 7.3 3.3 -0.8 12
13 124.8 120.6 116.4 112.1 107.9 103.7 99.5 95.4 91.2 87.0 82.9 78.8 74.6 70.5 66.4 62.4 58.3 54.2 50.2 46.1 42.1 38.1 34.0 30.0 26.1 22.1 18.1 14.2 10.2 6.3 2.4 13
14 124.9 120.7 116.6 112.5 108.3 104.2 100.1 96.0 91.9 87.9 83.8 79.7 75.7 71.7 67.7 63.7 59.7 55.7 51.7 47.7 43.8 39.9 35.9 32.0 28.1 24.2 20.3 16.5 12.6 8.7 4.9 14
15 124.4 120.3 116.3 112.2 108.2 104.1 100.1 96.1 92.1 88.1 84.1 80.2 76.2 72.3 68.3 64.4 60.5 56.6 52.7 48.8 45.0 41.1 37.3 33.4 29.6 25.8 22.0 18.2 14.4 10.6 6.9 15
16 123.4 119.4 115.4 111.4 107.5 103.5 99.6 95.6 91.7 87.8 83.9 80.0 76.2 72.3 68.4 64.6 60.8 57.0 53.2 49.4 45.6 41.8 38.0 34.3 30.5 26.8 23.1 19.4 15.7 12.0 8.3 16
17 121.8 117.9 114.0 110.1 106.2 102.3 98.5 94.6 90.8 87.0 83.1 79.3 75.6 71.8 68.0 64.2 60.5 56.8 53.0 49.3 45.6 41.9 38.2 34.6 30.9 27.3 23.6 20.0 16.4 12.8 9.2 17
18 119.6 115.8 112.0 108.2 104.4 100.6 96.8 93.0 89.3 85.5 81.8 78.1 74.4 70.7 67.0 63.3 59.7 56.0 52.4 48.7 45.1 41.5 37.9 34.3 30.7 27.2 23.6 20.1 16.5 13.0 9.5 18
19 116.9 113.2 109.4 105.7 102.0 98.3 94.6 90.9 87.2 83.6 79.9 76.3 72.7 69.1 65.4 61.9 58.3 54.7 51.1 47.6 44.1 40.5 37.0 33.5 30.0 26.5 23.1 19.6 16.1 12.7 9.3 19
20 113.6 110.0 106.3 102.7 99.0 95.4 91.8 88.2 84.6 81.1 77.5 73.9 70.4 66.9 63.3 59.8 56.3 52.8 49.4 45.9 42.4 39.0 35.6 32.1 28.7 25.3 21.9 18.6 15.2 11.8 8.5 20
21 109.8 106.2 102.7 99.1 95.6 92.0 88.5 85.0 81.5 78.0 74.5 71.0 67.6 64.1 60.7 57.2 53.8 50.4 47.0 43.6 40.3 36.9 33.6 30.2 26.9 23.6 20.3 17.0 13.7 10.4 7.1 21
22 105.4 101.9 98.5 95.0 91.5 88.1 84.6 81.2 77.8 74.3 70.9 67.6 64.2 60.8 57.4 54.1 50.8 47.4 44.1 40.8 37.5 34.3 31.0 27.7 24.5 21.3 18.0 14.8 11.6 8.4 5.2 22
23 100.5 97.1 93.7 90.3 86.9 83.5 80.2 76.8 73.5 70.1 66.8 63.5 60.2 56.9 53.7 50.4 47.2 43.9 40.7 37.5 34.3 31.1 27.9 24.7 21.5 18.4 15.2 12.1 9.0 5.9 2.8 23
24 95.0 91.7 88.4 85.0 81.7 78.5 75.2 71.9 68.6 65.4 62.2 58.9 55.7 52.5 49.3 46.2 43.0 39.8 36.7 33.5 30.4 27.3 24.2 21.1 18.0 15.0 11.9 8.8 5.8 2.8 -0.2 24
25 89.0 85.7 82.5 79.2 76.0 72.8 69.6 66.4 63.3 60.1 56.9 53.8 50.7 47.6 44.4 41.3 38.3 35.2 32.1 29.1 26.0 23.0 20.0 17.0 14.0 11.0 8.0 5.0 2.1 -0.9 -3.8 25
26 82.4 79.2 76.0 72.9 69.8 66.6 63.5 60.4 57.3 54.2 51.2 48.1 45.1 42.0 39.0 36.0 33.0 30.0 27.0 24.0 21.1 18.1 15.2 12.3 9.3 6.4 3.5 0.7 -2.2 -5.1 -7.9 26
27 75.2 72.1 69.0 66.0 62.9 59.9 56.9 53.8 50.8 47.8 44.8 41.9 38.9 35.9 33.0 30.1 27.1 24.2 21.3 18.4 15.6 12.7 9.8 7.0 4.2 1.3 -1.5 -4.3 -7.1 -9.8 -12.6 27
28 67.5 64.5 61.5 58.5 55.5 52.6 49.6 46.7 43.8 40.9 37.9 35.1 32.2 29.3 26.4 23.6 20.7 17.9 15.1 12.3 9.5 6.7 3.9 1.2 -1.6 -4.3 -7.0 -9.8 -12.5 -15.2 -17.9 28
29 59.2 56.3 53.4 50.5 47.6 44.7 41.9 39.0 36.2 33.3 30.5 27.7 24.9 22.1 19.3 16.6 13.8 11.0 8.3 5.6 2.9 0.2 -2.5 -5.2 -7.9 -10.5 -13.2 -15.8 -18.4 -21.0 -23.6 29
30 50.4 47.6 44.7 41.9 39.1 36.3 33.5 30.8 28.0 25.2 22.5 19.8 17.1 14.3 11.6 9.0 6.3 3.6 1.0 -1.7 -4.3 -6.9 -9.5 -12.1 -14.7 -17.3 -19.9 -22.4 -24.9 -27.5 -30.0 30
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
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TABLE A
The choice of the other participant in my group
M
y
c
h
o
i
c
e
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
0 -30.0 -27.5 -24.9 -22.4 -19.9 -17.3 -14.7 -12.1 -9.5 -6.9 -4.3 -1.7 1.0 3.6 6.3 9.0 11.6 14.3 17.1 19.8 22.5 25.2 28.0 30.8 33.5 36.3 39.1 41.9 44.7 47.6 50.4 0
1 -23.9 -21.5 -19.0 -16.5 -14.1 -11.6 -9.1 -6.6 -4.1 -1.6 1.0 3.5 6.1 8.7 11.2 13.8 16.4 19.0 21.7 24.3 27.0 29.6 32.3 35.0 37.7 40.4 43.1 45.8 48.5 51.3 54.0 1
2 -18.3 -16.0 -13.6 -11.2 -8.9 -6.5 -4.0 -1.6 0.8 3.3 5.7 8.2 10.7 13.1 15.6 18.1 20.7 23.2 25.7 28.3 30.9 33.4 36.0 38.6 41.2 43.8 46.5 49.1 51.8 54.4 57.1 2
3 -13.3 -11.1 -8.8 -6.5 -4.2 -1.9 0.5 2.8 5.1 7.5 9.9 12.3 14.7 17.1 19.5 21.9 24.3 26.8 29.3 31.7 34.2 36.7 39.2 41.7 44.2 46.8 49.3 51.9 54.5 57.0 59.6 3
4 -8.9 -6.7 -4.5 -2.3 -0.1 2.2 4.4 6.7 8.9 11.2 13.5 15.8 18.1 20.4 22.8 25.1 27.5 29.8 32.2 34.6 37.0 39.4 41.8 44.3 46.7 49.2 51.6 54.1 56.6 59.1 61.6 4
5 -5.0 -2.9 -0.8 1.3 3.5 5.6 7.8 10.0 12.1 14.3 16.6 18.8 21.0 23.2 25.5 27.8 30.0 32.3 34.6 36.9 39.2 41.6 43.9 46.2 48.6 51.0 53.4 55.8 58.2 60.6 63.0 5
6 -1.7 0.3 2.4 4.4 6.5 8.5 10.6 12.7 14.8 16.9 19.1 21.2 23.3 25.5 27.7 29.8 32.0 34.2 36.4 38.7 40.9 43.1 45.4 47.7 50.0 52.2 54.5 56.9 59.2 61.5 63.9 6
7 1.1 3.0 5.0 6.9 8.9 10.9 12.9 14.9 16.9 19.0 21.0 23.1 25.1 27.2 29.3 31.4 33.5 35.6 37.7 39.9 42.0 44.2 46.4 48.5 50.7 52.9 55.2 57.4 59.6 61.9 64.1 7
8 3.3 5.1 7.0 8.9 10.8 12.7 14.6 16.5 18.5 20.4 22.4 24.4 26.3 28.3 30.3 32.4 34.4 36.4 38.5 40.5 42.6 44.7 46.8 48.9 51.0 53.1 55.2 57.4 59.5 61.7 63.9 8
9 4.9 6.7 8.5 10.3 12.1 13.9 15.8 17.6 19.5 21.3 23.2 25.1 27.0 28.9 30.8 32.8 34.7 36.7 38.6 40.6 42.6 44.6 46.6 48.6 50.7 52.7 54.8 56.8 58.9 61.0 63.1 9
10 6.0 7.7 9.5 11.2 12.9 14.6 16.4 18.1 19.9 21.7 23.5 25.3 27.1 28.9 30.8 32.6 34.5 36.4 38.3 40.1 42.1 44.0 45.9 47.8 49.8 51.7 53.7 55.7 57.7 59.7 61.7 10
11 6.6 8.2 9.8 11.5 13.1 14.8 16.4 18.1 19.8 21.5 23.2 24.9 26.7 28.4 30.2 31.9 33.7 35.5 37.3 39.1 40.9 42.8 44.6 46.5 48.3 50.2 52.1 54.0 55.9 57.8 59.8 11
12 6.6 8.1 9.7 11.2 12.8 14.4 15.9 17.5 19.1 20.8 22.4 24.0 25.7 27.3 29.0 30.7 32.4 34.1 35.8 37.5 39.3 41.0 42.8 44.6 46.4 48.2 50.0 51.8 53.6 55.4 57.3 12
13 6.0 7.5 8.9 10.4 11.9 13.4 14.9 16.4 17.9 19.5 21.0 22.6 24.1 25.7 27.3 28.9 30.5 32.1 33.8 35.4 37.1 38.7 40.4 42.1 43.8 45.5 47.2 49.0 50.7 52.5 54.2 13
14 4.9 6.3 7.6 9.0 10.4 11.8 13.3 14.7 16.1 17.6 19.1 20.5 22.0 23.5 25.0 26.5 28.1 29.6 31.2 32.7 34.3 35.9 37.5 39.1 40.7 42.3 44.0 45.6 47.3 49.0 50.7 14
15 3.2 4.5 5.8 7.1 8.4 9.7 11.1 12.4 13.8 15.2 16.6 17.9 19.3 20.8 22.2 23.6 25.1 26.5 28.0 29.5 31.0 32.5 34.0 35.5 37.1 38.6 40.2 41.7 43.3 44.9 46.5 15
16 1.0 2.2 3.4 4.6 5.9 7.1 8.4 9.6 10.9 12.2 13.5 14.8 16.1 17.5 18.8 20.2 21.5 22.9 24.3 25.7 27.1 28.5 29.9 31.4 32.8 34.3 35.8 37.3 38.8 40.3 41.8 16
17 -1.8 -0.7 0.4 1.6 2.7 3.9 5.1 6.3 7.5 8.7 9.9 11.1 12.3 13.6 14.9 16.1 17.4 18.7 20.0 21.3 22.7 24.0 25.3 26.7 28.1 29.5 30.8 32.3 33.7 35.1 36.5 17
18 -5.1 -4.1 -3.1 -2.0 -0.9 0.1 1.2 2.3 3.4 4.6 5.7 6.9 8.0 9.2 10.4 11.5 12.7 14.0 15.2 16.4 17.7 18.9 20.2 21.5 22.7 24.0 25.4 26.7 28.0 29.4 30.7 18
19 -9.0 -8.1 -7.1 -6.2 -5.2 -4.2 -3.2 -2.1 -1.1 -0.1 1.0 2.0 3.1 4.2 5.3 6.4 7.5 8.7 9.8 10.9 12.1 13.3 14.5 15.7 16.9 18.1 19.3 20.5 21.8 23.1 24.3 19
20 -13.5 -12.6 -11.7 -10.9 -10.0 -9.0 -8.1 -7.2 -6.2 -5.3 -4.3 -3.3 -2.3 -1.3 -0.3 0.7 1.7 2.8 3.9 4.9 6.0 7.1 8.2 9.3 10.4 11.6 12.7 13.9 15.0 16.2 17.4 20
21 -18.5 -17.7 -16.9 -16.1 -15.3 -14.5 -13.6 -12.8 -11.9 -11.0 -10.1 -9.2 -8.3 -7.4 -6.5 -5.5 -4.6 -3.6 -2.6 -1.7 -0.7 0.3 1.4 2.4 3.4 4.5 5.6 6.6 7.7 8.8 9.9 21
22 -24.1 -23.4 -22.7 -21.9 -21.2 -20.4 -19.7 -18.9 -18.1 -17.3 -16.5 -15.7 -14.9 -14.1 -13.2 -12.3 -11.5 -10.6 -9.7 -8.8 -7.9 -7.0 -6.0 -5.1 -4.1 -3.1 -2.2 -1.2 -0.2 0.8 1.9 22
23 -30.2 -29.6 -29.0 -28.3 -27.6 -27.0 -26.3 -25.6 -24.9 -24.2 -23.5 -22.7 -22.0 -21.3 -20.5 -19.7 -18.9 -18.1 -17.3 -16.5 -15.7 -14.8 -14.0 -13.1 -12.2 -11.3 -10.4 -9.5 -8.6 -7.7 -6.7 23
24 -36.9 -36.3 -35.8 -35.2 -34.7 -34.1 -33.5 -32.9 -32.3 -31.6 -31.0 -30.3 -29.7 -29.0 -28.3 -27.6 -26.9 -26.2 -25.5 -24.7 -24.0 -23.2 -22.5 -21.7 -20.9 -20.1 -19.3 -18.4 -17.6 -16.7 -15.9 24
25 -44.1 -43.7 -43.2 -42.7 -42.2 -41.7 -41.2 -40.7 -40.2 -39.6 -39.1 -38.5 -37.9 -37.3 -36.7 -36.1 -35.5 -34.8 -34.2 -33.5 -32.9 -32.2 -31.5 -30.8 -30.1 -29.4 -28.6 -27.9 -27.1 -26.4 -25.6 25
26 -51.9 -51.5 -51.2 -50.8 -50.4 -49.9 -49.5 -49.1 -48.6 -48.1 -47.7 -47.2 -46.7 -46.2 -45.7 -45.1 -44.6 -44.0 -43.5 -42.9 -42.3 -41.7 -41.1 -40.5 -39.9 -39.2 -38.6 -37.9 -37.2 -36.6 -35.9 26
27 -60.3 -60.0 -59.7 -59.4 -59.0 -58.7 -58.3 -58.0 -57.6 -57.2 -56.8 -56.4 -56.0 -55.6 -55.2 -54.7 -54.3 -53.8 -53.3 -52.8 -52.3 -51.8 -51.3 -50.7 -50.2 -49.6 -49.1 -48.5 -47.9 -47.3 -46.7 27
28 -69.2 -69.0 -68.7 -68.5 -68.3 -68.0 -67.7 -67.5 -67.2 -66.9 -66.6 -66.3 -65.9 -65.6 -65.2 -64.9 -64.5 -64.1 -63.7 -63.3 -62.9 -62.4 -62.0 -61.5 -61.1 -60.6 -60.1 -59.6 -59.1 -58.6 -58.1 28
29 -78.6 -78.5 -78.4 -78.2 -78.1 -77.9 -77.7 -77.5 -77.3 -77.1 -76.9 -76.6 -76.4 -76.1 -75.8 -75.6 -75.3 -75.0 -74.6 -74.3 -74.0 -73.6 -73.3 -72.9 -72.5 -72.1 -71.7 -71.3 -70.9 -70.5 -70.0 29
30 -88.7 -88.6 -88.5 -88.5 -88.4 -88.3 -88.2 -88.1 -88.0 -87.8 -87.7 -87.5 -87.4 -87.2 -87.0 -86.8 -86.6 -86.4 -86.1 -85.9 -85.7 -85.4 -85.1 -84.8 -84.5 -84.2 -83.9 -83.6 -83.2 -82.9 -82.5 30
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
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TABLE B
The choice of the other participant in my group
M
y
c
h
o
i
c
e
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
0 -30.0 -27.5 -24.9 -22.4 -19.9 -17.3 -14.7 -12.1 -9.5 -6.9 -4.3 -1.7 1.0 3.6 6.3 9.0 11.6 14.3 17.1 19.8 22.5 25.2 28.0 30.8 33.5 36.3 39.1 41.9 44.7 47.6 50.4 0
1 -21.7 -19.3 -16.8 -14.4 -11.9 -9.4 -6.9 -4.4 -1.9 0.6 3.2 5.7 8.3 10.8 13.4 16.0 18.6 21.2 23.8 26.5 29.1 31.8 34.5 37.1 39.8 42.5 45.2 48.0 50.7 53.4 56.2 1
2 -14.0 -11.6 -9.3 -6.9 -4.5 -2.1 0.3 2.7 5.1 7.6 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0 22.5 25.0 27.5 30.1 32.6 35.2 37.8 40.4 43.0 45.6 48.2 50.8 53.5 56.1 58.8 61.4 2
3 -6.8 -4.6 -2.3 0.0 2.3 4.6 7.0 9.3 11.7 14.0 16.4 18.8 21.2 23.6 26.0 28.4 30.9 33.3 35.8 38.2 40.7 43.2 45.7 48.2 50.8 53.3 55.8 58.4 61.0 63.5 66.1 3
4 -0.2 2.0 4.2 6.4 8.6 10.8 13.1 15.3 17.6 19.9 22.2 24.5 26.8 29.1 31.4 33.8 36.1 38.5 40.9 43.3 45.7 48.1 50.5 52.9 55.4 57.8 60.3 62.8 65.3 67.8 70.3 4
5 5.8 7.9 10.1 12.2 14.3 16.5 18.6 20.8 23.0 25.2 27.4 29.6 31.8 34.1 36.3 38.6 40.9 43.2 45.5 47.8 50.1 52.4 54.7 57.1 59.5 61.8 64.2 66.6 69.0 71.4 73.8 5
6 11.3 13.3 15.4 17.4 19.5 21.6 23.6 25.7 27.8 29.9 32.1 34.2 36.4 38.5 40.7 42.9 45.0 47.3 49.5 51.7 53.9 56.2 58.4 60.7 63.0 65.3 67.6 69.9 72.2 74.5 76.9 6
7 16.3 18.2 20.2 22.1 24.1 26.1 28.1 30.1 32.1 34.1 36.2 38.2 40.3 42.4 44.5 46.6 48.7 50.8 52.9 55.1 57.2 59.4 61.5 63.7 65.9 68.1 70.4 72.6 74.8 77.1 79.3 7
8 20.6 22.5 24.4 26.3 28.2 30.1 32.0 33.9 35.8 37.8 39.7 41.7 43.7 45.7 47.7 49.7 51.7 53.8 55.8 57.9 59.9 62.0 64.1 66.2 68.3 70.5 72.6 74.7 76.9 79.1 81.2 8
9 24.5 26.3 28.0 29.8 31.7 33.5 35.3 37.2 39.0 40.9 42.8 44.6 46.5 48.4 50.4 52.3 54.2 56.2 58.2 60.1 62.1 64.1 66.1 68.2 70.2 72.2 74.3 76.3 78.4 80.5 82.6 9
10 27.7 29.4 31.2 32.9 34.6 36.3 38.1 39.8 41.6 43.4 45.2 47.0 48.8 50.6 52.5 54.3 56.2 58.1 60.0 61.8 63.7 65.7 67.6 69.5 71.5 73.4 75.4 77.4 79.4 81.4 83.4 10
11 30.5 32.1 33.7 35.3 37.0 38.6 40.3 42.0 43.7 45.4 47.1 48.8 50.5 52.3 54.0 55.8 57.6 59.4 61.2 63.0 64.8 66.6 68.5 70.3 72.2 74.1 76.0 77.9 79.8 81.7 83.6 11
12 32.6 34.2 35.7 37.3 38.8 40.4 42.0 43.6 45.2 46.8 48.4 50.1 51.7 53.4 55.1 56.7 58.4 60.1 61.9 63.6 65.3 67.1 68.8 70.6 72.4 74.2 76.0 77.8 79.6 81.5 83.3 12
13 34.2 35.7 37.1 38.6 40.1 41.6 43.1 44.6 46.1 47.7 49.2 50.8 52.3 53.9 55.5 57.1 58.7 60.3 62.0 63.6 65.3 66.9 68.6 70.3 72.0 73.7 75.5 77.2 78.9 80.7 82.5 13
14 35.3 36.6 38.0 39.4 40.8 42.2 43.6 45.1 46.5 48.0 49.4 50.9 52.4 53.9 55.4 56.9 58.4 60.0 61.5 63.1 64.7 66.3 67.9 69.5 71.1 72.7 74.4 76.0 77.7 79.3 81.0 14
15 35.8 37.1 38.4 39.7 41.0 42.3 43.6 45.0 46.3 47.7 49.1 50.5 51.9 53.3 54.7 56.2 57.6 59.1 60.6 62.0 63.5 65.0 66.5 68.1 69.6 71.1 72.7 74.3 75.9 77.4 79.0 15
16 35.7 36.9 38.1 39.3 40.6 41.8 43.1 44.3 45.6 46.9 48.2 49.5 50.8 52.2 53.5 54.9 56.2 57.6 59.0 60.4 61.8 63.2 64.7 66.1 67.6 69.0 70.5 72.0 73.5 75.0 76.5 16
17 35.1 36.2 37.3 38.5 39.6 40.8 42.0 43.1 44.3 45.5 46.8 48.0 49.2 50.5 51.7 53.0 54.3 55.6 56.9 58.2 59.5 60.9 62.2 63.6 65.0 66.3 67.7 69.1 70.6 72.0 73.4 17
18 33.9 35.0 36.0 37.1 38.1 39.2 40.3 41.4 42.5 43.6 44.8 45.9 47.1 48.2 49.4 50.6 51.8 53.0 54.2 55.5 56.7 58.0 59.2 60.5 61.8 63.1 64.4 65.7 67.1 68.4 69.8 18
19 32.2 33.1 34.1 35.1 36.1 37.1 38.1 39.1 40.1 41.2 42.2 43.3 44.3 45.4 46.5 47.6 48.8 49.9 51.0 52.2 53.3 54.5 55.7 56.9 58.1 59.3 60.5 61.8 63.0 64.3 65.6 19
20 29.9 30.8 31.7 32.5 33.4 34.4 35.3 36.2 37.2 38.1 39.1 40.1 41.1 42.1 43.1 44.1 45.1 46.2 47.3 48.3 49.4 50.5 51.6 52.7 53.8 55.0 56.1 57.3 58.4 59.6 60.8 20
21 27.1 27.8 28.6 29.5 30.3 31.1 31.9 32.8 33.7 34.5 35.4 36.3 37.2 38.2 39.1 40.0 41.0 41.9 42.9 43.9 44.9 45.9 46.9 48.0 49.0 50.1 51.1 52.2 53.3 54.4 55.5 21
22 23.7 24.4 25.1 25.8 26.5 27.3 28.1 28.8 29.6 30.4 31.2 32.0 32.8 33.7 34.5 35.4 36.3 37.1 38.0 38.9 39.9 40.8 41.7 42.7 43.6 44.6 45.6 46.6 47.6 48.6 49.6 22
23 19.7 20.3 21.0 21.6 22.3 22.9 23.6 24.3 25.0 25.7 26.4 27.2 27.9 28.7 29.4 30.2 31.0 31.8 32.6 33.4 34.3 35.1 35.9 36.8 37.7 38.6 39.5 40.4 41.3 42.2 43.2 23
24 15.2 15.7 16.3 16.8 17.4 18.0 18.6 19.2 19.8 20.5 21.1 21.7 22.4 23.1 23.8 24.5 25.2 25.9 26.6 27.3 28.1 28.9 29.6 30.4 31.2 32.0 32.8 33.6 34.5 35.3 36.2 24
25 10.1 10.6 11.0 11.5 12.0 12.5 13.0 13.6 14.1 14.6 15.2 15.8 16.3 16.9 17.5 18.1 18.8 19.4 20.0 20.7 21.4 22.1 22.7 23.4 24.2 24.9 25.6 26.3 27.1 27.9 28.6 25
26 4.5 4.9 5.3 5.7 6.1 6.5 6.9 7.4 7.8 8.3 8.7 9.2 9.7 10.2 10.8 11.3 11.8 12.4 12.9 13.5 14.1 14.7 15.3 15.9 16.5 17.2 17.8 18.5 19.2 19.9 20.5 26
27 -1.7 -1.4 -1.1 -0.8 -0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.9 4.3 4.8 5.3 5.8 6.3 6.8 7.3 7.8 8.4 8.9 9.5 10.1 10.7 11.3 11.9 27
28 -8.4 -8.2 -8.0 -7.8 -7.5 -7.3 -7.0 -6.7 -6.4 -6.1 -5.8 -5.5 -5.2 -4.8 -4.5 -4.1 -3.7 -3.3 -2.9 -2.5 -2.1 -1.7 -1.2 -0.8 -0.3 0.1 0.6 1.1 1.6 2.2 2.7 28
29 -15.7 -15.6 -15.4 -15.3 -15.1 -15.0 -14.8 -14.6 -14.4 -14.2 -13.9 -13.7 -13.4 -13.2 -12.9 -12.6 -12.3 -12.0 -11.7 -11.4 -11.1 -10.7 -10.3 -10.0 -9.6 -9.2 -8.8 -8.4 -8.0 -7.5 -7.1 29
30 -23.6 -23.5 -23.5 -23.4 -23.3 -23.2 -23.1 -23.0 -22.9 -22.7 -22.6 -22.4 -22.3 -22.1 -21.9 -21.7 -21.5 -21.3 -21.1 -20.8 -20.6 -20.3 -20.0 -19.7 -19.4 -19.1 -18.8 -18.5 -18.1 -17.8 -17.4 30
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
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TABLE A
The choice of the other participant in my group
M
y
c
h
o
i
c
e
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
0 -82.5 -82.9 -83.2 -83.6 -83.9 -84.2 -84.5 -84.8 -85.1 -85.4 -85.7 -85.9 -86.1 -86.4 -86.6 -86.8 -87.0 -87.2 -87.4 -87.5 -87.7 -87.8 -88.0 -88.1 -88.2 -88.3 -88.4 -88.5 -88.5 -88.6 -88.7 0
1 -70.0 -70.5 -70.9 -71.3 -71.7 -72.1 -72.5 -72.9 -73.3 -73.6 -74.0 -74.3 -74.6 -75.0 -75.3 -75.6 -75.8 -76.1 -76.4 -76.6 -76.9 -77.1 -77.3 -77.5 -77.7 -77.9 -78.1 -78.2 -78.4 -78.5 -78.6 1
2 -58.1 -58.6 -59.1 -59.6 -60.1 -60.6 -61.1 -61.5 -62.0 -62.4 -62.9 -63.3 -63.7 -64.1 -64.5 -64.9 -65.2 -65.6 -65.9 -66.3 -66.6 -66.9 -67.2 -67.5 -67.7 -68.0 -68.3 -68.5 -68.7 -69.0 -69.2 2
3 -46.7 -47.3 -47.9 -48.5 -49.1 -49.6 -50.2 -50.7 -51.3 -51.8 -52.3 -52.8 -53.3 -53.8 -54.3 -54.7 -55.2 -55.6 -56.0 -56.4 -56.8 -57.2 -57.6 -58.0 -58.3 -58.7 -59.0 -59.4 -59.7 -60.0 -60.3 3
4 -35.9 -36.6 -37.2 -37.9 -38.6 -39.2 -39.9 -40.5 -41.1 -41.7 -42.3 -42.9 -43.5 -44.0 -44.6 -45.1 -45.7 -46.2 -46.7 -47.2 -47.7 -48.1 -48.6 -49.1 -49.5 -49.9 -50.4 -50.8 -51.2 -51.5 -51.9 4
5 -25.6 -26.4 -27.1 -27.9 -28.6 -29.4 -30.1 -30.8 -31.5 -32.2 -32.9 -33.5 -34.2 -34.8 -35.5 -36.1 -36.7 -37.3 -37.9 -38.5 -39.1 -39.6 -40.2 -40.7 -41.2 -41.7 -42.2 -42.7 -43.2 -43.7 -44.1 5
6 -15.9 -16.7 -17.6 -18.4 -19.3 -20.1 -20.9 -21.7 -22.5 -23.2 -24.0 -24.7 -25.5 -26.2 -26.9 -27.6 -28.3 -29.0 -29.7 -30.3 -31.0 -31.6 -32.3 -32.9 -33.5 -34.1 -34.7 -35.2 -35.8 -36.3 -36.9 6
7 -6.7 -7.7 -8.6 -9.5 -10.4 -11.3 -12.2 -13.1 -14.0 -14.8 -15.7 -16.5 -17.3 -18.1 -18.9 -19.7 -20.5 -21.3 -22.0 -22.7 -23.5 -24.2 -24.9 -25.6 -26.3 -27.0 -27.6 -28.3 -29.0 -29.6 -30.2 7
8 1.9 0.8 -0.2 -1.2 -2.2 -3.1 -4.1 -5.1 -6.0 -7.0 -7.9 -8.8 -9.7 -10.6 -11.5 -12.3 -13.2 -14.1 -14.9 -15.7 -16.5 -17.3 -18.1 -18.9 -19.7 -20.4 -21.2 -21.9 -22.7 -23.4 -24.1 8
9 9.9 8.8 7.7 6.6 5.6 4.5 3.4 2.4 1.4 0.3 -0.7 -1.7 -2.6 -3.6 -4.6 -5.5 -6.5 -7.4 -8.3 -9.2 -10.1 -11.0 -11.9 -12.8 -13.6 -14.5 -15.3 -16.1 -16.9 -17.7 -18.5 9
10 17.4 16.2 15.0 13.9 12.7 11.6 10.4 9.3 8.2 7.1 6.0 4.9 3.9 2.8 1.7 0.7 -0.3 -1.3 -2.3 -3.3 -4.3 -5.3 -6.2 -7.2 -8.1 -9.0 -10.0 -10.9 -11.7 -12.6 -13.5 10
11 24.3 23.1 21.8 20.5 19.3 18.1 16.9 15.7 14.5 13.3 12.1 10.9 9.8 8.7 7.5 6.4 5.3 4.2 3.1 2.0 1.0 -0.1 -1.1 -2.1 -3.2 -4.2 -5.2 -6.2 -7.1 -8.1 -9.0 11
12 30.7 29.4 28.0 26.7 25.4 24.0 22.7 21.5 20.2 18.9 17.7 16.4 15.2 14.0 12.7 11.5 10.4 9.2 8.0 6.9 5.7 4.6 3.4 2.3 1.2 0.1 -0.9 -2.0 -3.1 -4.1 -5.1 12
13 36.5 35.1 33.7 32.3 30.8 29.5 28.1 26.7 25.3 24.0 22.7 21.3 20.0 18.7 17.4 16.1 14.9 13.6 12.3 11.1 9.9 8.7 7.5 6.3 5.1 3.9 2.7 1.6 0.4 -0.7 -1.8 13
14 41.8 40.3 38.8 37.3 35.8 34.3 32.8 31.4 29.9 28.5 27.1 25.7 24.3 22.9 21.5 20.2 18.8 17.5 16.1 14.8 13.5 12.2 10.9 9.6 8.4 7.1 5.9 4.6 3.4 2.2 1.0 14
15 46.5 44.9 43.3 41.7 40.2 38.6 37.1 35.5 34.0 32.5 31.0 29.5 28.0 26.5 25.1 23.6 22.2 20.8 19.3 17.9 16.6 15.2 13.8 12.4 11.1 9.7 8.4 7.1 5.8 4.5 3.2 15
16 50.7 49.0 47.3 45.6 44.0 42.3 40.7 39.1 37.5 35.9 34.3 32.7 31.2 29.6 28.1 26.5 25.0 23.5 22.0 20.5 19.1 17.6 16.1 14.7 13.3 11.8 10.4 9.0 7.6 6.3 4.9 16
17 54.2 52.5 50.7 49.0 47.2 45.5 43.8 42.1 40.4 38.7 37.1 35.4 33.8 32.1 30.5 28.9 27.3 25.7 24.1 22.6 21.0 19.5 17.9 16.4 14.9 13.4 11.9 10.4 8.9 7.5 6.0 17
18 57.3 55.4 53.6 51.8 50.0 48.2 46.4 44.6 42.8 41.0 39.3 37.5 35.8 34.1 32.4 30.7 29.0 27.3 25.7 24.0 22.4 20.8 19.1 17.5 15.9 14.4 12.8 11.2 9.7 8.1 6.6 18
19 59.8 57.8 55.9 54.0 52.1 50.2 48.3 46.5 44.6 42.8 40.9 39.1 37.3 35.5 33.7 31.9 30.2 28.4 26.7 24.9 23.2 21.5 19.8 18.1 16.4 14.8 13.1 11.5 9.8 8.2 6.6 19
20 61.7 59.7 57.7 55.7 53.7 51.7 49.8 47.8 45.9 44.0 42.1 40.1 38.3 36.4 34.5 32.6 30.8 28.9 27.1 25.3 23.5 21.7 19.9 18.1 16.4 14.6 12.9 11.2 9.5 7.7 6.0 20
21 63.1 61.0 58.9 56.8 54.8 52.7 50.7 48.6 46.6 44.6 42.6 40.6 38.6 36.7 34.7 32.8 30.8 28.9 27.0 25.1 23.2 21.3 19.5 17.6 15.8 13.9 12.1 10.3 8.5 6.7 4.9 21
22 63.9 61.7 59.5 57.4 55.2 53.1 51.0 48.9 46.8 44.7 42.6 40.5 38.5 36.4 34.4 32.4 30.3 28.3 26.3 24.4 22.4 20.4 18.5 16.5 14.6 12.7 10.8 8.9 7.0 5.1 3.3 22
23 64.1 61.9 59.6 57.4 55.2 52.9 50.7 48.5 46.4 44.2 42.0 39.9 37.7 35.6 33.5 31.4 29.3 27.2 25.1 23.1 21.0 19.0 16.9 14.9 12.9 10.9 8.9 6.9 5.0 3.0 1.1 23
24 63.9 61.5 59.2 56.9 54.5 52.2 50.0 47.7 45.4 43.1 40.9 38.7 36.4 34.2 32.0 29.8 27.7 25.5 23.3 21.2 19.1 16.9 14.8 12.7 10.6 8.5 6.5 4.4 2.4 0.3 -1.7 24
25 63.0 60.6 58.2 55.8 53.4 51.0 48.6 46.2 43.9 41.6 39.2 36.9 34.6 32.3 30.0 27.8 25.5 23.2 21.0 18.8 16.6 14.3 12.1 10.0 7.8 5.6 3.5 1.3 -0.8 -2.9 -5.0 25
26 61.6 59.1 56.6 54.1 51.6 49.2 46.7 44.3 41.8 39.4 37.0 34.6 32.2 29.8 27.5 25.1 22.8 20.4 18.1 15.8 13.5 11.2 8.9 6.7 4.4 2.2 -0.1 -2.3 -4.5 -6.7 -8.9 26
27 59.6 57.0 54.5 51.9 49.3 46.8 44.2 41.7 39.2 36.7 34.2 31.7 29.3 26.8 24.3 21.9 19.5 17.1 14.7 12.3 9.9 7.5 5.1 2.8 0.5 -1.9 -4.2 -6.5 -8.8 -11.1 -13.3 27
28 57.1 54.4 51.8 49.1 46.5 43.8 41.2 38.6 36.0 33.4 30.9 28.3 25.7 23.2 20.7 18.1 15.6 13.1 10.7 8.2 5.7 3.3 0.8 -1.6 -4.0 -6.5 -8.9 -11.2 -13.6 -16.0 -18.3 28
29 54.0 51.3 48.5 45.8 43.1 40.4 37.7 35.0 32.3 29.6 27.0 24.3 21.7 19.0 16.4 13.8 11.2 8.7 6.1 3.5 1.0 -1.6 -4.1 -6.6 -9.1 -11.6 -14.1 -16.5 -19.0 -21.5 -23.9 29
30 50.4 47.6 44.7 41.9 39.1 36.3 33.5 30.8 28.0 25.2 22.5 19.8 17.1 14.3 11.6 9.0 6.3 3.6 1.0 -1.7 -4.3 -6.9 -9.5 -12.1 -14.7 -17.3 -19.9 -22.4 -24.9 -27.5 -30.0 30
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
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TABLE B
The choice of the other participant in my group
M
y
c
h
o
i
c
e
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
0 -17.4 -17.8 -18.1 -18.5 -18.8 -19.1 -19.4 -19.7 -20.0 -20.3 -20.6 -20.8 -21.1 -21.3 -21.5 -21.7 -21.9 -22.1 -22.3 -22.4 -22.6 -22.7 -22.9 -23.0 -23.1 -23.2 -23.3 -23.4 -23.5 -23.5 -23.6 0
1 -7.1 -7.5 -8.0 -8.4 -8.8 -9.2 -9.6 -10.0 -10.3 -10.7 -11.1 -11.4 -11.7 -12.0 -12.3 -12.6 -12.9 -13.2 -13.4 -13.7 -13.9 -14.2 -14.4 -14.6 -14.8 -15.0 -15.1 -15.3 -15.4 -15.6 -15.7 1
2 2.7 2.2 1.6 1.1 0.6 0.1 -0.3 -0.8 -1.2 -1.7 -2.1 -2.5 -2.9 -3.3 -3.7 -4.1 -4.5 -4.8 -5.2 -5.5 -5.8 -6.1 -6.4 -6.7 -7.0 -7.3 -7.5 -7.8 -8.0 -8.2 -8.4 2
3 11.9 11.3 10.7 10.1 9.5 8.9 8.4 7.8 7.3 6.8 6.3 5.8 5.3 4.8 4.3 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.0 0.6 0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.8 -1.1 -1.4 -1.7 3
4 20.5 19.9 19.2 18.5 17.8 17.2 16.5 15.9 15.3 14.7 14.1 13.5 12.9 12.4 11.8 11.3 10.8 10.2 9.7 9.2 8.7 8.3 7.8 7.4 6.9 6.5 6.1 5.7 5.3 4.9 4.5 4
5 28.6 27.9 27.1 26.3 25.6 24.9 24.2 23.4 22.7 22.1 21.4 20.7 20.0 19.4 18.8 18.1 17.5 16.9 16.3 15.8 15.2 14.6 14.1 13.6 13.0 12.5 12.0 11.5 11.0 10.6 10.1 5
6 36.2 35.3 34.5 33.6 32.8 32.0 31.2 30.4 29.6 28.9 28.1 27.3 26.6 25.9 25.2 24.5 23.8 23.1 22.4 21.7 21.1 20.5 19.8 19.2 18.6 18.0 17.4 16.8 16.3 15.7 15.2 6
7 43.2 42.2 41.3 40.4 39.5 38.6 37.7 36.8 35.9 35.1 34.3 33.4 32.6 31.8 31.0 30.2 29.4 28.7 27.9 27.2 26.4 25.7 25.0 24.3 23.6 22.9 22.3 21.6 21.0 20.3 19.7 7
8 49.6 48.6 47.6 46.6 45.6 44.6 43.6 42.7 41.7 40.8 39.9 38.9 38.0 37.1 36.3 35.4 34.5 33.7 32.8 32.0 31.2 30.4 29.6 28.8 28.1 27.3 26.5 25.8 25.1 24.4 23.7 8
9 55.5 54.4 53.3 52.2 51.1 50.1 49.0 48.0 46.9 45.9 44.9 43.9 42.9 41.9 41.0 40.0 39.1 38.2 37.2 36.3 35.4 34.5 33.7 32.8 31.9 31.1 30.3 29.5 28.6 27.8 27.1 9
10 60.8 59.6 58.4 57.3 56.1 55.0 53.8 52.7 51.6 50.5 49.4 48.3 47.3 46.2 45.1 44.1 43.1 42.1 41.1 40.1 39.1 38.1 37.2 36.2 35.3 34.4 33.4 32.5 31.7 30.8 29.9 10
11 65.6 64.3 63.0 61.8 60.5 59.3 58.1 56.9 55.7 54.5 53.3 52.2 51.0 49.9 48.8 47.6 46.5 45.4 44.3 43.3 42.2 41.2 40.1 39.1 38.1 37.1 36.1 35.1 34.1 33.1 32.2 11
12 69.8 68.4 67.1 65.7 64.4 63.1 61.8 60.5 59.2 58.0 56.7 55.5 54.2 53.0 51.8 50.6 49.4 48.2 47.1 45.9 44.8 43.6 42.5 41.4 40.3 39.2 38.1 37.1 36.0 35.0 33.9 12
13 73.4 72.0 70.6 69.1 67.7 66.3 65.0 63.6 62.2 60.9 59.5 58.2 56.9 55.6 54.3 53.0 51.7 50.5 49.2 48.0 46.8 45.5 44.3 43.1 42.0 40.8 39.6 38.5 37.3 36.2 35.1 13
14 76.5 75.0 73.5 72.0 70.5 69.0 67.6 66.1 64.7 63.2 61.8 60.4 59.0 57.6 56.2 54.9 53.5 52.2 50.8 49.5 48.2 46.9 45.6 44.3 43.1 41.8 40.6 39.3 38.1 36.9 35.7 14
15 79.0 77.4 75.9 74.3 72.7 71.1 69.6 68.1 66.5 65.0 63.5 62.0 60.6 59.1 57.6 56.2 54.7 53.3 51.9 50.5 49.1 47.7 46.3 45.0 43.6 42.3 41.0 39.7 38.4 37.1 35.8 15
16 81.0 79.3 77.7 76.0 74.4 72.7 71.1 69.5 67.9 66.3 64.7 63.1 61.5 60.0 58.4 56.9 55.4 53.9 52.4 50.9 49.4 48.0 46.5 45.1 43.6 42.2 40.8 39.4 38.0 36.6 35.3 16
17 82.5 80.7 78.9 77.2 75.5 73.7 72.0 70.3 68.6 66.9 65.3 63.6 62.0 60.3 58.7 57.1 55.5 53.9 52.3 50.8 49.2 47.7 46.1 44.6 43.1 41.6 40.1 38.6 37.1 35.7 34.2 17
18 83.3 81.5 79.6 77.8 76.0 74.2 72.4 70.6 68.8 67.1 65.3 63.6 61.9 60.1 58.4 56.7 55.1 53.4 51.7 50.1 48.4 46.8 45.2 43.6 42.0 40.4 38.8 37.3 35.7 34.2 32.6 18
19 83.6 81.7 79.8 77.9 76.0 74.1 72.2 70.3 68.5 66.6 64.8 63.0 61.2 59.4 57.6 55.8 54.0 52.3 50.5 48.8 47.1 45.4 43.7 42.0 40.3 38.6 37.0 35.3 33.7 32.1 30.5 19
20 83.4 81.4 79.4 77.4 75.4 73.4 71.5 69.5 67.6 65.7 63.7 61.8 60.0 58.1 56.2 54.3 52.5 50.6 48.8 47.0 45.2 43.4 41.6 39.8 38.1 36.3 34.6 32.9 31.2 29.4 27.7 20
21 82.6 80.5 78.4 76.3 74.3 72.2 70.2 68.2 66.1 64.1 62.1 60.1 58.2 56.2 54.2 52.3 50.4 48.4 46.5 44.6 42.8 40.9 39.0 37.2 35.3 33.5 31.7 29.8 28.0 26.3 24.5 21
22 81.2 79.1 76.9 74.7 72.6 70.5 68.3 66.2 64.1 62.0 59.9 57.9 55.8 53.8 51.7 49.7 47.7 45.7 43.7 41.7 39.7 37.8 35.8 33.9 32.0 30.1 28.2 26.3 24.4 22.5 20.6 22
23 79.3 77.1 74.8 72.6 70.4 68.1 65.9 63.7 61.5 59.4 57.2 55.1 52.9 50.8 48.7 46.6 44.5 42.4 40.3 38.2 36.2 34.1 32.1 30.1 28.1 26.1 24.1 22.1 20.2 18.2 16.3 23
24 76.9 74.5 72.2 69.9 67.6 65.3 63.0 60.7 58.4 56.2 53.9 51.7 49.5 47.3 45.0 42.9 40.7 38.5 36.4 34.2 32.1 29.9 27.8 25.7 23.6 21.6 19.5 17.4 15.4 13.3 11.3 24
25 73.8 71.4 69.0 66.6 64.2 61.8 59.5 57.1 54.7 52.4 50.1 47.8 45.5 43.2 40.9 38.6 36.3 34.1 31.8 29.6 27.4 25.2 23.0 20.8 18.6 16.5 14.3 12.2 10.1 7.9 5.8 25
26 70.3 67.8 65.3 62.8 60.3 57.8 55.4 52.9 50.5 48.1 45.7 43.3 40.9 38.5 36.1 33.8 31.4 29.1 26.8 24.5 22.2 19.9 17.6 15.3 13.1 10.8 8.6 6.4 4.2 2.0 -0.2 26
27 66.1 63.5 61.0 58.4 55.8 53.3 50.8 48.2 45.7 43.2 40.7 38.2 35.8 33.3 30.9 28.4 26.0 23.6 21.2 18.8 16.4 14.0 11.7 9.3 7.0 4.6 2.3 0.0 -2.3 -4.6 -6.8 27
28 61.4 58.8 56.1 53.5 50.8 48.2 45.6 43.0 40.4 37.8 35.2 32.6 30.1 27.5 25.0 22.5 20.0 17.5 15.0 12.5 10.0 7.6 5.1 2.7 0.3 -2.1 -4.5 -6.9 -9.3 -11.6 -14.0 28
29 56.2 53.4 50.7 48.0 45.2 42.5 39.8 37.1 34.5 31.8 29.1 26.5 23.8 21.2 18.6 16.0 13.4 10.8 8.3 5.7 3.2 0.6 -1.9 -4.4 -6.9 -9.4 -11.9 -14.4 -16.8 -19.3 -21.7 29
30 50.4 47.6 44.7 41.9 39.1 36.3 33.5 30.8 28.0 25.2 22.5 19.8 17.1 14.3 11.6 9.0 6.3 3.6 1.0 -1.7 -4.3 -6.9 -9.5 -12.1 -14.7 -17.3 -19.9 -22.4 -24.9 -27.5 -30.0 30
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
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Chapter 2
Competition and Innovation: An
Experimental Investigation
joint with Dario Sacco and Armin Schmutzler
1 Introduction
Simple two-stage games are often used to derive predictions about the effects of in-
creasing competition on cost-reducing investments.1 Testing such predictions in the
field is very difficult, and the literature comes to ambiguous conclusions.2 There-
fore, this paper uses laboratory experiments to explore whether at least the basic
strategic effects identified in the theoretical models are present.
We consider four different games where two or four firms choose a cost-reducing
investment before they engage in Cournot or Bertrand competition with homoge-
neous goods. Thus we can explore how increasing competition by increasing the
number of players and by switching from Cournot to Bertrand competition affects
investments.3 To understand better what drives the results, we not only consid-
ered treatments with the two-stage structure of the underlying game, but we also
analyzed one-stage treatments where subjects’ investment decisions automatically
result in the payoffs of the ensuing product-market subgame. This allows us to
investigate whether deviations from the equilibrium investments in the two-stage
1Schmutzler (2010) and Vives (2008) synthesize the existing literature.
2See the references at the end of this section.
3In a related paper, Sacco and Schmutzler (2011) analyze the effects of increasing competition
by changing the degree of substitutability in a differentiated product market. They expose a
U-shaped relation in the underlying Shubik-Levitan model, and they provide weak experimental
evidence in favor of such a relation.
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game are driven exclusively by expected deviations in the product-market game.
Our analysis leads to the following main insights.
(1) Investments decrease as the number of players increases.
(2) For a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition, the observed effect on
investments is positive.
(3) The positive investment effect of moving from Cournot to Bertrand competi-
tion arises even in the four-player case, where the predicted effect is negative.
(4) Even though all three results just described arise both for the one-stage and
two-stage treatments, the positive effect of moving from Cournot to Bertrand
is more pronounced for the two-stage treatments.
Result (1) confirms what has been observed by other authors in stochastic static
and dynamic patent races (Isaac and Reynolds 1988, 1992). Cournot investment
games have been studied by Suetens (2005), but only for duopoly markets.4 Thus,
the number effects of competition on investment have not been studied in a Cournot
setting.5
The remaining results have not been observed elsewhere. Except for the unpub-
lished working paper of Sacco and Schmutzler (2008) and Chapter 3, we are not
aware of any other contribution that deals with investment games under homoge-
neous Bertrand competition,6 let alone with a comparison between Cournot and
Bertrand investment games.7
Result (3) has also not been observed so far, but it is related to familiar over-
bidding results in the context of all-pay auctions, which are similar to Bertrand
investment games.8 Result (4) is of more general methodological value: It shows
that, to understand behavior in two-stage games, it is useful to consider both the
4Suetens (2005) focuses on the differences between investments and the Nash equilibrium, and
specifically on the role of knowledge spillovers in this context. In Suetens (2008) the focus is
on RJVs and their effect on price collusion in Bertrand competition with product differentiation.
Again she only considers duopoly markets and the effects of increasing competition are not a matter
of concern.
5Importantly, note that our analysis is distinct from the more familiar analysis of number effects
in Cournot oligopolies (Huck et al. 2004; Orzen 2008). This literature deals with the effects on
prices and quantities rather than on investments.
6Sacco and Schmutzler (2008) consider the reduced one-stage version of a two-stage Bertrand
game, where investments precede price competition. It shows that overinvestment is substantial.
Overinvestment is also observed in Chapter 3 where both stages are played out, but they focus
on the incentive effects of political instruments on investment. However, both papers do not deal
with the effects of increasing competition.
7Suetens and Potters (2007) compare prices and outputs in Bertrand and Cournot games, but
not investments.
8See Section 5 for a more careful discussion.
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full two-stage game and the reduced one-stage version. In this fashion, one can iden-
tify the sources of deviations from the first-stage equilibrium choices more readily.
Specifically, we show that first-stage overinvestment in the Bertrand case tends to
go hand in hand with above-equilibrium prices in the second stage.
We see our experimental research as complementary to the existing field research,
which comes to ambiguous conclusions about the effects of competition on invest-
ment. Broadly speaking, this ambiguity may reflect either small differences in the
strategic environment or endogeneity problems. As to the former, Schmutzler (2010)
emphasizes how the predicted effect of competition on investment depends on mod-
eling details, which would suggest that ambiguous empirical results are merely the
confirmation of ambiguous predictions. As to the endogeneity problem, it looms
large in the early literature, surveyed in Cohen and Levin (1989). While this litera-
ture regarded market structure as an explanatory variable, the causality might run
in the opposite direction.9 Innovation may influence market structure because R&D
involves fixed costs, because it affects the pattern of firm growth in an industry or
changes the efficient scale of production. This endogeneity problem has been taken
into account to some extent by the more recent literature. Nevertheless this liter-
ature is not very conclusive. For instance, Nickell (1996) obtains a positive effect
of competition on investments. In Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt
(2005), an inverted-U relationship between intensity of competition and investments
arises. An experimental analysis addresses both problems: It allows us to delineate
a setting in which the theoretical predictions are clear and there are no endogeneity
problems.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the theoretical framework.
Sections 3-5 describe the experimental design and results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We analyze static two-stage games, where firms i = 1, ..., I first invest in R&D and
then compete in the product market. The demand function for the homogeneous
product is given by D(p) = a− p, with a > 0. All firms i are identical ex-ante, with
constant marginal costs c > 0. In the first stage, firms simultaneously choose R&D
investments Yi ∈ [0, c), resulting in marginal costs ci = c − Yi. The cost of R&D
is given by kY 2i , where k > 0. In the second stage, firms simultaneously choose
quantities (Cournot competition) or prices (Bertrand competition).
9For an introduction to more recent evidence on that matter, see Gilbert (2006).
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2.1 Cournot Competition
For the Cournot case, backward induction shows that the net payoff function of firm
i in the first stage is given by
Πi(Y1, ..., YI , α, k) =
(
α + IYi −
∑
i 6=j Yj
I + 1
)2
− kY 2i , (1)
where α ≡ a− c represents the demand parameter.10
The gross payoff of firm i, that is, the first term on the right-hand side of (1),
depends positively on its own investment and the demand parameter, and negatively
on the investments of the other firms. The following result is immediate11:
Proposition 2.1. Under Cournot competition the symmetric pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium investment levels are
Y C =
αI
k(I + 1)2 − I
. (2)
By (2), equilibrium investments are increasing in the demand parameter α, and
decreasing in the cost parameter k and in the number of firms I.
2.2 Bertrand Competition
For Bertrand Competition, backward induction shows that the net payoff function
of firm i can be written as a function of efficiency levels as follows:
Πi(·) =
{
(Yi − Y
m
−i)D(c− Y
m
−i)− kY
2
i , if Yi > Y
m
−i
−kY 2i , if Yi ≤ Y
m
−i
, (3)
where Y m−i = maxj 6=i Yj. Compared to the Cournot case, competition is intense in
the sense that a firm can achieve a positive gross payoff only by investing more than
the highest investment of the others. If Yi > Y
m
−i , maximizing (3) with respect to Yi
gives
∂Πi(·)
∂Yi
= D(c− Y m−i)− 2kYi ≡ 0. (4)
Yi ≤ Y
m
−i can only be a best response if Yi = 0 holds: If firm i does not invest
more than all others, it gets a negative net payoff. In such a case the deviation to
Yi = 0 is profitable. The pure-strategy equilibrium is thus characterized as follows
(Sacco and Schmutzler (2008), Prop. 7).
10Here and in the following, we assume that α+ IYi −
∑
i6=j Yj ≥ 0.
11We assume that the second order condition holds, that is, I2/(I+1)2−k < 0, which is fulfilled
for arbitrary I ≥ 2 if k ≥ 1.
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Proposition 2.2. (i) Under Bertrand Competition, for k > 1
2
, there are multiple
asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria with one firm investing Y Bi =
α
2k
and firms j 6= i
investing Y Bj = 0. (ii) There are no other pure-strategy equilibria.
Proposition 2.2 implies that the average investments are Y
B
= α
2kI
, which is
increasing in α, and decreasing in k and in I. It is unlikely that agents can coordinate
on one of the asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria. We therefore refer to the following
result of Sacco and Schmutzler (2008).
Proposition 2.3. The investment game with Bertrand Competition has a symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium, where firms mix between all strategies up to a cut-off
level.12
Of course, one may be concerned with the relevance of mixed-strategy equilibria in
the context of an oligopoly with a small number of players. We clearly do not expect
decision makers in firms to randomize deliberately. Also, the common justification
that mixed-strategy equilibria describe behavior in large populations of players,
each of which takes non-random decisions, makes no sense in our context. A more
convincing a priori justification relies on standard purification arguments (Harsanyi,
1973).13
2.3 The Effects of Increasing Competition
We now consider the predicted effects of competition on investment.
Corollary 2.1. (i) The average equilibrium investments are decreasing in I for both
Bertrand and Cournot competition.
(ii) Suppose that k > max
{
1
2
, I
2
(I+1)2
}
. The average equilibrium investment for
Cournot is higher than the average investment in each asymmetric pure-strategy
equilibrium for Bertrand for I ≥ 3. For I = 2, average investments are higher for
Bertrand unless k ≤ 2.
Though we cannot provide such results for the mixed-strategy equilibrium at this
level of generality, a similar statement holds for the parameters we choose (see 3.2).
Thus, except for the caveat for I = 2, for both concepts of competitiveness, an
increase in competition reduces investment.
Both of these changes in the competitive environment have the common feature
that they correspond to reductions in the mark-ups that firms can command in the
product market equilibrium. To see the crucial difference, note that an increase in
12The game also has asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria where some firms always play zero
and others randomize.
13Specifically, one can consider a Bayesian game with a continuum of players with statistically
independent types, reflecting small differences in payoffs. The mixed-strategy equilibrium of the
complete information game is then close to the equilibria of nearby Bayesian games.
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the number of competitors in a Cournot setting has a fairly smooth effect on the
nature of competition. Most importantly, both firms can obtain positive profits be-
fore and after the change in competition. As one moves from Cournot to Bertrand,
the change in the competitive environment is more dramatic: It is well known that
at most one firm can obtain a positive profit in the Bertrand investment game when
both firms choose equilibrium prices in the ensuing subgame; so that competition is
of a winner-takes-all nature. Thus, without correct expectations about competitor
investments players may easily take very bad decisions. The Bertrand game has
multiple asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria, a symmetric mixed-strategy equilib-
rium and even asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria. It is not obvious how players
coordinate in a static setting. We use the mixed-strategy equilibria as the bench-
mark to predict equilibrium investments in the Bertrand game, whereas we resort
to the symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in the Cournot case.
3 Experimental Design
We now describe the treatments, the parameters and the hypotheses.
3.1 Treatments
We conducted eight treatments (see Table 1), which differed in the following three
dimensions:
1. The number of players (two vs. four)
2. The mode of competition (Bertrand vs. Cournot)
3. The number of stages played out (one vs. two)
The need for the first two treatment variations is obvious given our questions of
interest. The third point requires some clarification. To capture the models intro-
duced in Section 2 accurately, the two-stage treatments are adequate and, arguably,
they are also more realistic. However, in such treatments, there may be confusion
about the source of possible deviations from the equilibrium in the investment game.
Broadly, one can imagine two classes of deviations. First, subjects may be expecting
non-equilibrium behavior in the product market stage.14 For instance, they might
believe that all parties (including themselves) collude below the equilibrium out-
put in the Cournot game, in which case they should rationally choose lower than
equilibrium investments in the first stage. Second, even when they do not expect
14Such deviations are known to arise both in the Bertrand (Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2007) and
in the the Cournot case (Huck et al. 2004, and many others).
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Table 1: Treatments
Type of competition
Number of players Bertrand Cournot
I = 2 B2, 2 sessions C2, 2 sessions
I = 4 B4, 2 sessions C4, 2 sessions
For each treatment we ran two sessions, one with one stage
and one with two stages played out.
such deviations in the product market game, players may want to deviate from
equilibrium investments for other reasons. For example, they might realize that in-
vestments involve negative externalities, and they may want to coordinate on lower
investments that make all players better off.
To identify which of these two types of deviations arise, we conducted all treat-
ments in two different versions which we call one- and two-stage treatments. In
the latter, subjects play the product market game as well as the investment game.
In the one-stage treatments subjects only choose investment levels, and payoffs for
each choice of investments correspond to the payoffs in the equilibrium of the en-
suing product market subgame by assumption. Thus deviations from equilibrium
cannot result from expected deviations in the product market game. Thereby we
can identify to which extent deviations in the two-stage game are attributable to
each source of deviations.
3.2 Parameters and Predictions
We chose parameter values α = 30 and k = 3. We restricted the strategy sets to
Yi ∈ {0, 1, ..., 9}. Restricting choices to discrete strategies had two main advantages.
First, we could present information on payoffs (gross of investment costs) in simple
matrices. Second, in this fashion, the integers no longer play the role of prominent
numbers.
The downside is that the equilibria of the discrete game reflect the negative ef-
fect of increasing the number of players on investments only imperfectly. For some
parameters, increases in the number of players have no effect. For instance, equilib-
rium investments are (2, 2) for the two-player Cournot game and (2, 2, 2, 2) for the
four-player game. While the equilibria of the discrete game are the more natural
benchmark for individual behavior given the discrete strategy sets, it will turn out
to be instructive to compare average behavior with the corresponding continuous
games. The equilibria for these games are (2.4, 2.4) and (1.69, 1.69, 1.69, 1.69), so
that the investment effect of increasing the number of players is negative.
For Bertrand competition, there is no such problem: According to Proposition
2.2, there are asymmetric equilibria, each with one firm investing 5 and the other
60 Chapter 2: Competition and Innovation: An Experimental Investigation
firm(s) 0. This holds both for the discrete and continuous strategy set. Moreover,
using the formulas provided by Sacco and Schmutzler (2008), one can show that the
two-player game has a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium (MSE) given by
(p0, ..., p9) = (0.1, 0.193, 0.187, 0.182, 0.176, 0.160, 0, 0, 0, 0) . (5)
For the four-player game, the symmetric MSE is given by
(p0, ..., p9) = (0.464, 0.2, 0.119, 0.088, 0.071, 0.057, 0, 0, 0, 0) . (6)
The expected investment levels (2.62 for the two-player and 1.27 for the four-player
Bertrand game) are close to the average investments (Y
B2
= 2.5; Y
B4
= 1.25) of
the pure-strategy equilibria.
Table 2 provides an overview of the equilibrium investments.
Table 2: Equilibria
Equilibrium investment
Model discrete continuous mixed
Cournot I = 2 (2, 2) (2.4, 2.4) -
Cournot I = 4 (2, 2, 2, 2) (1.69, 1.69, 1.69, 1.69) -
Bertrand I = 2 (5, 0) (5, 0) (2.62, 2.62)
Bertrand I = 4 (5, 0, 0, 0) (5, 0, 0, 0) (1.27, 1.27, 1.27, 1.27)
For the mixed equilibria we show expected investment levels, see equations (5) and (6).
We use the equilibrium predictions to derive the following hypotheses about the
effects of increasing competition.
Hypothesis 3.1. Increasing competition in the sense of switching from two to four
players has a non-positive effect on investments in the Cournot case and reduces
investments in the Bertrand case.
The non-positive effect on investments in the Cournot case is consistent with the
prediction of no effect from the discrete game and of a negative effect from the
continuous game.
Hypothesis 3.2. Increasing competition in the sense of switching from Cournot
to Bertrand competition increases investments in the two-player case and reduces
investments in the four-player case.
The two predictions of Hypothesis 3.2 can be derived by using the equilibria of the
discrete game as well as those of the continuous game. They hold for the asymmetric
pure-strategy equilibria and the symmetric MSE.
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3.3 Subjects and Payments
The experimental sessions were conducted between November 2008 and February
2009 at the University of Zurich. The participants were undergraduate students.15
We implemented four sessions with Bertrand treatments, and four with Cournot
treatments (see Table 1). Two of the Bertrand and two of the Cournot sessions
were two-player treatments. In each session there were 20 periods. No subject
participated in more than one session. The four-player sessions had 32 subjects;
each two-player session had 36 subjects. The 36 (32) subjects of the two-player
(four-player) treatments were randomly divided in matching groups of four (eight)
subjects each at the beginning of the experiment. Within the matching groups we
applied the stranger design, i.e. randomly rematched subjects into groups of two
(four) after each period.16 Thus, we obtained nine (four) independent observations
per two (four)-player session. Sessions lasted about 90 minutes each.
At the end of each period, subjects were informed about the investment of the
other subject(s) in their group and their own net payoff for that period. When
the second stage was played out, they were informed about the investment of the
other subject(s) in their group before choosing price or quantity and after the sec-
ond stage they also learned the price or the quantity decision of the other group
member(s). Participants received an initial endowment of CHF 35 (≈EUR 23).17
Average earnings including the endowment were between CHF 30 (≈EUR 20) and
CHF 36 (≈EUR 23) for the Bertrand sessions and between CHF 39 (≈EUR 26) and
CHF 49 (≈EUR 33) for the Cournot sessions. The experiment was programmed and
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and subjects were recruited
using ORSEE (Greiner 2004).
4 Results
In Section 4.1 we provide a brief overview of the results. In Section 4.2, we look at
our hypotheses in more detail.
15We did not exclude any disciplines. We had students of law, engineering, psychology, economics
etc.
16Thanks to the matching group approach, we obtain sufficiently many independent observations
while reducing the possibility of repeated game behavior. Nevertheless, subjects may “learn”from
the past prices/quantities chosen by the other players in their matching groups. Modeling how the
firms arrive at their beliefs about the other player’s future prices when they choose investments is
beyond the scope of this paper, however.
17The instructions of all treatments are available online as supplementary material to Darai,
Sacco, and Schmutzler (2010).
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4.1 Overview
Here and in the following, we always use matching group averages as independent
observations. Kruskal-Wallis tests reveal that we can reject the hypothesis that the
investment levels of all treatments, of all one-, or of all two-stage treatments are
drawn from the same population.18
Figure 1 illustrates how investments vary across treatments. Each panel contains
the average per-period investments for one of the four cases, distinguishing between
the one-stage and the two-stage treatments. It also shows the equilibrium invest-
ments.19 Based on this descriptive evidence, we arrive at the following tentative
conclusions.
Figure 1: Average investment per period
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1. Increasing the number of players leads to lower average investments in the
Cournot and the Bertrand case.20
18The null hypothesis of no differences is rejected with a p-value of 0.000, if all treatments are
considered. If we take only the one (two)-stage treatments into account the p-value is 0.006 (0.000).
19In the Cournot case, we depict the equilibria of the continuous game; recall that the equilibria
for the discrete game are (2, 2) and (2, 2, 2, 2), respectively.
20These results are supported by pairwise Mann-Whitney-U tests. We find significant differences
between C2 and C4 as well as between B2 and B4. One-tailed tests reject the null hypothesis of
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2. Moving from Cournot to Bertrand competition leads to greater average invest-
ments for the two-player and four-player treatments.21
3. For the four-player case, the positive effect of moving from Cournot to Bertrand
competition holds even though the predicted effect is negative.22
4. The positive investment effect of moving from Cournot to Bertrand competi-
tion is more pronounced in the two-stage treatments.23
4.2 Comparative Statics
We now analyze the comparative statics effects in more detail.
4.2.1 Number Effects
To investigate the number effects, we consider OLS models24 of all Cournot treat-
ments as well as of the one- and two-stage treatments separately; similarly for the
Bertrand case. The model is given by
yit = β0 + β1δ
i
I4 +
3∑
s=1
βs+1δ
i
P s + β5δ
i
one−stage + β6δ
i
I4∗one−stage + e
i
t, (7)
where δiI4 is a dummy variable for intense competition (four players rather than
two), and δiP s are dummy variables for the first, second, and third quarter of periods.
When we use the data of all treatments, we consider two additional dummy vari-
ables δione−stage which is equal to one for the one-stage treatments and δ
i
I4∗one−stage
which captures the interaction effect between the number of players and the type of
treatment.
no differences in average investments in favor of higher investment levels in C2 (B2) than in C4
(B4) at a p-value of 0.025 (0.048) for the one-stage treatments, and respectively at a p-value of
0.010 (0.003) for the two-stage treatments. Pooling the data of the one- and two-stage treatments
results a p-value of 0.001 (0.000).
21The result for the two-player case is supported by a one-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test for
the two-player one-stage (p=0.005) and two-stage treatments (p=0.000) and for the pooled data
(p=0.000). For the four-player case, a two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test does not reject the hy-
pothesis of no differences in investment levels between the two four-player one-stage treatments
with a p-value of 0.200. For the two-stage treatments it rejects the null with a p-value of 0.029
and for the pooled data with a p-value of 0.001 if we pool the data. However the mean ranks are
always higher in B4 than in C4.
22This predicted negative effect holds not only for the equilibrium of the continuous Cournot
game depicted Figure 1, but also for the equilibrium of the discrete Cournot game, where average
investments are 2 and thus higher than in the Bertrand MSE (1.27).
23In the C2 one (two)-stage treatment we observe average investment of 2.51 (2.22) and 1.94
(1.57) in the C4 treatment. However, in the B2 one (two)-stage treatments we observe average
investment of 3.10 (3.55) and 2.42 (2.56) for B4 treatments.
24We correct the standard error for matching group clusters in all OLS models presented in the
following.
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Table 3: Number effects in Cournot and Bertrand treatments
investment (1-stage) (2-stage) (1- and 2-stage)
Cournot Treatments
I4 -0.575∗∗∗ (0.186) -0.648∗∗∗ (0.184) -0.648∗∗∗ (0.180)
P1st−quarter 0.415
∗∗ (0.138) 0.682∗∗∗ (0.149) 0.549∗∗∗ (0.107)
P2nd−quarter 0.141 (0.103) 0.265
∗∗∗ (0.068) 0.203∗∗∗ (0.063)
P3rd−quarter 0.053 (0.069) 0.047 (0.044) 0.050 (0.040)
one-stage 0.296 (0.178)
I4*one-stage 0.073 (0.256)
constant 2.362∗∗∗ (0.112) 1.970∗∗∗ (0.106) 2.018∗∗∗ (0.120)
R2 0.082 (N=1360) 0.113 (N=1360) 0.114 (N=2720)
Bertrand Treatments
I4 -0.675∗∗ (0.293) -0.992∗∗∗ (0.205) -0.992∗∗∗ (0.201)
P1st−quarter 0.626
∗ (0.313) 1.044∗∗∗ (0.178) 0.835∗∗∗ (0.178)
P2nd−quarter 0.491
∗ (0.275) 0.382∗∗ (0.131) 0.437∗∗∗ (0.150)
P3rd−quarter 0.294
∗∗ (0.100) 0.135 (0.173) 0.215∗∗ (0.099)
one-stage -0.451∗∗ (0.207)
I4*one-stage 0.317 (0.351)
constant 2.744∗∗∗ (0.161) 3.158∗∗∗ (0.149) 3.177∗∗∗ (0.172)
R2 0.026 (N=1360) 0.078 (N=1360) 0.051 (N=2720)
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3 shows that the estimated coefficient for β1 in the one-stage Cournot model
is −0.575 and highly significant. For the two-stage treatments, we obtain a highly
significant β1 of −0.648. Thus, the comparative statics are essentially the same in
one-stage and two-stage treatments.25 This result is supported by an insignificant
stage and interaction effect if we pool the data. Finally, for both the one-stage and
the two-stage treatments, we see that investments decrease over time.
For the Bertrand treatments, the effect of the number of players on investments
has the predicted sign and is significant for the one– and two-stage treatments.26
But the stage effect in the third Column is significant and negative. The interaction
effect is insignificant which means that the number effect does not differ between the
one- and two-stage treatments. Again we find that investment levels are significantly
higher in earlier periods.
Summing up, we obtain the following confirmation of Hypothesis 3.1.
Result 4.1. For Cournot and Bertrand competition, investments are higher for two
than for four players. Even though investment levels in one-stage and two-stage
25Using a t-test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the two estimated
coefficients (|t| = 0.2790).
26Running a t-test reveals that the difference between the two estimated coefficients is not
significant (|t| = 0.8865).
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treatments differ, there is no significant difference in the size of the number effect
across treatments.
4.2.2 Cournot versus Bertrand
We now consider the effect of moving from soft Cournot to intense Bertrand compe-
tition, considering OLS models of the one-stage and two-stage treatments separately
and jointly. The models include δiBertrand as a dummy variable for intense (Bertrand)
competition and dummy variables δiP s for the first, second, and third quarter of peri-
ods. δione−stage is a dummy variable for the one-stage treatment and δ
i
Bertrand∗one−stage
is the interaction effect between the type of competition and treatment.
yit = β0 + β1δ
i
Bertrand +
3∑
s=1
βs+1δ
i
P s + β5δ
i
one−stage + β6δ
i
Bertrand∗one−stage + e
i
t. (8)
Table 4: Effects of the type of competition in two- and four-player treatments
investment (1-stage) (2-stage) (1- and 2-stage)
Two-Player Treatments
Bertrand 0.583∗∗∗ (0.170) 1.331∗∗∗ (0.217) 1.331∗∗∗ (0.213)
P1st−quarter 0.386
∗ (0.199) 0.783∗∗∗ (0.201) 0.585∗∗∗ (0.144)
P2nd−quarter 0.311 (0.215) 0.317
∗∗ (0.123) 0.314∗∗ (0.122)
P3rd−quarter 0.147
∗∗ (0.067) 0.033 (0.129) 0.090 (0.072)
one-stage 0.296 (0.177)
Bertrand*one-stage -0.747∗∗∗ (0.271)
constant 2.303∗∗∗ (0.138) 1.935∗∗∗ (0.126) 1.971∗∗∗ (0.131)
R2 0.028 (N=1440) 0.185 (N=1440) 0.094 (N=2880)
Four-Player Treatments
Bertrand 0.483 (0.310) 0.986∗∗∗ (0.172) 0.986∗∗∗ (0.166)
P1st−quarter 0.672
∗ (0.298) 0.953∗∗∗ (0.122) 0.813∗∗∗ (0.160)
P2nd−quarter 0.322 (0.227) 0.331
∗∗∗ (0.076) 0.327∗∗ (0.115)
P3rd−quarter 0.203 (0.128) 0.156 (0.123) 0.180
∗ (0.086)
one-stage 0.369∗ (0.186)
Bertrand*one-stage -0.503 (0.342)
constant 1.640∗∗∗ (0.190) 1.210∗∗∗ (0.142) 1.241∗∗∗ (0.150)
R2 0.030 (N=1280) 0.088 (N=1280) 0.060 (N=2560)
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4 summarizes the results. In all three models, the effect of competition on
investment is positive and highly significant for the two-player case. In the four-
player case the result is positive and significant for the two–stage treatments.27
27The period dummies show that investments decrease significantly as time goes by, independent
of the data selection.
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Result 4.2. Mean investments are higher for the Bertrand game than for the cor-
responding Cournot games.
In the four-player game this contradicts the equilibrium prediction that invest-
ments are lower for the Bertrand case.28
Result 4.3. In the four-player case, the positive investment effect of moving from
Cournot to Bertrand competition arises even though the predicted effect is negative.
Next, compare one-stage and two-stage treatments. In the two-player as well as
the four-player case, β1 is larger for the two-stage treatments. The difference is
significant for the two-player case (|t| = 2.7135), but not for the four-player case
(|t| = 1.4188). This is also shown by the highly significant interaction term in the
two-player case, i.e. the effect of Bertrand competition on investment is different for
one- and two-stage treatments. With this qualification, we summarize:
Result 4.4. The effect of moving from Cournot to Bertrand competition tends to
be more positive for two-stage than for one-stage treatments.
5 Understanding Overinvestment
We now investigate why the effect of moving from Cournot to Bertrand competi-
tion (i) is positive even when the prediction is that it is negative and (ii) is more
pronounced in the two-stage treatments. We consider the OLS regression
△yit = y
i
t − y
i∗
t = β0 + e
i
t, (9)
with yi∗t standing for the predicted investment. If subjects invest according to the
prediction, the estimated constant β0 should be zero. The results for all treatments
are presented in Table 7 in Appendix A.2.
The most important observation is the highly significant overinvestment in all
two-and four-player Bertrand treatments. The overinvestment is significantly higher
(|t| = 2.108) in the two-player two-stage treatments than in the one-stage treatments
and significantly higher (|t| = 2.105) in the one-stage four-player than in the one-
stage two-player treatments. The Cournot case essentially confirms the equilibrium
prediction for the continuous model (see Table 3), whereas in the two-player discrete
model there is overinvestment. The fact that the continuous model is a better
predictor for average investments than the discrete model is worth emphasizing.
To understand why the switch from Cournot to Bertrand tends to have a strong
28The predicted effect is negative: In the continuous game, the effect is 1.27-1.69=-0.42; in the
discrete game it is 1.27-2=-0.73.
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positive effect on investments, however, one mainly has to find out what lies behind
the overinvestment in the Bertrand case. Further, one needs to understand why the
overinvestment is more pronounced for the two-stage treatments.
Before we deal with these issues, note the relation between our overinvestment
and the overbidding observations that have emerged in the literature on all-pay
auctions. In a Bertrand investment game, even when all players invest a positive
amount, only one player can earn positive profits if second-period equilibrium prices
are set. However, contrary to standard all-pay auctions, the size of the bids affects
not only the chances of winning, but also the prize. In particular, at least in the
one-stage version, when the difference to the second-highest bid is close to zero,
so is the winner’s prize. In spite of these differences in the strategic setting, our
overinvestment results are similar to the overbidding that arises in fixed-prize all-
pay auctions.29
5.1 Reasons for Overinvestment
To understand overinvestment in the Bertrand case, consider the following evidence.
(1) Investments decrease strongly over time.
(2) There is substantial cross-player heterogeneity.
(3) In the four player-treatments, players obtain negative profits on average in all
periods, but the losses are decreasing over time. In the two-player treatments,
average profits are mostly positive.
(4) Compared to the MSE, the overinvestment comes mainly from too low weight
on low positive strategies rather than too low weight on zero.
Point (1) has already been made in Section 4.2.
Point (2) is illustrated in Figure 2. This figure is a histogram of average per-player
investments in the four Bertrand treatments. The heterogeneity across players is
substantial.30 As to (3), consider Figure 3, which shows how profits developed over
times for the one- and two-stage case. The differences between the two-player and
the four-player case are evident.31
29Most closely related is Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006) who consider symmetric all-pay auc-
tions with 4, 8, and 12 players and also observe overinvestment. Like us, these authors obtain
overbidding that diminishes over time, but remains substantial even in later periods. See also
Davis and Reilly (1998).
30A figure with all individual investment paths (see Figure 5 in Appendix A.1) reveals substantial
variety in another dimension: A considerable fraction of the players had one or two preferred
investment choices that were chosen at least half the time. Almost as many players hardly ever
chose the same investment level twice in a row.
31A two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test rejects the null hypothesis of no differences between the
one- and two-stage two-player treatments (p = 0.000), but the test cannot reject the null hypothesis
in the four-player case (p = 0.200).
68 Chapter 2: Competition and Innovation: An Experimental Investigation
Figure 2: Average observed investment per subject for all Bertrand treatments
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Figure 4 in Appendix A.1 confirms (4). In all treatments, subjects choose 1 and
2 much less frequently than in the MSE. The differences for zero investments are
much smaller, and in one case (B2, one-stage) there are more zero investments than
predicted by the MSE.
Our observations suggest a number of possible explanations for the overinvest-
ment, all of which would apply both in the one-stage and the two-stage treatments.
1. Joy of winning : Subjects do not care exclusively about monetary payoffs, but
derive an independent benefit from winning the game.
2. Efficiency considerations : Subjects deviate from equilibrium in order to come
closer to joint-payoff maximization.32
3. Reputation effects : Subjects hope to induce others to refrain from investing.
4. Confusion: Subjects are at least initially unaware of the high risk of making
losses with high investment choices.
5. Optimism: Subjects are aware of the possible losses, but overestimate the
chances that others choose lower investments.
32See, e.g., Engelmann and Strobel (2004).
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Figure 3: Average profits over time of all Bertrand treatments
−
80
−
60
−
40
−
20
0
20
−
80
−
60
−
40
−
20
0
20
0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20
Bertrand I=2 Bertrand I=4
average profit, one−stage average profit, two−stage
pr
of
it
period
Given the heterogeneity of individual profiles, it seems unlikely that a single ex-
planation applies to all players. Joy of winning, for instance, is consistent with the
observation that subjects tend not to choose low investment levels if they invest at
all.33 However, because of the substantial reductions in investments over time,34
joy of winning cannot explain all observations. Efficiency considerations are not an
entirely convincing explanation either. At least for I = 4, the deviations from equi-
librium reduce joint profits (which are zero in expectation in the MSE). For I = 2,
however, in most periods, average profits are positive, so that subjects indeed come
closer to joint-profit maximization.
Among the other explanations, the appeal of reputation effects is limited: player
identities were not common knowledge. The other explanations all have some merits.
Players invest a lot and earn negative profits in early periods, which is consistent
both with confusion and excessive optimism that fade away over time. Also, it is
suggestive that these effects are stronger in the four-player case, where the strategic
uncertainty is compounded by the fact that three opponents are present in each
period. Finally, as Figure 4 in Appendix A.1 shows, 10-15 % of the investments in all
33This argument is closely related to Sheremeta (2010) who allows for joy of winning in the
utility function in an analysis of contests and provides experimental evidence for it.
34See regression results in Section 4.2.
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Bertrand treatments are weakly dominated strategies (6 or higher), also suggesting
some degree of confusion.
Although we can rule out that overinvestment results exclusively from anticipated
deviations in the two-stage game, we still have to explain why the comparative-
statics effect is more pronounced in the two-stage case than in the one-stage case.
5.2 The Role of the Second Stage
In the four-player games, averaging over all subgames, the observed output in the
Bertrand (Cournot) case is only 1% (4%) lower than predicted.
For arbitrary investment decisions, the subgame equilibrium for Bertrand com-
petition leads to higher market outputs than for Cournot competition. Consistent
with this prediction, market outputs are higher in the Bertrand treatments than in
the Cournot treatments, after controlling for average investments.35 There are 14
different average investment levels that arise both in the Bertrand and the Cournot
case. In 12 of these cases, the Bertrand outputs are higher than the Cournot out-
puts. Nevertheless, outputs tend to be lower than in equilibrium in the Bertrand
treatment.
Analyzing individual behavior in the second stage, however, is more informative
than considering only aggegate behavior. The key insight is that deviations from
equilibrium (“collusion”) in the second stage have different effects on the first period
actions in the Cournot and in the Bertrand cases. In the Cournot case, collusion
means that subjects choose lower outputs than in equilibrium in the second stage.
Anticipating this, the value of investment is lower than it would be with equilibrium
outputs. Thus, if subjects plan to set low outputs, they invest less in the two-stage
game than in the one-stage version.
In the Bertrand case on which we focus here, the role of the second stage is much
more subtle. A firm always runs the risk that there is another firm with a lower
price, so that investments may be useless. Its willingness to invest will depend on
how it perceives this risk – a firm will invest only if it is sufficiently confident that
its competitors will not set lower prices than itself. Modeling how the firm arrives
at its beliefs about the other players’ future prices when it chooses investments is
beyond the scope of this paper. But suppose there is some exogenous difference in
the firms’ “optimism“. Optimistic firms believe that their competitors will not set
prices aggressively, and they will therefore put a high probability on the chance of
winning even with a substantial own mark-up. Firms that are more optimistic than
others – for whatever reason – should thus set high prices (because they expect to
35In the Bertrand case (not in the Cournot case), the average equilibrium outputs may depend
on the precise investment profile rather than merely on average investments. A clean comparison of
market outputs would therefore condition on investment profiles rather than on averages. However,
there are very few investment vectors that were chosen both in the Cournot and in the Bertrand
treatments, so that this approach is not informative.
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get away with it) and choose high investments (because they put a high probability
on winning in spite of high prices).
Table 5: Deviation from the equilibrium price p∗ in Bertrand two-stage treatments
ci < min{c−i} ci = min{c−i} ci > min{c−i}
∑
Two-Player Treatment
pi < p
∗ 16% 4% 11% 12%
pi = p
∗ 31% 64% 34% 39%
pi > p
∗ 53% 32% 54% 49%
N 287 146 287 720
Four-Player Treatment
pi < p
∗ 12% 8% 7% 8%
pi = p
∗ 28% 64% 54% 49%
pi > p
∗ 60% 28% 39% 43%
N 139 50 451 640
Note: p∗ comprises both the continuous and the discrete equilibrium.
Closer analysis of the data shows that this is precisely what happens. To see this,
first consider Table 5 which shows that prices above the subgame equilibrium p∗36
are indeed quite common.37 In particular, 53% (60%) of the firms with the lowest
marginal costs set prices above p∗ in the two (four)-player treatment.
Table 6: Average investment in Bertrand two-stage treatments
ci < min{c−i} ci = min{c−i} ci > min{c−i}
∑
Two-Player Treatment
pi ≤ p
∗ 4.07 3.38 1.54 2.98
pi > p
∗ 5.22 4.32 3.01 4.13
Four-Player Treatment
pi ≤ p
∗ 4.78 2.81 0.34 1.25
pi > p
∗ 6.36 4.93 3.29 4.32
Note: p∗ comprises both the continuous and the discrete equilibrium.
Table 6 elaborates on this by giving the average investments both for the case that
prices are below or essentially at the equilibrium (pi ≤ p
∗) and the case of above-
equilibrium prices (pi > p
∗). In the former case, investments tend to be lower than
36The second stage of the discrete Bertrand game has the following subgame perfect equilibria:
(i) if ci = min{c−i} − 1 or ci = min{c−i}, then p
∗
i = ci or p
∗ = ci + 1; (ii) if ci < min{c−i} − 1,
then p∗i = c−i − 1; (iii) if ci > min{c−i}, then p
∗
i ≥ ci.
37Note, however, that we observe merely in 12% (9%) of the two (four)-player markets successful
collusion, i.e. that both players in the two-player or the two players with the lowest marginal cost
in the four-player treatment set the same price above p∗.
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in the latter. This confirms the interpretation that above equilibrium (“collusive”)
prices and high investments tend to go together.
We finally add some brief comments on the Cournot investment game. We con-
sider the four-player game. Interestingly, when the average investments are close
to the equilibrium prediction, the same is true for market outputs in the second
stage.38 More generally, there is a clear and significant relation between outputs
and investments. When we regress the outputs of a firm over own investments
and competitor investments, the former have a positive effect, whereas the latter
have a negative effect.39 Both of these effects are consistent with the theoretical
prediction, but smaller. Intuitively, the marginal effect of higher output on prof-
its increases when own costs are low and decreases when competitor costs are low
(because low-cost competitors produce a higher output and hence market prices are
lower). Conversely, the value of investing is higher when one expects to produce
high outputs.
The logic of the relation between investments and outputs is therefore related to,
but different from the Bertrand case. There, investments were highest for firms in
situations with high prices, because optimistic firms would chose high investments
and expect to get away with high prices. Now optimistic firms expect competitors to
choose low investments and low outputs. Therefore, optimistic firms should choose
high investments and high outputs.
6 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the effects of more intense competition on investments in
simple two-stage R&D models. In the first stage, firms whose marginal costs are
identical ex-ante simultaneously invest in R&D. The investment leads to a decrease
in marginal costs. In the second stage of the game, firms simultaneously choose
quantities or prices in a homogeneous good market. We show that an increase in
the number of firms tends to reduce investments, whereas a shift from Cournot to
Bertrand increases investments. The latter observation is partly predicted by theory
(for two firms) and partly the result of overinvestment in the Bertrand case.
A simple set of experiments cannot resolve the debate about the effects of com-
petition on investment. First, there are conceptual ambiguities at the theoretical
level. Even the definition of increasing competition is contentious, some insight-
38In the 14 cases where the average individual investment is 2, the average market output is 24.5
(as opposed to 25.6 in the continuous subgame equilibrium).
39The equilibrium output of firm i is qi =
a−c
5 +
4
5yi−
1
5
∑
j 6=i yj . In an OLS regression with out-
puts as dependent and investments and period dummies as independent variables, the coefficients
are 0.340 for yi (significant at the 1%-level) and −0.089 for yj (significant at the 10%-level).
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ful attempts to structure the debate notwithstanding.40 Second, even for specific
notions of increasing competition in two-stage games, there are many models to
investigate the issue.41 Finally, one may worry about the external validity of the
laboratory setting as a means of testing predictions about the long-term strategic
decisions of managers in large firms.
However, our analysis provides a clear result that is worthy of further investiga-
tion: In some situations, there are behavioral effects that support a positive effect
of competition on investment.
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Appendix
A.1 Figures
Figure 4: Observed investment levels in all Bertrand treatments and predicted
MSE investment levels
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A.2 Tables
Table 7: Observed and predicted investment
Cournot I = 2, yi∗t = 2
∆yit (1) (2) (3)
β0 0.514
∗∗∗ (0.126) 0.218 (0.135) 0.366∗∗∗ (0.097)
N 720 720 1440
Cournot I = 4, yi∗t = 2
∆yit (1) (2) (3)
β0 -0.061 (0.154) -0.430
∗ (0.141) -0.245∗ (0.119)
N 640 640 1280
Bertrand I = 2, yi∗t = 2.62
∆yit (1) (2) (3)
β0 0.477
∗∗∗ (0.121) 0.929∗∗∗ (0.177) 0.703∗∗∗ (0.118)
N 720 720 1440
Bertrand I = 4, yi∗t = 1.27
∆yit (1) (2) (3)
β0 1.152
∗∗ (0.297) 1.286∗∗∗ (0.121) 1.219∗∗∗ (0.151)
N 640 640 1280
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In model (1) we use one-stage data, in model (2) two-stage, and in model (3) we pool
one- and two-stage data.
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Chapter 3
Patents versus Subsidies: A
Laboratory Experiment
joint with Jens Großer and Nadja Trhal
1 Introduction
Patents and subsidies are widely-used policy instruments to incentivize firms to in-
vest in R&D.1 It was shown that sufficient R&D investment is crucial for economic
growth due to its positive effect on firm profits and productivity, and thereby even-
tually on total welfare in the economy.2 Empirical evidence, however, suggests that
firms’ private returns on R&D investment are often lower than the social returns,
e.g., Bloom, Schankerman, and van Reenen (2010) estimate private returns to be
about 18 percentage points lower than social returns. The reason for this inequality
lies in the special properties of the good ‘innovation’ itself. For instance, a firm can
only get a substantial profit from an innovation if the innovation is exclusive, i.e., not
freely available to its competitors. In general, the amount of R&D investment will
depend on the degree of appropriability of an innovation and thus on the realizable
profits of an investing firm. Policy instruments are used by the government with
1The instruments are especially common in various industries like consumer electronics, phar-
maceuticals, or automobile. In the fiscal year 2007, for instance, 184,376 patents were granted in
the U.S. (39.37% of the applications) and the U.S. government funded 9.22% (24,450 out of 265,193
millions of US-$) of the industry’s R&D expenditures (see Performance and Accountability Report
2008 by the United States Patent and Trademark Office and Info Brief 2008 of the National Science
Foundation).
2For empirical studies investigating firms’ R&D investment behavior and its effect on economic
growth see e.g., Bernstein (1996), Cohen (1995), Cohen and Levin (1989), Jones and Williams
(1998, 2000), or Steger (2005).
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the intention of providing the missing investment incentives and solving or at least
diminishing the problem of underinvestment. The most frequently implemented in-
struments are patents, subsidies, granting research joint ventures, or announcing
research tournaments.3 But, whether the policy instruments increase investment by
the intended amount is anything but clear.
In this paper, we focus on the incentive effects of patents and subsidies on firms’
R&D investment decisions. Furthermore, we analyze their impact on total social
welfare as well as on the distribution of welfare between consumers, producers, and
the government. Instead of using real-world data as it is done in empirical research,
we use a controlled laboratory experiment to test for the incentive effects of each in-
strument. By doing so, we can keep any other possible influences fixed and are thus
able to disentangle the induced effects. Further, we are able to directly compare the
performance of the two instruments between each other and with a benchmark situa-
tion in which we provide no additional investment incentives. To our best knowledge
this is the first study directly comparing the performance of patents and subsidies
using a laboratory experiment. We find evidence that (i) subsidies and patents have
a significantly positive impact on R&D investment and that (ii) the effect of both
instruments on incentives to innovate is not significantly different. However, our ex-
periment also shows that (iii) firms overinvest in all three scenarios compared to the
theoretical prediction of the profit maximizing R&D investment. This gives rise to
a perverse result with respect to social welfare: The level of welfare reached without
providing additional investment incentives is as high as the one intended to reach
by making use of policy instruments. Apart from that, we show which instrument
is favored by which interest group, i.e., by consumers, producers, or the government.
There exists a vast theoretical and empirical literature also including some exper-
imental studies analyzing the effects, usage, design, and drawbacks of the two policy
instruments4. The impact of granting patent protection is typically analyzed in dy-
namic patent race models (among others see Harris and Vickers (1987)).5 In these
studies patent protection of an innovation indeed increases equilibrium R&D in-
vestment. However, by creating a the-winner-takes-all situation, patent races might
systematically induce excessive spending on R&D (i.e., higher than socially op-
3For an overview of different aspects of R&D spending and incentive instruments refer to Scotch-
mer (2005).
4For patents please refer to e.g., Reinganum (1983), Wright (1983), or Sakakibara and Branstet-
ter (2001); for subsidies to e.g., Spencer and Brander (1983), Romano (1989), Hinloopen (2000,
2001), or Aerts and Schmidt (2008).
5Among various aspects of patent laws that have been already studied in the economic literature
are the optimal length and breadth of patents (e.g., Nordhaus (1969); Gilbert and Shapiro (1990);
Klemperer (1990); Gallini (1992); Chang (1995)). There exist also studies on patent races focusing
on the timing of investment and the different behavior of leaders and laggards see e.g., Breitmoser,
Tan, and Zizzo (2010), Zizzo (2002) and Ka¨hko¨nen (2005).
1 Introduction 81
timal investment levels) with negative effects on welfare (see e.g., Dasgupta and
Stiglitz (1980), or Loury (1979)). Early empirical studies show that 36% of R&D
expenditure would not have been carried out if patent protection was not available.
The degree varies between industries and is higher in industries in which imitation
costs are low (Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner (1981) and Mansfield (1986)). A
structural estimation of the patent premium, firms’ expected net payoff of patent
protection, is done by Arora, Ceccagnoli, and Cohen (2008) and they show that
an increase of the patent premium rises firms’ R&D spending. The more effective
patent protection is, the higher is the investment incentive and the larger is the rise
of R&D expenditure. Experimental studies on a one-stage stochastic R&D process
by Isaac and Reynolds (1986, 1988) show that subjects invest more under full6 than
under partial appropriability and that the R&D investment exceeds the socially op-
timal amount under full appropriability. Subsidies as another policy instrument are
used to stimulate investment and to decrease the risk of firms investing in R&D
since the sunk costs in case of failure are reduced. Subsidies should encourage firms
either to invest more or to overcome a threshold of investing in R&D. Theoretical
work (see e.g., Hinloopen (2001)) concerning the impact of subsidies indicates that
investment levels as well as welfare are increased, but that profits are decreased.
An experimental study on the effects of subsidies and appropriability on stochastic
R&D investment by Davis, Quirmbach, and Swenson (1995) also proves that R&D
investment is increased significantly by a subsidy.7
Apart from studies investigating the impact of a single incentive instrument, there
exists a literature addressing the question of the optimal policy mix. However, the
answer to that question is ambiguous. Romano (1991) shows that it is almost never
optimal to offer patent protection and subsidization at the same time, but Li (2001)
finds in the context of a growth model that it is always optimal to subsidize as long
as the government can set the patent breadth. An interesting insight is provided by
Schankerman (1998) who estimates the value of patent protection in terms of the de-
gree of subsidization which is needed to reach the same amount of R&D investment.
He estimates the “equivalent subsidy rate” to be about 25%. Arora, Ceccagnoli, and
Cohen (2008) do the same estimation and estimate a rate of 33%. Summarizing,
the existing literature provides evidence that patents as well as subsidies have a
substantial impact on rising R&D investment, but does not show which of the two
instruments is better in stimulating investment and which is more favorable from
the consumers’ or producers’ point of view.
6Full appropriability of an innovation means that the innovating firm gains the complete profits
induced by the innovation, i.e., monopoly profits. Therefore full appropriability corresponds to
patent protection.
7Other experimental studies on subsidizing R&D like those by Buckley, Mestelman, and Shehata
(2003) and Cooper and Selto (1991) rather focus on the effect of different designs of the subsidy
in form of tax benefits and R&D project funding (see Giebe, Grebe, and Wolfstetter (2006)).
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In contrast to the existing experimental literature we directly compare the effect
of the two instruments using the framework of a two-stage game8 in which at a first
stage subjects are asked to invest in an uncertain R&D project followed by a market
stage with Bertrand price competition.9 Note that by additionally implementing
a market stage (second stage of the game), a firm’s private returns from R&D are
determined endogenously in the Bertrand competition stage (by price setting) and
are not exogenously given. Following Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) who show
that three firms are enough to let prices converge to equilibrium prices in Bertrand
games, a market is assumed to consist of three competing firms.
We run three treatments: one for each policy instrument and - as a benchmark -
one without any incentive instruments. In the first two we provide either patent
protection or subsidize investments, i.e., lower the firms’ investment costs. In order
to make patent protection and subsidizing perfectly comparable, the experimental
parameters for both incentive instruments are chosen in a way that in equilibrium
the profit maximizing investment for firms and thus the social welfare evolving from
both are equal. Specifically, in our model the patent protects the innovation during
the whole market duration and the subsidy is chosen in such a way that the invest-
ment induced will equal the investment under patent protection in equilibrium.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the
theoretical model, which is followed by the experimental design and proceedings
in Section 3. Section 4 encloses the experimental results and with a discussion, in
Section 5, we conclude.
2 The Model
Consider the following two-stage game with i=1,...,n risk-neutral firms. Table 1
shows the structure of the game: At the first stage (‘R&D investment stage’), each
firm starts out with identically high marginal costs cHi = c
H , ∀i, and independently
decides on the amount it invests in R&D, ri ∈ [0, 1) , to gain low marginal costs,
cLi = c
L > 0, ∀i, with 0 ≤ cL < cH .10
8Two-stage games are used as well to experimentally investigate investment behavior in R&D by
e.g., Jullien and Ruffieux (2001), Suetens (2008), Isaac and Reynolds (1992), Sacco and Schmutzler
(2011), and Chapter 2. However, all studies mentioned do not make a comparison of the investment
incentive induced by different policy instruments, but, e.g., analyze the effect of changes in the
degree of competition on the investment incentive.
9A Bertrand market is chosen for simplification in the experiment and to follow the patent race
literature which often uses a the-winner-takes-all assumption, for a general model see Harris and
Vickers (1987). In our setting only an exclusive innovating firm can reap all profits at the market
stage, the other firms receive nothing.
10Each firm chooses privately and simultaneously an R&D investment level.
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Table 1: Structure of the two-stage game
1st stage n firms invest each ri ∈ [0, 1] and receive with
probability F (ri) low marginal costs c
L; in-
vestment costs are (1− σ)ri
single investment decision
2nd stage firms have either low (cL) or high marginal
costs (cH) and set prices pi,t in each period:
1,...,T Bertrand market periods
low marginal costs cL cannot be imitated 1st market period
low marginal costs cL are protected from imi-
tation by a patent
θ = 0, 1, ..., T − 1 market period
low marginal costs cL can be imitated T − θ − 1 market periods
Firm i ’s probability of successful R&D is given by a continuous cumulative distri-
bution, F (ri), with density f(ri), and we assume F (0) = 0, F (1) = 1, and that F (·)
is monotone and concave (i.e., f(ri) > 0 and f
′(ri) < 0 for ri ∈ [0, 1] , respectively).
In words, we assume constant marginal costs and diminishing returns from R&D
investment.11 At the second stage (‘market stage’), t=1,...,T consecutive Bertrand
market periods take place in each of which firms simultaneously set their prices, pi,t,
at which they sell a homogeneous good.12 Consumers only buy at the lowest market
price, pmint , and we assume the same (normalized) price-inelastic market demand
in each period, Q=Qt=1, ∀t.
13 In the first Bertrand market period, each firm’s
marginal costs, cH or cL, only depend on its own success in the R&D investment
stage.14 We assume, without loss of generality, that high cost firms can then imitate
the production technology of low cost firms at no cost and also produce at cL be-
ginning in the second market period. Thus, in absence of any imitation-prohibiting
policy, a firm’s marginal costs in the second and all subsequent market periods de-
pend not only on its own success but also on whether or not at least one firm has
successfully innovated in the first period.
We examine two common government R&D policies that influence the firms’ in-
centives to invest in R&D: subsidies and patents. Subsidies target at the cost side
of each firm’s expected profit from R&D by covering a proportion σ ∈ [0, 1] of its
11Although it is debated whether R&D investments exhibit diminishing returns in the empirical
literature, we follow the theoretical papers in the tradition of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
For comments on that matter please refer, e.g., to Kamien and Schwartz (1975), Griliches (1990),
and Nadiri (1993). We also refrain from modeling fix costs, FC, as we do not analyze any decisions
to enter the market.
12For simplicity, we assume that firms only produce when they can sell.
13An implication of assuming price-inelastic demand is that the innovation will be automatically
non-drastic since the monopoly price before and after the innovation (which equals the prohibitive
price p¯) is assumed to be higher than cH .
14We assume that there are no technological spillovers at the investment stage: each firm i’s
chances of a successful innovation depend only on its own investment ri, not on a rival’s investment
rj .
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R&D costs (i.e., each firm i pays (1 − σ)ri and government pays σri). Patents,
in contrast, target at the revenue side of each firm’s expected profit by protecting
innovating firms beyond the first period. More precisely, government prohibits high
cost firms to apply imitated production technologies for other θ=0,1,...,T-1 market
periods after the first market period. Note that each successfully innovating firm
obtains patent protection in our model, i.e., more than one firm in a market might
be provided with a patent. Thus, patent protection does not automatically create
a monopoly. One might argue that this is no ‘pure’ patent protection (in the sense
of ‘the winner takes all’). However, it is realistic to assume that firms might invest
in different technology innovations yielding a cost reduction and that these different
technologies are protected. Finally, we assume that the game structure and parame-
ters as well as the R&D success of each firm and the government R&D policy (hence
the marginal cost of each firm in each market period) are common knowledge. In
the next subsections we analyze our two-stage game. Due to backward induction we
start the analysis with the second stage of the game followed by the first stage.
2.1 Market Stage
Depending on the government’s R&D policy and the firms’ R&D successes at the
first stage, we distinguish between different compositions of marginal costs in each
Bertrand market which lead to different market prices (for simplicity, we refrain
from indexing R&D policies and market periods). We assume that among the firms
which offer the lowest price those with the lowest marginal costs share the demand
equally.
(1) The market price equals the lowest marginal costs in the market and is thus
either p∗ = cHor p∗ = cL. p∗ = cH is the market price if no firm has low
marginal costs and p∗ = cLis the market price if at least two firms have low
marginal costs. Hence, the market profits for all firms are π∗ = 0.
(2) A market price higher than the lowest marginal costs is set if merely one firm
has low marginal costs. This firm sets a price as high as the competitors’
marginal costs, i.e., the market price equals high marginal costs, p∗ = cH .
Thus, the firm with low marginal costs receives positive market profits π∗i =
p∗i−c
L ≡ cH−cL > 0 while the competitors receive zero market profits π∗−i = 0,
∀ − i 6= i.
For a more detailed derivation of the market prices, see, for instance, Motta (2004).
Note that (2) may apply to the first market period and all periods that are patent
protected by government, but in all other cases either no firm or all firms have
low marginal costs. Moreover, note that market prices as well as Nash equilibrium
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profits are unique for each cost structure (though there are infinitely many Nash
equilibrium price constellations) and that the only equilibrium situation in which a
firm makes strictly positive market profits is in case it is the only low cost firm.
2.2 R&D Investment Stage
In this subsection we analyze the investment decision at the first stage. In the fol-
lowing we concentrate on the case that all firms’ R&D investments are symmetric
(i.e., ri≡r, ∀i) as a benchmark case. Note that there might also exist asymmetric
equilibria. We will discuss the equilibrium selection in more detail in Sections 3.1
and 4.1. At the R&D investment stage, each firm knows the government’s R&D
policy and anticipates all possible Nash equilibrium profits at the market stage.
Proposition 2.1. The symmetric Nash equilibrium level of R&D investment,
r∗(n,∆c, θ, σ) ∈ [0, 1], is characterized by the necessary and sufficient condition
f(r∗) [1− F (r∗)]n−1 (1 + θ)∆c = 1− σ. (1)
The optimal investment level in R&D r∗ is increasing in the mark-up from being the
only low cost firm ∆c = p− cL = cH − cL, the number of patent-protected periods θ,
and the subsidized proportion of the firms’ R&D investment costs σ. However, r∗ is
decreasing in the number of firms n; and it is independent of the number of market
periods T.
The proof is given in Appendix A.1.
Proposition 2.1 implies that both policy instruments provide incentives for the
firms to increase their investment levels in R&D. Moreover, as a firm can only
achieve positive profits under Bertrand competition if it is the sole innovating firm
in its market, the incentive to invest in R&D increases the higher this mark-up is.
In our model investment levels decrease with tougher competition (i.e., an increase
in n), because it becomes less probable that a firm is the sole innovator the more
competitors are in the market. Note that there is huge literature studying the
impact of market structure on investment behavior providing mixed results (for
studies on the different effects of competition on investment see e.g., Boone (2000),
Schmutzler (2010), Vives (2008), or Chapter 2 for an experimental investigation).15
The equilibrium value of r is independent of the number of market periods T, but
dependent of the number of patent-protected market periods θ. Since the number
of market periods in which a single low cost firm can make positive profits is in
15Cohen and Levin (1989, p. 1075) already stated that “[e]conomists have offered an array
of theoretical arguments yielding ambiguous predictions about the effects of market structure on
innovation.”
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our model reduced to the first period and in the patent case determined by the
additional number of patent-protected market periods θ.
2.3 Distributional Effects
In this subsection we distinguish the welfare shares (or rents) of the different inter-
est groups (firms, consumers and government) in order to analyze the effects of an
increase in the subsidized proportion and in the number of patent-protected periods,
respectively. Thereby, we do not focus on absolute changes of the rents, but rather
on rent shifting between different interest groups. Given equilibrium behavior of the
firms (i.e., the symmetric Nash equilibrium investment level of r∗i (σ, θ) = r
∗(σ, θ),
∀i), we investigate the impact of each policy instrument on added rents.16 Propo-
sition 2.2 indicates that different policy instruments have different distributional
consequences.
Proposition 2.2. An increase in the subsidized proportion of the firms’ R&D in-
vestment costs induces a transfer from government to firms as well as expected rent
shifting between consumers and firms; an increase in the number of patent-protected
market periods induces as well expected rent shifting between consumers and firms.
The proof is given in Appendix A.1.
However, note that the sign of the shifted transfers between consumers and pro-
ducers depends on the concrete parameterization. Precise predictions for our ex-
perimental setup are derived in the next section in order to analyze which group
benefits from an introduction of subsidies and patents, respectively.
3 Experimental Predictions and Design
In the first section, we parameterize the model to derive the hypotheses for the
experiment and in the second section, we describe the experimental design.
3.1 Experimental Set-Up:
Equilibrium Predictions and Hypotheses
Table 2 summarizes the treatment parameters of our experimental set-up.17 Specif-
ically, we use the continuous cumulative probability distribution of R&D success
16Note that we use added rents, i.e., we consider the change of actual total rents in case firms
invest in R&D in comparison to the situation in which no firm invests in R&D.
17In the following the standard case with no instrument is called NO, the subsidy case is called
SUB and the patent case PAT.
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F (ri) =
1
10
r0.5i , ∀ri ∈ {0, 99}, with density f(ri) =
1
20
r−0.5i and f
′(ri) = −
1
40
r−1.5i ,
and n = 3, cH = 500, cL = 100 and T = 2. As the market stage consists only of two
market periods and a cost reduction can only be imitated in the second period, we
set the patent-protected rounds equal to θ = 1 (θ = T − 1), i.e., the patent protects
the innovation during the whole market duration T . The subsidy proportion σ = 1
2
is chosen such that the two policy instruments (patents and subsidies) induce equal
symmetric Nash equilibrium investment levels.
Table 2: Treatment parameters
Treatment Investment Cost structure Cost structure Number of independent
costs 1st market period 2nd market period observations (sessions)
NO ri ci,1 ∈ {c
L, cH} ci,2 = min[c1,1, c2,1, c3,1] 5(1)
SUB 0.5ri ci,1 ∈ {c
L, cH} ci,2 = min[c1,1, c2,1, c3,1] 5(1)
PAT ri ci,1 ∈ {c
L, cH} ci,2 = ci,1 5(1)
The cost structure is given by ci,t, where i denotes the firm and t the market period.
The continuous equilibrium predictions which will be used as a benchmark for
our data analysis are given in Table 3 for our concrete parameters.18 The equilib-
rium R&D investments lead to the same added welfare in SUB and PAT which is
higher than in NO.19 Comparing the effect of an introduction of each R&D policy
instrument with the situation without policy instruments Table 3 indicates that an
introduction of subsidies decreases the firms’ expected added profits and government
rent, and increases expected added consumer rent. The introduction of patent pro-
tection increases the firms’ expected profits and decreases expected consumer rent.
Thus, in our concrete experimental set-up the introduction of a subsidy partly shifts
rents from firms to consumers and the introduction of a patent partly shifts rents
from consumers to firms.
The symmetric Nash equilibrium investment level and the corresponding implica-
tions for welfare shares yield testable predictions about the incentives to invest in
R&D. Let us summarize our main experimental hypothesis which will be tested in
Section 4:
Hypothesis 3.1. Investment levels increase if a policy instrument (SUB, PAT) is
introduced.
Hypothesis 3.2. Welfare increases if a policy instrument is introduced.
18Derivations of equilibrium investment levels are given in Mathematical Appendix A.1.2. Note
that the presented investment levels are the symmetric Nash equilibria. In SUB and in PAT in
addition there exist three asymmetric Nash equilibria given by (56.25, 56.25, 6.25).
19The formula for added welfare as well as the individual welfare shares (added consumer, pro-
ducer and government rent) are given in Mathematical Appendices A.1.1 and A.1.2.
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Table 3: Experimental predictions
Treatment Nash eq. Added Added Added Added
investment welfare consumer rent producer rent government rent
NO 25.00 625.00 550.00 75.00 0.00
SUB 37.16 640.92 640.90 55.76 -55.74
PAT 37.16 640.92 529.40 111.51 0.00
For the derivation of welfare shares we use the continuous symmetric Nash equilibrium investment levels
given in Table 4 as well as T = 2, θ = 1, σ = 0.5, and ∆c = 400.
Hypothesis 3.3. Consumers prefer SUB to NO to PAT, firms prefer PAT to NO
to SUB20.
3.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
The computerized21 experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Eco-
nomic Research in December 2005. We ran 3 sessions (baseline (NO), subsidy (SUB)
and patent (PAT ) treatment) each with 30 subjects.22 Each session lasted about
1.45 hours (cf. Appendix A.5 for the instructions). Earnings in the experiment
were expressed in points. At the end of a session, point earnings were transferred to
cash at an exchange rate of 300 points = 1e. Subjects earned on average 14.95e
including a 2.50e show-up fee (average earnings amount to: 16.53e in Session 1
(PAT ), 13.84e in Session 2 (SUB) and 14.48e in Session 3 (NO).
Each session consists of 30 decision rounds. At the beginning of the experiment,
subjects are randomly divided into 5 matching groups of 6 subjects each. At the
beginning of each round 3 subjects (i.e., ‘firm’ 1, 2, and 3, respectively) are ran-
domly matched.23 Though subjects know they are randomly re-matched in each
round, they are not informed that this happens within matching groups. Hence,
each session provides us with five independent observations.
Each round of the 30 rounds is divided into two phases. Phase 1 corresponds to
the investment stage and phase 2 to the market stage with two consecutive market
periods T=2 (labeled phase 2A and 2B, respectively). In the NO treatment, each
subject receives an endowment of B=100 points at the beginning of each round. In
20Note, firms prefer NO to SUB because the firm’s expected profit is higher in NO than in SUB.
The reasoning is that the effect of the higher probability of being the alone innovating firm due to
the lower investment in NO overweighs the effect of the lower investment costs in SUB.
21The experimental software was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
22Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2004). The vast majority (96%) of subjects
were undergraduate students from the University of Cologne, mostly belonging to the faculty of
management, economics and social sciences.
23We use strangers matching to avoid cooperation in a repeated game and to retain the one-
shot character. Price competition experiments show that three firms are sufficient to ensure near
Bertrand-equilibrium prices (see Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000)).
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phase 1, each subject has to make an investment decision by choosing an integer of
ri ∈ {0, 1, ..., 99} points, which is subtracted from his endowment B. Moreover, each
subject starts with high production costs of cHi = 500 points. Depending on the
investment decision ri and chance, represented by the realization of the cumulative
probability function F (ri) = 0.1(ri)
0.5,24 an innovation may occur which decreases
production costs to a lower level of cLi = 100 points.
25 At the beginning of phase
2, each subject is informed about whether or not he successfully innovates, i.e.,
achieves lower production costs, and also about the innovation success of the other
two subjects in his group (but not about their investment decisions). Thereafter,
the first Bertrand market (phase 2A) starts, in which each subject has to submit a
price pi,1 ∈ {ci,1, ci,1 + 1, ..., 1000} between his own production costs ci,1 ∈
{
cLi,1, c
H
i,1
}
and a prohibitive price of 1000 points. The n1 ∈ {1, 2, 3} subjects with the lowest
submitted price in the market can sell their goods26 each earning πi,1 =
1
n1
(pi,1−ci,1)
points in the first market, whereas subjects with higher prices earn nothing (zero
points). Each subject is informed about the lowest price and his own profit in
the first market, but no other information is given. In the second Bertrand market
(phase 2B), due to costless imitation opportunities, each subject starts with the low-
est production cost among the firms in the first market ci,2 = min [c1,1, c2,1, c3,1] , ∀i.
The procedure in the second market is exactly the same as in the first market: those
subjects with the lowest price (n2) obtain profits of πi,2 =
1
n2
(pi,2 − ci,2) points and
those with higher prices zero-profits. At the end of each round, each subject i is
informed about his round profits, which are given by πi = πi,1 + πi,2 − ri + B, and
his total profits so far.
In the PAT treatment, exactly the same procedure as in NO is applied, with the
only difference that imitation in the second Bertrand market is prohibited (θ = 1):
Each subject’s production costs in the second market are equal to his own costs in
the first market ci,1 = ci,2, ∀i. Finally, the SUB treatment differs in only one aspect
from NO : As half of the investment costs are subsidized (σ = 1
2
), a firm’s investment
costs are reduced from ri to 0.5ri (compare also Table 2).
24To simplify matters ri is divided by hundred, since this allows subjects to choose integer
numbers between 0 and 99 in the experiment instead of decimals. Note that by excluding an
investment level of 100 cost reduction remains stochastic even for the maximum investment.
25In the experiment subjects are given a table which specifies the investment costs and the
probability of a cost reduction (i.e., a successful innovation) for each possible investment level.
Given a subject’s investment decision, the computer program randomly determines based on the
corresponding cumulative probability function F (ri) whether or not the subject ‘innovates’, i.e.,
achieves lower production costs (for more details of these procedures and the given table see the
instructions in Appendix A.5).
26In order to make the design as simple as possible for the subjects, those subjects with the
lowest price share the demand equally. Thus, we relax the assumption of our model that among
those firms which offer the lowest price only those with the lowest marginal costs share the demand.
Note that this implies that the achievable mark-up of a sole innovator decreases to ∆c = 399, since
its equilibrium price decreases to 499.
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4 Experimental Results
The presentation and analysis of our experimental data are organized as follows.
We start by examining R&D investment levels (4.1) including investment dynamics
over time and individual behavior. Thereafter, we investigate firms’ price setting
and resulting profits in the Bertrand markets (4.2). Finally, we analyze the effects
of subsidies and patents on social welfare as well as on welfare for special interest
groups, i.e., firms, consumers and government (4.3). In case average results are pre-
sented, the term average refers to mean value over rounds in the subsequent analyses.
Laboratory findings and their comparisons with the respective Nash predictions are
summarized as experimental results (ER) at the end of each section.
4.1 R&D Investments
Table 4 shows the average R&D investment for each treatment and the predicted
symmetric Nash equilibrium for continuous investment levels.27 At first sight, there
are two remarkable aspects. First, the observed investment level is higher using a
policy instrument like subsidy or patent in comparison with our baseline treatment
with no R&D policy: Subsidies and patents increase firms’ R&D investment levels
by 35.79% and 45.62%, respectively. This indicates that both instruments serve the
purpose of rising investment levels supporting Hypothesis 3.1.28 Using matching
group averages as independent observations a Kruskal-Wallis test reveals that we can
reject the hypothesis that the investment levels of all treatments are drawn from the
same population.29 Pair wise Mann-Whitney-U tests reveal significant differences
between NO and SUB as well as between NO and PAT whereas SUB and PAT
investment levels do not differ significantly.30 Second, the observed average R&D
investment in the experiment is always higher than the predicted Nash equilibrium
for each treatment. R&D investments are about 37.92% (26.00%; 35.12%) higher
than theoretically predicted by the symmetric Nash equilibrium in NO (SUB, PAT ).
We will later discuss possible explanations for this overinvestment.
27We take the continuous symmetric Nash equilibrium as a benchmark. Note that we get multiple
equilibria in case of discrete investment levels (all equilibria are given in Table 12 in Appendix
A.4). However, continuous and discrete equilibria do not differ (much) as long as we concentrate
on symmetric equilibria (discrete symmetric equilibria are 25, 37, 37 in NO, SUB, PAT ).
28However, note that the theoretical increase in investment levels is higher: Investment levels
are predicted to be 48.64% higher in SUB (and PAT respectively) than in NO.
29In the following nonparametric tests we always use matching groups as independent observa-
tions.
30One-tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests reject the null hypothesis of no differences in average in-
vestments in favor of higher investment levels in SUB and PAT than in NO (p=0.016) respectively
(p=0.004), but cannot reject the null hypothesis for the comparison of SUB and PAT (p=0.21).
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Table 4: Average observed and predicted R&D
Investment levels NO SUB PAT
Observed 34.48 46.82 50.21
(23.67) (32.13) (35.61)
Predicted 25.00 37.16 37.16
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
4.1.1 Time Path of Investment
Figure 1 depicts observed and predicted average R&D investment levels per round.
These levels are higher than predicted by the symmetric Nash equilibrium in all
rounds in each treatment (with only three exceptions in SUB). Considering invest-
ment behavior over time, average R&D investment levels decrease from the first to
the second half of 30 rounds in NO and PAT (36.59 vs. 32.36 and 52.14 vs. 48.28,
respectively), but increase in SUB (43.81 vs. 49.82). However, Wilcoxon Signed
Rank tests yield significant results only for the decrease in investments in NO at
the 5% significance level.
Figure 1: Observed and predicted R&D investments over rounds
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To examine the dynamics of R&D investment decisions at the individual level,
we use a simple ordinary least squares regression (Table 5). Due to dependency
of the observations within matching groups we calculate clustered standard errors.
As explanatory variables we consider treatment dummies and dummies for firm i’s
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success in reducing its cost in the previous round (i.e., lagged variables) as well as
round dummies. The treatment dummies (NO, SUB, PAT ) are used to generate
interaction variables with the explanatory variables. In model (1) in Table 5 we
consider dummies for a cost reduction due to successful innovation of a firm in the
previous round CRt−1 (CR=1 for successful innovation, CR=0 for no innovation),
where t denotes the round. Round dummies given for the first half of rounds (round
1-15) and the second half of rounds (round 16-30) as the base category are con-
sidered additionally in model (3). Moreover, in the estimated model (2) in Table
5 cost reduction dummies CR are subdivided into the cases that only firm i suc-
cessfully reduced its costs (CR1t−1), that firm i and one other firm j reduced their
costs (CR2t−1), and that all three firms reduced their costs in the previous round
(CR3t−1). Note that in all these categories at least firm i successfully innovates. The
reference category for the three cost reduction dummies (CR1t−1, CR2t−1,CR3t−1)
is the situation that firm i did not have low costs in the previous round independent
of the other firms’ cost levels (CR0t−1).
Model (1) in Table 5 shows that a successful innovation of firm i in the previous
round has a positive and highly significant influence on its current investment level
compared to the reference category ‘no success’ (CR=0). Moreover, the coefficients
of all single cost reduction dummies in model (2) have a positive sign and are sig-
nificantly different from zero as well: Independent of the treatment a firm i invests
significantly more in the current round if at least this firm i successfully innovated in
the previous round compared to the benchmark case that firm i had no success. Note
that the investment level also increases if one or even both other firms in the market
were also successful in cost reduction in the previous round. Note as well that being
the exclusive innovator increases investment levels strongest (compare Table 13 in
Appendix A.4, where we drop CR1 as the base category; the coefficients for all other
cost reduction dummies are negative compared with CR1 ). In line with the results
from above we observe a round effect in NO : We find that investment levels in NO
are significantly higher being in the first half of rounds (first round excluded) com-
pared to the last half of rounds, whereas investment levels are significantly lower in
the first half of rounds in SUB and are not significantly influenced by round in PAT.
The OLS regression measures the effects of the tested parameters in each treat-
ment (i.e., whether a parameter has an influence on a firm’s investment level for each
treatment separately). For a comparison of effects between treatments (i.e., whether
a parameter has a stronger influence in one treatment than in the other) see OLS
regression results given in Table 14 in Appendix A.4. As the reference treatment
we drop the treatment dummy ‘SUB ’. Table 14 clearly indicates that the positive
effect of firm i’s successful innovation (compared to no success) on investment levels
is significantly stronger in PAT than in SUB and significantly weaker in NO than
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in SUB (see models (1) and (3)). Moreover, the positive effect of a successful cost
reduction on the investment level if firm i is the exclusive innovator or if firm i and
one other firm successfully innovate is as well in PAT significantly higher and in NO
significantly lower than in SUB (see model (2)).
Table 5: OLS regression results
Investment Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
NO 28.262∗∗∗ (2.604) 28.262∗∗∗ (2.607) 26.669∗∗∗ (2.347)
SUB 31.783∗∗∗ (2.086) 31.783∗∗∗ (2.088) 34.840∗∗∗ (1.626)
PAT 27.902∗∗∗ (3.671) 27.902∗∗∗ (3.675) 27.329∗∗∗ (3.663)
CRt−1 ×NO 11.178
∗∗∗ (2.226) 11.094∗∗∗ (2.204)
CRt−1 × SUB 23.341
∗∗∗ (3.096) 23.088∗∗∗ (2.983)
CRt−1 × PAT 37.486
∗∗∗ (3.884) 37.404∗∗∗ (3.906)
CR1t−1 ×NO 15.823
∗∗∗ (2.870)
CR1t−1 × SUB 25.626
∗∗∗ (1.862)
CR1t−1 × PAT 46.842
∗∗∗ (4.337)
CR2t−1 ×NO 11.950
∗∗∗ (2.581)
CR2t−1 × SUB 22.455
∗∗∗ (3.652)
CR2t−1 × PAT 38.120
∗∗∗ (2.896)
CR3t−1 ×NO 6.231
∗∗ (2.769)
CR3t−1 × SUB 23.792
∗∗∗ (3.160)
CR3t−1 × PAT 31.356
∗∗∗ (4.070)
round1 15×NO 3.389∗∗ (1.511)
round1 15×SUB -6.004∗∗∗ (1.917)
round1 15×PAT 1.286 (1.838)
R2 0.211 0.218 0.215
N 2610 2610 2610
No. of clusters 15 15 15
Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for matching group clusters. As we drop the constant
in the estimated models, the reported R2 is taken from the (analogous) models as presented in Table 14 in
Appendix A.4. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.1.2 Individual Investment Decisions
In the previous sections we focused on symmetric Nash equilibrium R&D investment
strategies, which specifically imply that each firm always chooses a discrete invest-
ment level of 25 in NO and 37 in SUB and PAT. However, the actual investment
levels are very diverse: Figure 2 specifies the frequencies of the chosen investment
levels for each treatment.31 Obviously, in the baseline treatment without policy in-
struments the predominant investment level is consistent with the symmetric Nash
31Individual investment behavior over rounds is given in Figures 7 to 9 in Appendix A.3. A small
fraction of subjects sticks to a certain investment level (or adjusts the investment level only slightly
over rounds). Investment levels remaining constant over rounds are most frequently observed in
the PAT treatment.
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equilibrium investment level of 25 (this level is chosen in 19.11% of cases). Yet
keeping the endowment and investing zero is the second most chosen behavior in
this treatment. On the contrary, in the two treatments with policy instruments the
Nash equilibrium of 37 is almost never chosen (in less than 1% of the cases). In the
PAT treatment the most frequently chosen investment levels are zero (15%) and
the maximum of 99 (16.11%). This behavior obeys kind of an ‘all-or-none law’: a
subject either invests his complete endowment trying to achieve low costs (and thus
a possible competitive advantage in the two market periods) or a subject decides
on retaining his endowment and not trying at all to reduce his costs for the market
stage. A smaller percentage of investments of 9.56% is set equal to the intermediate
level of 50. In the SUB treatment the most chosen investment levels 0, 50 and 99 are
more uniformly distributed (7.78%; 9.33%; 10.33%). Investing 99 points is the most
frequently chosen strategy in both treatments with policy instruments,32 whereas
investing the maximum amount plays nearly no role in the baseline treatment. To
examine these observed frequencies further, we consider asymmetric equilibria in
the following. Table 6 summarizes discrete symmetric and asymmetric Nash equi-
librium R&D investment levels for our experimental parameters. Note that the
discrete parameterization gives raise to asymmetric equilibria. In the continuous
case there exists only a unique symmetric equilibrium investment level in NO, and a
symmetric and three asymmetric equilibria in SUB and PAT (compare Footnote 16).
To understand the frequencies shown in Figure 2, it might be helpful to consider
asymmetric Nash equilibria (see Table 6). In all treatments there exist three asym-
metric Nash equilibria in which two firms choose 0 and one firm chooses 99. This is
consistent with the observed investment levels of 0 and 99. However, note that the
predicted asymmetric equilibria of (0, 0, 99) fail to explain (i) why 99 is chosen even
more often than the minimum level of zero in SUB and PAT, and (ii) why 0 and 99
are less frequently chosen in NO than in SUB and PAT. The first observation might
hint at a possible coordination failure. The asymmetric equilibria add a substantial
coordination problem to the subjects’ decision task.33 The second observation that
0 and 99 are less frequently chosen in NO than in SUB and PAT may be explained
by additional asymmetric investment levels which exclusively occur in NO : In NO
the number of discrete asymmetric Nash equilibria is highest (in SUB and PAT
there exist – besides the symmetric equilibrium – only the asymmetric equilibria
32The accumulation of the maximum investment level in SUB and PAT might be a further
indication that the introduction of either policy instrument provides stronger incentives to invest
in R&D.
33However, there seems to be evidence that at least some subjects are aware of this coordination
problem, because we observe subjects ‘jumping’ from very low investment levels to very high
investment levels and vice versa especially in the SUB treatment (cf. Figures 7 to 9 in Appendix
A.3). In general, investments are strategic substitutes since a subject has an incentive to decrease
his own investment if a rival increases his investment and vice versa (see comparative statics in
Mathematical Appendix A.1.2).
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Figure 2: Investment frequencies
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in which one firm invests all and the other two firms invest nothing (0,0,99)). In
NO there are in addition asymmetric Nash equilibria consisting of R&D investment
levels from the interval [20, 21,..., 30]. Note that although in NO the number of
discrete asymmetric Nash equilibria is highest, NO is nevertheless the treatment
in which behavior is most consistent with the symmetric Nash equilibrium. This
might be due to the fact that the additional asymmetric investment levels are os-
cillating around the symmetric equilibrium investment level of 25. Hence, it seems
that asymmetric Nash equilibria can contribute to explain some of our data.34
We also examine the dynamics of investment behavior in order to analyze whether
there is a convergence to equilibrium levels over rounds. Therefore we consider in-
vestment behavior of the first round as well as investment behavior of the first
third, second third and last third of rounds separately (Figures 3 – 5). Strikingly,
investment levels of 25 (which is no equilibrium strategy in SUB and PAT ) and
50 are chosen frequently (50 is even the most chosen investment level in NO and
PAT in the first round). Possible explanations for this observation might be that
those investment levels are prominent numbers and, moreover, that an investment
34Besides behavior that is consistent with asymmetric equilibria, we observe ‘local maxima’ in
all three treatments, which occur in 5-scale increments. By local maxima we mean investment
levels which are chosen more frequently compared to investment levels slightly below and slightly
above these maxima (e.g., in the range from 50 to 60 investments of 50, 55 and 60 are chosen in
more cases than intermediate investment levels). This may be explained by the prominence level
of numbers (see Albers (2001)) as these investment level increments seem to create focal points.
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Table 6: Discrete symmetric and asymmetric Nash equilibrium investment levels
Treatment Investment decision
ri rj rk
NO Symmetric 25 25 25
Asymmetric All combinations of investment levels [20,...,30]
that add up to 75, without (25,25,25)
0 0 99
SUB Symmetric 37 37 37
Asymmetric 0 0 99
PAT Symmetric 37 37 37
Asymmetric 0 0 99
All asymmetric equilibria are given in Table 12 in Appendix A.4.
of 25 gives a 50% chance of a successful innovation, which might also create a focal
point. However, note that an investment level of 25 is chosen much more frequently
in NO – where it is the symmetric equilibrium level. Thus, at least a part of this
percentage in NO seems to be driven by equilibrium investment behavior. Fur-
thermore, the fraction of the chosen symmetric Nash equilibrium level of 25 in NO
remains constant from the first third till the last third (although it is lower in the
first round in which the most chosen investment level is 50). In general, in all treat-
ments non-equilibrium investment levels decrease over rounds and there seems to
be a tendency to converge to the asymmetric equilibria (0, 0, 99). Especially the
fraction of zero investment, which belongs to an asymmetric equilibrium strategy,
increases. Specifically, in SUB non-equilibrium levels (in particular choosing 50)
decrease over rounds converging to the extreme points 0 and 99 and also the PAT
treatment clearly indicates that the extreme investment levels 0 and 99 are chosen
more frequently in later rounds (non-equilibrium levels decrease in favor of 0 and 99).
ER Investment Levels
Result 4.1. Concerning the investment levels the experimental data show the fol-
lowing:
• The introduction of each policy instrument (SUB and PAT) significantly in-
creases the investment level compared to no governmental R&D intervention
(by 35.79% and 45.62% compared to a theoretical increase of 48.64%), which
is in favor of Hypothesis 3.1.
• As compared to the Nash predictions, firms overinvest in R&D with and with-
out R&D policy instruments.
Result 4.2. The dynamics of R&D investment decisions are very similar between
treatments: previously successful innovation has a positive effect on current invest-
ment decisions independent of other firms’ success. Moreover, investment levels
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increase strongest if a firm was the exclusive innovator in the previous round and if
patent protection is implemented.
Result 4.3. In NO, the modal R&D investment level is indeed the predicted level of
25, whereas the modal level of 99 in SUB and PAT is different from the predicted 37.
The second and third most frequently chosen levels are 0 and an intermediate level
of 50 in PAT, and 50 and 0 in SUB. These observations might be (partly) explained
by asymmetric equilibria. Investment levels tend to converge to the asymmetric
equilibrium levels of 0 and 99 over rounds.
Figure 3: Dynamic view on investment level choices – NO
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4.2 Cost Structure, Prices, and Profits
4.2.1 Cost Structure
The cost structure in the first Bertrand market period (i.e., the number of firms
facing low costs of 100 and the number of firms facing high costs of 500) is deter-
mined by the number of successful innovations. The cost structure in the second
Bertrand market period depends on the cost structure of the first market as well as
on the chosen policy instrument. Table 7 gives observed frequencies of the different
cost structures in the two Bertrand market periods (and as a benchmark predicted
frequencies in case of symmetric discrete equilibrium investment levels). Only in the
PAT treatment the innovating firms are protected against imitation. Thus, in this
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Figure 4: Dynamic view on investment level choices – SUB
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Figure 5: Dynamic view on investment level choices – PAT
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treatment the number of low cost firms does not change in the 2nd market. In the
other two treatments however, in the second market period there are either three
firms with high costs (if in the first market period there was no low cost firm in the
market) or three firms with low costs (in all other cases). Markets with two or three
low cost firms occur more often in SUB and PAT than in NO after the investment
stage. Moreover, we observe the extreme case of three high cost firms (see column
‘zero’ in the 1st period) twice as often in the baseline treatment as in SUB and
PAT. The higher percentage of successfully innovating firms in a market is a result
of the higher investment levels in treatments with policy instruments.
Table 7 reveals only slight differences in observed proportions of cost structures
as compared to those predicted by symmetric R&D investment strategies.35 Specif-
ically, predicted proportions are always higher than observed proportions if there
is no low cost firm in the market in all three treatments, whereas the chances of
two or three low cost firms in a market are typically higher than predicted.36 This
observation can be explained by the observed overinvestment in all three treatments.
The observed frequency of a sole low cost firm is smaller than predicted in NO and
SUB, but higher in PAT. Theoretically, SUB and PAT should result in identical
frequencies of cost structures in the first market. Note however, that in SUB more
successful innovations occur than in PAT (the percentage of two and three low cost
firms is higher and the percentage of no or one low cost firm is lower in SUB).
4.2.2 Prices and Mark-ups
Figure 6 depicts the average market price (i.e., the lowest price pmini,t = min[p1,t, p2,t, p3,t]
set in each market) for the three treatments for both market periods. Obviously,
observed market prices in the experiment are on average close to those theoretically
predicted (if subjects choose discrete symmetric equilibrium investment levels and
equilibrium market prices).
Under Bertrand competition market prices are mainly driven by the underlying
cost structure. Therefore, Table 8 presents the average of actual market prices in
the 1st and 2nd Bertrand markets for each cost structure separately.37 Again, in all
35This is a surprising result. Although the majority of individual behavior is not consistent with
the discrete symmetric equilibrium investment level, on average similar market structures result
as predicted by the symmetric Nash equilibrium.
36However, Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests yield no significant differences on the 10%-level in
observed and predicted frequencies for all three treatments in the first market period (- values are
given by 4.60, 4.48 and 3.24 in NO, SUB and PAT). It is not possible to calculate Chi-square tests
for the second period as there are parameter values equaling zero in NO and SUB.
37We proceed in the following way: After the investment stage four different states of nature may
occur - the numbers of successful innovations before Bertrand market starts are either zero, one,
two or three. We calculate for these four different cases the average of lowest prices over all rounds
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Table 7: Observed (predicted) cost structure in the Bertrand markets
Bertrand Number of low cost firms 1st period
markets Treatment Zero One Two Three Total
1st NO 11.67% 32.33% 41.33% 14.67% 100%
(12.50%) (37.50%) (37.50%) (12.50%) (100%)
SUB 4.67% 24.00% 48.67% 22.67% 100%
(6.01%) (28.00%) (43.48%) (22.51%) (100%)
PAT 5.67% 29.67% 46.33% 18.33% 100%
(6.01%) (28.00%) (43.48%) (22.51%) (100%)
Number of low cost firms 2nd period
Zero One Two Three Total
2nd NO 11.67% 0.00% 0.00% 88.33% 100%
(12.50%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (87.50%) (100%)
SUB 4.67% 0.00% 0.00% 95.30% 100%
(6.01%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (93.99%) (100%)
PAT 5.67% 29.67% 46.33% 18.33% 100%
(6.01%) (28.00%) (43.48%) (22.51%) (100%)
The number of low cost firms indicates how many of the three competing firms
in each Bertrand market attain low cost of 100. Predicted cost structure taking
discrete symmetric Nash equilibrium investment levels of 25 in NO and 37
in SUB and PAT are given in parentheses.
Figure 6: Average market price
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The average market price was derived by taking the observed (predicted) frequency of each cost structure after the
investment stage (see Table 7) and multiplying these probabilities with the observed (predicted) average lowest
prices of each cost structure. Note that the average market price thus includes all different cost structures.
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three treatments average market prices are close to those theoretically predicted. If
there are only high cost firms in the market (column 1) prices are slightly above 500
in all three treatments (in the 1st market slightly higher prices are set than in the
2nd market). If there is one low cost firm in the first market (column 2), prices are
set again close to those theoretically predicted. One low cost firm in the first market
means three low cost firms in the second market due to imitation in NO and SUB.
Thus, prices drop close to 100 except for the PAT treatment, where innovation is
protected (prices stick to nearly 499). In case of two successfully innovating firms
market prices in the first market period are between 127.77 and 149.20 on average,
depending on the treatment (column 3). This cost structure implies that there are
in the second market three low cost firms again in NO and SUB and still two low
cost firms in PAT. The last column gives the average lowest prices if there are three
low cost firms in the 1st and thus also three low cost firms in the 2nd market in
all three treatments. In case of zero, two as well as three low cost firms prices are
lower in the 2nd than in the 1st market period. Moreover, prices are higher than
theoretically predicted in all cases, except the case that one firm has low costs and
the other two firms have high costs.38 Figures 10 to 12 in Appendix A.3 depicts av-
erage lowest prices for each cost structure in the 1st and 2nd Bertrand markets for
each round. The figure shows that average market prices converge to the Bertrand
equilibrium prices over rounds as well as over market periods: First, average prices
in general converge to the equilibrium price over rounds and second, prices in the
2nd market are nearly always set closer to the equilibrium price than those of the
corresponding 1st market.
With the average lowest price (market price) for each cost structure given by
Table 8 we can derive the expected mark-ups of firms depicted in Table 15 39.
The finding that prices and thus mark-ups are higher if there are only two low
cost firms in the market is consistent with what has been observed in previous
Bertrand market experiments: E.g., Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) find that the
number of competing firms with identical marginal costs influences the fierceness
of competition in a Bertrand oligopoly experiment. Their data provide evidence
that prices converge towards the theoretical prediction when there are groups of
three or four competitors, whereas prices are much higher than predicted when only
two competitors are matched. Hence, these observations can be explained by the
separately for the 1st and for the 2nd market. Note that the labeling ‘Number of innovating firms’
alludes only to the number of low cost firms at the beginning of the first market period, not to the
second market period (where number of low-cost firms might differ due to imitation).
38Slightly higher prices in these cases might be explained by the fact that in the discrete case
firms can achieve positive profits even if they are not the only innovating firm with low costs.
Note that in the discrete case 501(and 101) are also equilibrium prices for zero (two and three)
innovating firms.
39Note that only those firms benefit from the mark-up who set the lowest price in their market.
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Table 8: Average of lowest prices observed (predicted) in the Bertrand markets
Bertrand Treatment Number of innovating firms
markets Zero One Two Three
1st NO 508.37 (500) 494.37 (499) 146.13 (100) 124.14 (100)
SUB 507.36 (500) 473.00 (499) 127.77 (100) 112.69 (100)
PAT 519.29 (500) 493.88 (499) 149.20 (100) 131.36 (100)
2nd NO 504.66 (500) 113.39 (100) 114.23 (100) 113.55 (100)
SUB 504.93 (500) 107.26 (100) 108.77 (100) 106.12 (100)
PAT 504.53 (500) 494.99 (499) 124.48 (100) 111.13 (100)
The number of innovating firms indicates the successfully innovating firms after the investment stage (i.e.,
low cost firms in the first market period), but does not refer to imitating firms in the second market period.
Note that in case of a sole low cost firm the discrete equilibrium price is 499, otherwise the sole innovator
runs the risk of sharing the demand and decreasing his profits considerably.
influence of market concentration (of firms with identical low costs) on price setting.
For a detailed analysis of the mark-ups please refer to Appendix A.2.
4.2.3 Profits
This subsection surveys the profits of the firms. We differ between profits achieved
solely at the market stage and profits over both stages of the game: Market profits
(given separately for the first period, second period, and both periods) refer to the
actually realized profit per firm at the market stage and round profits defined as
endowment - investment cost + market profits over both periods give profits over
both stages (including the investment and the market stage). Table 9 gives average
market profits over rounds for both periods separately and in sum.40
For each specific cost structure after the investment stage πi(c
H
i,1) and πi(c
L
i,1)
denote firm i’s profits depending on its marginal costs (e.g., (cHi,1) refers to firm i
starting with high marginal costs after the investment stage in market period t = 1).
Note that in NO and SUB in case of one and two low cost firms after the investment
stage all three firms face low costs in the 2nd market period due to imitation. Table
9 summarizes average total market profits per firm for all cost structures as well as
market profits per firm separately for low and high cost firms if both types share a
market. Total market profits give the average profit of a market per firm for each
40Note that there is a difference between mark-ups and market profits. Mark-up refers to the
potential profit margin in a market with a specific cost structure, thus measuring a firm’s profit
margin if a single firm sets the lowest price. Since mark-ups present the potential profit margin
they can be interpreted as incentives to innovate in order to enable a firm to set the lowest price
in the market. Average market profits, however, refer to the sum of actually realized profits in a
market divided by the number of firms, thus measuring the average profit per firm (including also
the ‘losing’ firms). Hence, average market profits can be seen as the expected profit a firm could
obtain ex ante.
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Table 9: Average market profits per high and low cost firms
Number of innovating firms
Zero One Two Three
Treatment πi(c
H
i,1) πi(c
L
i,1) πi(c
H
i,1) Total πi(c
L
i,1) πi(c
H
i,1) Total πi(c
L
i,1)
NO (1st period) 2.79 390.25 0.00 130.08 21.45 0.00 14.30 8.05
SUB (1st period) 2.45 367.44 0.00 122.48 13.89 0.00 9.26 4.23
PAT (1st period) 6.43 389.38 0.00 129.79 24.60 0.00 16.40 10.45
NO (2nd period) 1.55 5.49 3.95 4.46 3.99 6.25 4.74 4.52
SUB (2nd period) 1.64 1.76 2.75 2.42 2.33 4.10 2.92 2.04
PAT (2nd period) 1.51 389.93 0.28 130.16 12.24 0.00 8.16 3.71
NO (both) 4.34 395.74 3.95 134.55 25.44 6.25 19.05 12.56
SUB (both) 4.10 369.21 2.75 124.90 16.22 4.10 12.18 6.27
PAT (both) 7.94 779.31 0.28 259.96 36.84 0.00 24.56 14.16
cost structure (which naturally equals profits of solely high (low) cost firms in zero
(three)). Concentrating on average total market profits over both market periods
(which can be interpreted as a firm’s expected profit at the market stage before it
gets to know if it successfully innovates or not) it holds again for each possible cost
structure that firms benefit most from PAT and achieve lowest profits in SUB as
theoretically predicted (for this matter refer also to the following subsection).
Now we take a look on firms’ average round profits including the investment stage.
We can interpret the average round profits as the expected profits a firm can gain
in general in a specific treatment per round (regardless of a specific cost structure).
As round profits measure the ex ante expected profit, they indicate which treatment
is most profitable for firms. Table 10 summarizes the average (predicted) profits of
all firms over all rounds for the three treatments. Note that round profits (observed
as well as predicted) are smallest in SUB, however profits do not differ significantly
between treatments. A Kruskal-Wallis test as well as pair-wise Mann-Whitney-
U tests reveal no significant differences in average profits across treatments using
matching groups.41
ER Cost Structures, Prices and Profits:
Result 4.4. The predicted and observed proportions of market structures show only
slight differences.
Result 4.5. Average market prices converge to predicted Bertrand market prices
(over rounds as well as over subsequent market periods). This results in mark-ups
(and thus the incentive to invest in R&D) being highest in PAT (over the two market
41Kruskal-Wallis test yields p=0.171 and pair-wise one-tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests yield
p=0.274 (NO -SUB), p=0.075 (NO -PAT ) and p=0.075 (SUB -PAT ).
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Table 10: Average observed and predicted round profits
Round profits NO SUB PAT
Observed 119.25 114.11 141.34
(119.92) (102.85) (226.07)
Predicted 124.88 118.74 137.48
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. To calculate predicted levels
we use the discrete symmetric equilibrium (25 in NO and 37 in SUB and
PAT ) and ∆c = 399.
periods). Observed mark-ups of a sole low cost firm are somewhat lower than in Nash
equilibrium and mark-ups are somewhat higher when there are zero, two, or three
low cost firms.
Result 4.6. Firms’ profits are highest in PAT and lowest in SUB (although we find
no significant difference), which confirms the tendency of firms’ interest as stated in
Hypothesis 3.3.
4.3 Welfare Effects
In this subsection, we examine the effects of subsidies and patents on welfare at
the society level and at the level of interest groups (i.e., consumers, firms,42 and
government). For each treatment Table 11 gives observed and predicted (in paren-
theses) added welfare as compared to a benchmark situation in which all firms make
zero-R&D investments. There are three main observations: First, in comparison to
zero-investments in R&D, total social welfare (as well as total consumer surplus and
total firms’ profits) increases intensely if firms invest in R&D with and without R&D
instruments (which is shown by the fact that all added values in all treatments are
positive). Second, if firms invest in R&D, added social welfare (NO : 600.56; SUB :
620.88; and PAT : 601.38) does not differ significantly between our treatments,43
which implies that added social welfare cannot be enhanced by the introduction of
policy instruments. However, subsidies and patents have very different consequences
for the distribution of welfare within society. As compared to the situation without
R&D policy (NO), on the one hand subsidies increase consumer welfare by 105.95
42Note that we refrain from including the firms’ experimental endowment of 100 in the producer
rent in contrast to round profits presented in Table 10 in the last subsection. Here we use instead
the formula of rents given in Appendix A.1.
43Using added welfare per matching group a Kruskal-Wallis test yields p>0.5 and two-tailed
Mann-Whitney-U tests p>0.1 for each comparison. Note however, that a replication of the experi-
ment would be reasonable in order to check the robustness of results by getting more independent
observations.
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points and on the other hand they reduce industry profits by 15.42 points and gov-
ernment budget by 70.23 points. In contrast, patents decrease consumer welfare by
65.47 points, leave the government budget unaffected, and increase firms’ profits by
66.29 points.44 Third, observed added social welfare and added welfare shares are
lower than the theoretically predicted values (besides consumer rent in SUB and
producer rent in PAT ),45 which can be explained by the overinvestment mentioned
above. This result implies that those interest groups which are anyway privileged
by a policy instrument (consumers in SUB and firms in PAT ), realize even higher
rents than predicted at the expense of the already disadvantaged group.
However, it remains the problematical question what practical implications can
actually be derived. Our welfare results have to be interpreted with caution as our
model and experimental setting are subject to some limitations which deserve men-
tion: We neglected the funding of subsidies (for instance, in our model government
budget is not linked to consumers by tax) and further patent costs (which occur
due to the possible monopoly position of an innovating firm with patent protection:
e.g., future welfare might decrease as firms’ incentives decrease to invest in future
R&D projects). For these reasons a complete welfare analysis is beyond the scope of
this paper. But even in our simplified framework it can be shown that the decisions
of whether and which R&D policy should be introduced seem to be sensitive to the
political process of interests.
ER Welfare Effects
Result 4.7. R&D subsidies and patents do not increase social welfare significantly
(due to overinvestment), thus we question Hypothesis 3.2. However, we observe an
(although not significant) tendency that both policy instruments cause redistribution
within society. With subsidies, consumers gain welfare at the expense of industry
profits and government budget. With patents, the industry increases profits at the
expense of consumer welfare. These results seem to support Hypothesis 3.3.
44The increase in consumer rent if SUB is introduced compared to NO is significant at the 1%-
level (one-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test). All other comparisons do not yield significant differences.
This result might be partly driven by a small sample size of only 5 independent observations.
45CR in SUB is higher than expected, because more successful innovations take place than
theoretically predicted (compare Table 7: theoretically SUB and PAT should provide identical
cost structures (due to the Nash equilibrium of 37 in both treatments), however more successful
innovations occur in SUB for two and three firms). In PAT we observe a higher than predicted
frequency of one low cost firm in the market which might explain the higher PR.
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Table 11: Average welfare effects
Added welfare - observed (predicted)
Treatment Social welfare Consumers Producers Government
NO
600.56 542.83 57.74 0.00
(623.25) (548.63) (74.63) (0.00)
SUB
620.88 648.78 42.32 -70.23
(639.03) (638.31) (56.23) (-55.50)
PAT
601.38 477.36 124.03 0.00
(639.03) (526.58) (112.45) (0.00)
To calculate predicted levels we use the discrete symmetric equilibrium
(25 in NO and 37 in SUB and PAT ) and ∆c = 399.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the performance of two prominent policy instruments used
to enhance firms’ investments in R&D: subsidies and patents. A successful R&D
innovation entails lower marginal costs for the innovating firm. We use a two-stage
stochastic R&Dmodel with an investment stage followed by a Bertrand price compe-
tition stage with two market periods and derive equilibrium investments and prices
for our experimental parameters. In equilibrium, both patents and subsidies induce
the same amount of R&D investment, which is higher than the investment without
governmental incentives. To test these theoretical predictions we run an experiment
comparing a baseline treatment without any policy instrument with two treatments
in which either subsidies are paid to investing firms or in which innovating firms are
granted patent protection respectively. Our main finding at the investment stage is a
significant increase in investment levels if a policy instrument is implemented. Thus,
our experiment provides evidence that both instruments are effective in promoting
investments in R&D.46 However, we observe overinvestment in all three treatments.
This overinvestment might be on the one hand explained by asymmetric discrete
equilibrium investment levels (especially those in which one firm invests the maxi-
mal amount and two other firms refrain from investing) and a simple coordination
failure of the subjects. On the other hand, this result might be (also) due to the
specific properties of a Bertrand market: a Bertrand market leads to ‘aggressive’
interaction among vigorous competitors. Competition in a Bertrand market is very
strong in the sense that a firm makes zero-profits for sure if it does not become the
46Theoretically both introducing a subsidy as well as patent protection should increase the
investment level by the same amount compared to the situation in which no policy instrument
is used. This is supported by our experimental results as the investment level does not differ
significantly across the treatments SUB and PAT.
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only innovator in the market.47 Maybe this all-or-none property tempts subjects
into overinvesting in R&D.
Concerning the market stage we observe that although prices are set slightly above
the marginal costs, they converge to the theoretically predicted Bertrand equilib-
rium prices both over rounds as well as over market periods. In general, note that
despite the complex experimental setting (like implementing a two-stage game with
endogenously determined profits), theory predicts outcomes on average quite well al-
though individual investment behavior diverges from the predicted symmetric Nash
equilibrium: e.g., market structures, average market prices, and average profits are
close to the theoretically predicted levels.
Our data show that R&D investment increases added social welfare compared to
no R&D investment, but also exposes that R&D subsidies as well as patents do
not strongly affect social welfare compared to no policy instrument. This result is
driven by the observed overinvestment discussed above. However, both policy in-
struments cause substantial redistribution within society. Firms fare better under
patents than under no policy, the latter still yields higher profits than subsidies.
The investigation of different ‘interest groups’ is important for policy analysis, be-
cause it reveals where support and opposition can be expected. Nevertheless, the
described results should be interpreted carefully. Due to several limitations of our
model an extensive welfare analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. Limitations
of our analysis are the following: we do not include funding of the instruments, i.e.,
taxes would change the consumer surplus, for instance, nor do we take the costs of
granting patent protection into account. Patents have two effects on social welfare:
on the one hand they provide incentives to innovate in R&D, but on the other hand
they might create monopolies. If a firm holds a monopoly position this could in
turn inhibit near-term following innovations.48 These intertemporal aspects are ne-
glected in our static framework analysis. Thus, as it is shown by Bessen and Maskin
(2009), patents may be desirable to encourage innovation in a static setting (e.g., in
their static model a patent protection leads to higher profits of a firm undertaking
R&D as well as to higher welfare), but they might actually inhibit complementary
innovation in a sequential setting in which imitation might even become a spur to
innovation. Scotchmer (1991) also notes that including positive externalities and in-
47Expecting Bertrand competition at the second stage creates a kind of the-winner-takes-all
situation at the investment stage. Patent race literature suggests that non-colluding firms invest
excessively in R&D (for a seminal paper see Loury (1979)). Doraszelski (2008) shows that this
result strongly hinges on the winner-takes-all assumption. If this assumption is relaxed and patent
protection becomes less effective firms might even underinvest in R&D.
48Note however, that this effect is alleviated by our design as it is possible that more than one
firm successfully innovates. Therefore, patent protection in our experiment does not automatically
imply monopoly power of an innovating firm.
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tertemporal knowledge spillovers, which early innovators confer on later innovators,
poses new problems for the optimal design of patent law. Furthermore, our model
lacks R&D coordination and cooperation (like cross-licensing agreements and joint
ventures), which is very common in R&D intensive markets (compare e.g., Morasch
(1995)). All these factors might have an essential influence on the impact of policy
instruments on R&D investment and their successful implementation and should be
investigated in future research.
Hence, further research is to be done on the robustness of our results concerning
the effects of the policy instruments on investment behavior. Of course, our results
cannot yield conclusive evidence for policy implications as we simplified the model
a lot. However, our experiment is a first step and its insights might contribute to
a broader research agenda on R&D investment promoting policy instruments: Our
findings suggest that the tested policy instruments serve the purpose of rising in-
vestments and that the choice of an appropriate instrument depends on the political
process of interests.
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Appendix
A.1 Mathematical Appendix
A.1.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1 Firm i ’s expected total profit is given by
πei (ri, r−i) = F (ri) [1− F (r−i)]
n−1 (1 + θ)∆c− (1− σ)ri,
where ∆c gives i ’s mark-up if it is the only low cost firm, which occurs with probability
F (ri) [1− F (r−i)]
n−1 for 1+θ periods, and (1− σ)ri gives its R&D costs net of subsidy.
49
Maximization of i ’s expected total profit with respect to ri yields
∂πei (ri, r−i)
∂ri
= f(r∗i ) [1− F (r−i)]
n−1 (1 + θ)∆c− (1− σ)
!
= 0, ∀i.
Rearranging and assuming symmetry, i.e., ri=r, ∀i, yields condition (1) as stated in our
proposition:
f(r∗) [1− F (r∗)]n−1 (1 + θ)∆c = 1− σ,
where the left-hand and right-hand sides (henceforth LHS and RHS, respectively) give
the expected marginal revenues MRe, and marginal costs MC, of R&D investment, respec-
tively. Comparative static analysis with each of the parameters ∆c, θ and n is conducted
like follows: We can rewrite condition (1) as g(x, r(x)) = c, where the LHS is a function
of x ∈ (∆c, θ, n), which is the parameter of interest, and the investment level r. The RHS
is a constant c. A marginal change in x leads to dg
dx
+ dg
dr
dr
dx
= 0. We are interested in dr
dx
.
Note that LHS is strictly decreasing in r (dg
dr
< 0), because:
∂LHS
∂r
=
[
f ′(r) [1− F (r)]n−1 − (n− 1)f(r)2 [1− F (r)]n−2
]
(1+θ)∆c < 0 for r ∈ (0, 1)
with f ′(r)[1 − F (r)] n−1 < 0 and (n− 1)f(r)[1− F (r)] n−2 > 0.
We derive for each specific x the derivative dg
dx
and thus can conclude whether dr
dx
must be
increasing or decreasing. The procedure is analogous for the comparative statics with the
parameter σ: Here we use the first order condition: f(r∗i ) [1− F (r−i)]
n−1 (1+ θ)∆c− (1−
σ)
!
=0, which can be rewritten as g(x, r(x)) = c again.
This analysis exposes the following influence of each parameter on the optimal investment
level r :
• Mark-ups: For a change in ∆c, dg
d∆c > 0 and thus
dr
d∆c > 0 which implies that the
equilibrium value of r increases if ∆c increases.
• Patent-protected market periods: For a change in θ, dg
dθ
> 0 and thus dr
dθ
> 0 which
implies that the equilibrium value of r increases if θ increases.
• Subsidy: For a change in σ, dg
dσ
> 0 and dg
dr
< 0 and thus dr
dσ
> 0 which implies that
the equilibrium value of r increases if σ increases.
49A discount factor for the profits realized in subsequent rounds is neglected.
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• Number of firms: For a change in n, dg
dn
< 0. Since dg
dr
< 0 it holds that dr
dn
< 0
which implies that the equilibrium value of r decreases if n increases.
• Number of market periods: Finally, the equilibrium value of r is independent of
the number of market periods, T, because a firm can only receive strictly positive
Nash equilibrium market profits if it is the only low cost firm. In our model the
number of market periods in which this low cost firm can make such profits is entirely
determined by the first period and the additional number of patent-protected market
periods θ. However, T is the upper boundary of θ and thus may have an indirect
effect on r∗.
Proof of Proposition 2.2 If firms choose the symmetric Nash equilibrium investment
level, this yields the following implications for added welfare shares of different interest
groups. Note first that the investment level r is strictly increasing in σ and θ as was shown
in Proposition 2.1 ( dr
dσ
> 0 and dr
dθ
> 0). In the following we first present the derivatives
of welfare shares with respect to σ, then with respect to θ. The added government rent is
given by
GR(r∗, σ) = −nr∗σ (2).
Hence, an increase in the subsidized proportion σ yields
∂GR(r∗, σ, θ)
∂σ
= −nσ
dr∗
dσ
− nr∗ < 0.
}
transfer to PR
Moreover, expected added consumer rent is given by50
CRe(r∗, θ, σ) = nF (r∗) [1− F (r∗)]n−1 (T − 1− θ)∆c
+
∑n
k=2
(
n
k
)
F (r∗)k [1− F (r∗)]n−k T∆c,
which can be rewritten as
CRe(r∗, θ, σ) = T∆c− [1− F (r∗)]n T∆c
−nF (r∗) [1− F (r∗)]n−1 (1 + θ)∆c.
(3)
This yields
∂CRe(r∗,θ,σ)
∂σ
= T∆cnf(r∗)dr
∗
dσ
[1− F (r∗)]n−1
−n(1 + θ)∆cf(r∗)dr
∗
dσ
[1− F (r∗)]n−2 [[1− F (r∗)]− (n− 1)F (r∗)] .
}
transfer to PR
Finally, expected added producer rent is given by
PRe(r∗, θ, σ) = nF (r∗) [1− F (r∗)]n−1 (1 + θ)∆c− n(1− σ)r∗ (4).
Hence, we have
∂PRe(r∗,θ,σ)
∂σ
= n(1 + θ)∆cf(r∗)dr
∗
dσ
[1− F (r∗)]n−2 [[1− F (r∗)]− (n− 1)F (r∗)]
}
transfer from CR
+nr∗ + nσ dr
∗
dσ
}
transfer from GR− ndr
∗
dσ
.
50For a derivation of the added consumer rent see Mathematical Appendix A.1.2.
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Now we concentrate on an increase of the number of patent-protected periods θ. Concern-
ing government rent this yields
∂GR(r∗, σ, θ)
∂θ
= − nσ
dr∗
dθ
< 0.
}
transfer to PR
Note that ∂GR(r
∗,σ,θ)
∂θ
= 0 if we consider ‘pure’ instruments (i.e., σ = 0 if patent protection
is on hand).
The derivatives of CRe and PRe with respect to θ are given by
∂CRe(r∗, θ, σ)
∂θ
= T∆cnf(r∗)
dr∗
dθ
[1− F (r∗)]n−1
− n(1 + θ)∆cf(r∗)dr
∗
dθ
[1− F (r∗)]n−2 [[1− F (r∗)]− (n− 1)F (r∗)]
− n∆cF (r∗) [1− F (r∗)]n−1
}
transfer to PR
and
∂PRe(r∗, θ, σ)
∂θ
= n(1 + θ)∆cf(r∗)dr
∗
dθ
[1− F (r∗)]n−2 [[1− F (r∗)]− (n− 1)F (r∗)]
+n∆cF (r∗) [1− F (r∗)]n−1
}
transfer from CR
+nσ
dr∗
dθ
}
transfer from GR
− n
dr∗
dθ
Then, our proposition holds, because there is rent shifting both between firms and
government as well as between firms and consumers as indicated by curly brackets. More
precisely, the first term of PR equals the second term of CR and the decrease of GR equals
the increasing second term in PR. This is valid for an increase in the subsidized proportion
as well as for an increase in the number of patent-protected periods.
A.1.2 Derivations
Derivation Added Consumer Rent Expected total consumer rent if firms invest
is given by:
Total Re(r, θ, σ) = nF (r) [1− F (r)]n−1 (T − 1− θ)(p¯− cL)
+ nF (r) [1− F (r)]n−1 (1 + θ)(p¯− cH)
+
∑n
k=2
(
n
k
)
F (r)k [1− F (r)]n−k T (p¯− cL) (A1)
+ (1− F (r))n(p¯− cH)T
Total consumer rent if no firm invests in R&D (benchmark situation) is given by: (p¯−
cH)T. Thus, subtracting the benchmark situation from the expected total CR results in
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an expected added consumer rent of:
CRe(r, θ, σ) = nF (r) [1− F (r)]n−1 (T − 1− θ)(p¯− cL)
+ nF (r) [1− F (r)]n−1 (1 + θ)(p¯− cH)
+
∑n
k=2
(
n
k
)
F (r)k [1− F (r)]n−k T (p¯− cL) (A2)
+ (1− F (r))n(p¯− cH)T
− (p¯ − cH)T
This expression can be rewritten as:
CRe(r, θ, σ) = nF (r) [1− F (r)]n−1 (T − 1− θ)((p¯− cL)− (p¯− cH))
+ nF (r) [1− F (r)]n−1 (1 + θ)((p¯− cH)− (p¯− cH))
+
∑n
k=2
(
n
k
)
F (r)k [1− F (r)]n−k T ((p¯ − cL)− (p¯− cH)) (A3)
+ (1− F (r))n((p¯ − cH)− (p¯ − cH))T
because (T−1−θ)+(1+θ) = T and nF (r) [1− F (r)]n−1+
∑n
k=2
(
n
k
)
F (r)k [1− F (r)]n−k+
(1− F (r))n = 1. (A3) yields expected added consumer rent given in Proposition 2.2.
Derivation of the Optimal Investment for our Parameterization The profit
function of firm i (i={1, 2, 3}) with an endowment B=100 at the market stage in each of
the 30 rounds is given by:
πi(ri, rj , rk) = (p − c
L)(1 + θ)F (ri)(1 − F (rj))(1− F (rk))− (1− σ)ri +B
Taking the equilibrium price p=cH , F (ri) =
1
10r
0.5
i , T=2, σ = 0.5 and θ = 1 yield the
following first order conditions (FOC):
FOC general:
∂πi(ri, rj , rk)
∂ri
=
1
20 (c
H − cL)(1 + θ)(1− 110r
0.5
j )(1−
1
10r
0.5
k )
r0.5i
− (1− σ) = 0
FOC NO (σ = 0, θ = 0):
∂πi(ri, rj , rk)
∂ri
=
1
20 (c
H − cL)(1− 110r
0.5
j )(1 −
1
10r
0.5
k )
r0.5i
− 1 = 0.
FOC SUB (σ = 0.5, θ = 0):
∂πi(ri, rj , rk)
∂ri
=
1
20(c
H − cL)(1− 110r
0.5
j )(1 −
1
10r
0.5
k )
r0.5i
−
1
2
= 0.
FOC PAT (σ = 0, θ = 1):
∂πi(ri, rj , rk)
∂ri
=
1
10 (c
H − cL)(1− 110r
0.5
j )(1 −
1
10r
0.5
k )
r0.5i
− 1 = 0.
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Solving these equation systems for each treatment leads to the equilibrium investments
presented in Table 2.
SOC general case:
∂2πi(ri, rj , rk)
∂r2i
= −
1
40(c
H − cL)(1 + θ)(1− 110r
0.5
j )(1−
1
10r
0.5
k )
r1.5i
< 0.
For the given parameters SOC is always negative.
Added Welfare In general, expected added welfare through R&D is given by
W e(r) = (1−
n∏
i=1
[1− F (ri)])T∆c−
n∑
i=1
ri,
where ∆c gives the increase in welfare if at least one firm succeeds in R&D,51 which occurs
with probability 1 −
∏n
i=1 [1− F (ri)], and
∑n
i=1 ri gives the total R&D investment costs
in the industry.
Expected added welfare for symmetric R&D investment levels ri=r is given by
W e(r) = (1− [1− F (r)]n)T∆c− nr.
Comparative Statics of the Optimal Investment The optimal investment is
characterized by the first order condition:
∂πi(ri, rj , rk)
∂ri
= Q(cH − cL)(1 + θ)f(ri)(1− F (rj))(1 − F (rk))− (1− σ) = 0
With the implicit function theorem

 dri
drj
= −
∂2pii(ri,rj,rk)
∂rirj
∂2pii(ri,rj,rk)
∂r2
i

 we can show that the firm’s
investment decreases with an increase in the rival’s investment:
∂2πi(ri, rj , rk)
∂rirj
= −Q(cH − cL)(1 + θ)f(ri)f(rj)(1− F (rk))
∂2πi(ri, rj , rk)
∂r2i
= Q(cH − cL)(1 + θ)f ′(ri)(1− F (rj))(1 − F (rk))
dri
drj
=
f(ri)f(rj)
f ′(ri)(1− F (rj))
< 0.
A.2 Additional Experimental Results
Mark-ups of the firms are defined as price – costs and represent the firm’s incentive to
innovate. Recall that theoretically predicted mark-ups if there are zero, one, two and three
innovations are 0, 399, 0, and 0 points in the first market; 0, 0, 0, and 0 in the second
51The additional welfare of a lower market price if at least one firm’s innovation is successful
compared to the initial higher price is given by (p¯− cL)− (p¯− cH) = cH − cL ≡ ∆c.
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market for NO and SUB due to imitation, and 0, 399, 0, and 0 in the second market
for PAT. Table 15 shows that mark-ups deviate to some extent from Nash predictions.
Hence, observed mark-ups are higher when zero-mark-ups are predicted if there are no,
two, or three low cost firms and slightly lower when mark-ups of 399 points are predicted
if there is a sole low cost firm. Moreover, deviations appear to be systematic. First,
observed average mark-ups are always larger in the first than the second market period
for a given cost structure and treatment, except when there is only one low cost firm in
PAT.52 Second, mark-ups rank in a specific ascending order of cost structures: Three low
cost firms achieve somewhat higher mark-ups than three high cost firms, and two low cost
firms have somewhat higher mark-ups than three low and high cost firms, i.e., it holds
zero < three < two < one low cost firms for a given market period and treatment. Table
15 shows that in terms of providing incentives to invest in R&D PAT is not only the best
policy for a sole innovating firm as the observed (theoretically predicted) sum of mark-ups
of both periods amounts to 788.87 (798) compared to 407.76 and 380.26 (both 399) in NO
and SUB, but furthermore it also yields the highest sum of mark-ups for all other cost
structures (zero, two and three). In SUB mark-ups over both periods are lowest. Note
that here incentives to innovate refer to a ‘pure’ mark-up effect (and target solely at the
revenue side of firms) neglecting incentives which arise from a reduction of investment
costs.
A.3 Figures
Figures 10 to 12 give average lowest prices for each cost structure in the 1st and 2nd
Bertrand markets for each round. In case there is no entry there was no group consisting
of that special number of low cost firms in that specific round. Note that the number of
low cost firms only refers to the cost structure in the first market period (i.e., it refers to
the number of initially successfully innovating firms). The labeling specifies different cost
structures after the investment stage and gives prices for both periods of the Bertrand
market.
52This result is driven by the higher price setting in the first market.
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Figure 7: Individual investment behavior in NO
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Figure 8: Individual investment behavior in SUB
0
50
10
0
0
50
10
0
0
50
10
0
0
50
10
0
0
50
10
0
0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16 17 18
19 20 21 22 23 24
25 26 27 28 29 30
In
ve
st
m
e
n
t
Round
Graphs per Subject
SUB Treatment
116 Chapter 3: Patents versus Subsidies: A Laboratory Experiment
Figure 9: Individual investment behavior in PAT
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Figure 10: Average lowest prices for each cost structure over rounds in NO
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Figure 11: Average lowest prices for each cost structure over rounds in SUB
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Figure 12: Average lowest prices for each cost structure over rounds in PAT
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A.4 Tables
Table 12: Discrete symmetric and asymmetric Nash equilibrium investment levels
NO SUB PAT
ri rj rk ri rj rk ri rj rk
0 0 99 0 0 99 0 0 99
20 25 30 37 37 37 37 37 37
20 26 29
20 27 28
21 24 30
21 25 29
21 26 28
21 27 27
22 23 30
22 24 29
22 25 28
22 26 27
23 23 29
23 24 28
23 25 27
23 26 26
24 24 27
24 25 26
25 25 25
∆c = 399 is taken for the computation of equilibria (compare Footnote 24).
Table 13: OLS regression on investment with CR1 as base category
NO 44.084∗∗∗ (5.057)
SUB 57.408∗∗∗ (3.272)
PAT 74.744∗∗∗ (0.748)
CR0t−1 ×NO -15.823
∗∗∗ (2.870)
CR0t−1 × SUB -25.626
∗∗∗ (1.862)
CR0t−1 × PAT -46.842
∗∗∗ (4.337)
CR2t−1 ×NO -3.872
∗ (2.169)
CR2t−1 × SUB -3.171 (2.543)
CR2t−1 × PAT -8.722
∗∗∗ (2.585)
CR3t−1 ×NO -9.592
∗∗ (4.391)
CR3t−1 × SUB -1.834 (2.590)
CR3t−1 × PAT -15.486
∗∗∗ (1.304)
R2 0.218
N 2610
No. of clusters 15
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters. Cost reduction dummy variable
CR1 is dropped as base category. As we drop the constant in the estimated models, the reported R2 is
taken from the(analogous) model (2) as presented in Table 14. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 14: OLS regression results with SUB as base category
Investment Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
NO -3.521 (3.336) -3.521 (3.340) -8.171∗∗ (2.855)
PAT -3.881 (4.222) -3.881 (4.227) -7.511∗ (4.008)
Constant 31.783∗∗∗ (2.086) 31.783∗∗∗ (2.088) 34.840∗∗∗ (1.626)
CRt−1 ×NO -12.163
∗∗∗ (3.813) -11.994∗∗∗ (3.709)
CRt−1 × PAT 14.144
∗∗ (4.967) 14.316∗∗ (4.915)
CRt−1 23.341
∗∗∗ (3.096) 23.088∗∗∗ (2.983)
CR1t−1 ×NO -9.803
∗∗ (3.422)
CR1t−1 × PAT 21.216
∗∗∗ (4.720)
CR1t−1 25.626
∗∗∗ (1.862)
CR2t−1 ×NO -10.505
∗∗ (4.472)
CR2t−1 × PAT 15.665
∗∗∗ (4.660)
CR2t−1 22.455
∗∗∗ (3.652)
CR3t−1 ×NO -17.561
∗∗∗ (4.201)
CR3t−1 × PAT 7.564 (5.153)
CR3t−1 23.792
∗∗∗ (3.160)
round1 15×NO 9.393∗∗∗ (2.441)
round1 15×PAT 7.290∗∗ (2.656)
round1 15 -6.004∗∗∗ (1.917)
R2 0.211 0.218 0.215
N 2610 2610 2610
No. of clusters 15 15 15
Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for matching group clusters.
Treatment dummy variable SUB is dropped as base category. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 15: Average mark-ups in the Bertrand markets
Number of innovating firms
Bertrand markets Treatment Zero One Two Three
1st period NO 8.37 394.37 46.13 24.14
SUB 7.36 373.00 27.77 12.69
PAT 19.29 393.88 49.20 31.36
2nd period NO 4.66 13.39 14.23 13.55
SUB 4.93 7.26 8.77 6.12
PAT 4.53 394.99 24.48 11.13
Both periods NO 13.03 407.76 60.36 37.69
SUB 12.29 380.26 36.54 18.81
PAT 23.82 788.87 73.68 42.49
The number of innovating firms indicates the successfully innovating firms
after the investment stage i.e., low cost firms in the first market period,
but does not refer to imitating firms in the second market period.
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A.5 Instructions (Translation from German)
Welcome and thank you very much for participating in this experiment. You receive
2.50e for participating. Depending on your and other participants’ decisions you can earn
additional money. You collect points during the experiment with 300 points equaling
1e. At the end of the experiment your accumulated points will be converted into eand
together with the 2.50e paid out to you in cash. Payoffs remain anonymous. During
the whole experiment, starting now, communication with other participants is strictly
forbidden. If you have a question, please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to
your place and answer your questions.
The Experiment
The experiment consists of 30 rounds. At the beginning of each round all participants
are randomly divided into groups of 3 participants, i.e., the composition of your group
changes in each round. In the following we refer to the 3 participants of your group as
firm 1, 2, and 3. Your firm number is randomly drawn anew in each round. You do not
interact with other groups in a respective round. Your identity is not revealed at any time
before, during or after the experiment.
At the beginning of each round each participant receives an endowment of 100 points
which is credited your personal account of points.
Each round consists of 2 phases (“phase 1” and “phase 2“). In addition phase 2 consists
of two sub-phases (“phase 2A“ and “phase 2B“). You make three decisions in each round,
one in phase 1 and one in each of the phases 2A and 2B.
Phase 1 – 1st Decision
In phase 1 you and the two other firms in your group can make an investment. Each firm
can influence the level of its costs in the current round by its investment. You can have
either high or low costs. You invest by choosing an amount of points (integer) between
0 and 99 (0, 1, 2, . . . , 98, 99). Only you know your own investment (chosen points), it
cannot be observed by any other firm. The same applies to the other firms.
PAT and NO:
Your investment induces investment costs; they are equal to your investment (=
chosen points) and will be subtracted from your endowment of 100 points.
SUB:
Your investment induces investment costs; they are equal to half of your invest-
ment (= chosen points) and will be subtracted from your endowment of 100
points.
Your investment level determines the probability of having costs of 100 points (“low
costs“) or of 500 points (“high costs“) in the current round. The higher your investment,
the higher the probability that you have low costs (100 points). The same applies to the
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two other firms in your group.53
After you and the other two firms in your group made their investment decision, the
computer separately draws a random number for each firm. The number is in the range
of 0.1 and 100 whereby all numbers (0.1, 0.2, . . . , 99.8, 99.9, 100) have an equal chance
to be drawn.
Two alternatives arise:
1. Your random number is smaller than or equal to your probability of
obtaining costs of 100 points: In this case your costs amount to 100 points.
2. Your random number is higher than your probability of obtaining costs
of 100 points: In this case your costs amount to 500 points.
The same applies to both other firms in your group. Thus, your costs only depend
on your own investment level which yields the probability of obtaining certain costs and
chance. Four different situations can arise: Either none, 1, 2 or all 3 firms of your group
have low costs of 100 points (the rest of the firms in the group faces high costs of 500
points).
Phase 2A – 2nd Decision
At the beginning of phase 2A each firm within your group gets to know the costs of all
three firms.
Each firm in your group is asked to choose a price between your own costs in phase 2A
and 1000, i.e., a price either between 100, 101, 102, . . . 999, 1000, if you have low costs
or between 500, 501, 502, .., 999, 1000, if you have high costs. Each firm only knows its
own price and cannot observe the prices of the other two firms.
After all firms made their decisions, the computer identifies the lowest price within your
group which all three firms get to know. There are three possibilities for your group in
phase 2A with the according profits:
1. One firm in your group has chosen the lowest price:
The profit in points of the firm with the lowest price in phase 2A is calculated by
subtracting the costs of this firm in phase 2A from its chosen price. Both firms with
the higher prices receive nothing (0 points) in phase 2A, independent of their prices
and costs in phase 2A.
2. Two firms in your group have chosen the same lowest price:
The profit in points of each firm with the same lowest price in phase 2A is calculated
by subtracting the costs from the chosen price and dividing the result by two. The
firm with the higher price receives nothing (0 points) in phase 2A, independent of
its price and costs in phase 2A.
53All participants received a table containing all possible investment levels, the according invest-
ment costs, and the resulting probabilities of obtaining costs of 100 or 500 points. The probabilities
are calculated by the formula
√
i/100, i stands for the investment of one firm.
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3. All three firms in your group have chosen the same price:
The profit in points of each firm in phase 2A is calculated by subtracting the costs
from the chosen price and dividing the result by three.
If you have not chosen the lowest price of your group in phase 2A, you will not bear any
costs. At the end of phase 2A your profit, which can either be positive or zero, is credited
your personal account of points.
Phase 2B – 3rd Decision
PAT:
The 3rd decision is identical to the 2nd decision. Each firm’s costs have not changed
compared to phase 2A.
NO and SUB:
The 3rd decision just differs slightly from the 2nd decision in phase 2A. The decision pro-
cedure and the computation of profits in phase 2B are the same as in phase 2A. But
compared to phase 2A there is an important difference: In phase 2B the costs of all
firms in one group are the same. The equal cost level in phase 2B corresponds
to the lowest costs within the group in phase 2A. The costs in phase 2B which
are identical for all three firms in your group are announced within your group before you
have to choose your price.
After a round (consisting of phase 1, phase 2A, and phase 2B) is finished you are in-
formed again about your decisions and the results of this round. Afterwards the next
round starts.
Profit per Round
Profit per round =
Phase 1 endowment per round – investment costs in phase 1
Phase 2 + profit in phase 2A
+ profit in phase 2B
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Table 16: Probabilites and costs for NO and PAT
Your investment Your investment costs Probability of getting Probability of getting
(chosen points) Your investment costs costs of 100 points in % costs of 500 points in %
0 0 0,0 100,0
1 1 10,0 90,0
2 2 14,1 85,9
3 3 17,3 82,7
4 4 20,0 80,0
5 5 22,4 77,6
6 6 24,5 75,5
7 7 26,5 73,5
8 8 28,3 71,7
9 9 30,0 70,0
10 10 31,6 68,4
11 11 33,2 66,8
12 12 34,6 65,4
13 13 36,1 63,9
14 14 37,4 62,6
15 15 38,7 61,3
16 16 40,0 60,0
17 17 41,2 58,8
18 18 42,4 57,6
19 19 43,6 56,4
20 20 44,7 55,3
21 21 45,8 54,2
22 22 46,9 53,1
23 23 48,0 52,0
24 24 49,0 51,0
25 25 50,0 50,0
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
75 75 86,6 13,4
76 76 87,2 12,8
77 77 87,7 12,3
78 78 88,3 11,7
79 79 88,9 11,1
80 80 89,4 10,6
81 81 90,0 10,0
82 82 90,6 9,4
83 83 91,1 8,9
84 84 91,7 8,3
85 85 92,2 7,8
86 86 92,7 7,3
87 87 93,3 6,7
88 88 93,8 6,2
89 89 94,3 5,7
90 90 94,9 5,1
91 91 95,4 4,6
92 92 95,9 4,1
93 93 96,4 3,6
94 94 97,0 3,0
95 95 97,5 2,5
96 96 98,0 2,0
97 97 98,5 1,5
98 98 99,0 1,0
99 99 99,5 0,5
The table given to the subjects included all integer numbers between 0 and 99 and in SUB investment costs are halved.
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Chapter 4
Determinants of Successful
Cooperation in a Face-to-Face
Social Dilemma
joint with Silvia Gra¨tz
1 Introduction
The well known prisoner’s dilemma game has become the classic economic exam-
ple to demonstrate non-cooperative behavior: Two contestants face a “dilemma”
in which, independent of the other’s action, each player is better off by defection
than by cooperation. But, the outcome obtained when both defect is worse for each
player than the outcome they would have obtained if both had cooperated. Thus,
self-interested behavior does not unequivocally lead to a globally optimal solution.
Two players who both pursue rational self-interest may end up worse off than if
both act contrary to rational self-interest.
This paper uses data from the television show “Golden Balls” which gives us the
opportunity to analyze cooperative behavior in an environment of high stakes and
face-to-face communication between players as well as players’ behavior in the pre-
play. Players are not only allowed to talk to each other, but they have the possibility
to play with each other, and thereby build a reputation of being trustworthy or be-
ing a liar.
The show consists of three rounds, the first two are pre-play and in the third two
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contestants play a prisoner’s dilemma with defection being a weakly dominant strat-
egy. Starting with four contestants, each round every player is randomly assigned
a certain cash value. These values are partly common knowledge and partly pri-
vate information for the respective player. Then players make truthful or untruthful
statements about their values. At the end of each round, each player has to cast a
vote against one of the other players. The one who receives the majority of votes has
to leave the show empty-handed and her values are taken out of the game. Thus,
the selection procedure determines the two finalists and the stake size at the same
time and does not involve any effort provision by the contestants. The two final
players decide about the division of the stakes via playing a prisoner’s dilemma.
Immediately before the dilemma is played, they can discuss their intentions with
respect to their final decision.
Our contribution consists not only of (i) the analysis of cooperative behavior in the
presence of high stakes and face-to-face communication, but also of (ii) the analysis
of the players’ behavior in the pre-play, especially their voting decisions with respect
to its influence on the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma. Concerning cooperative
behavior, we observe a unilateral cooperation rate of 55% and a mutual cooperation
rate of 33%. Our analysis shows a negative correlation between the stake size and
the cooperation rate with a substantial decline around the level of £500. In games
with stakes below that value, the unilateral cooperation rate even increases to 74%,
and the mutual cooperation rate to 56%. Further, we can show that player’s ex-
pectation about the stake size matters. If the jackpot is lower than expected, the
players are more likely to cooperate. With respect to communication, certain words
and gestures are more important than others. Mutually promising each other to
cooperate and shaking hands on it increases the cooperation rate, whereas shaking
hands without a promise leads to a decline. Apart from those effects, demographic
characteristics, such as age and place of residence, matter.
The analysis of the contestants’ behavior in the pre-play shows that players make
their voting decision dependent on objective criteria such as their opponent’s mone-
tary contribution to the stake size, but also on subjective criteria such as the player’s
trustworthiness and race. In addition, we observe that the weight given to objective
and subjective criteria changes between the first and the second voting decision. In
the second round, apart from stake size, player’s trustworthiness seems to be more
important than player’s demographics. Further, we show that there is a strong link
between the two rounds of pre-prisoner’s dilemma play and the player’s decision on
cooperation. For instance, we find that whether a player lied about her stakes in
the pre-play has a significant effect on the cooperation rate.
While writing the first draft of this paper, published in July 2010, it came to our
attention that van den Assem, van Dolder, and Thaler (2010) are independently
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analyzing data from “Golden Balls”. They came out first with a working paper in
April 2010. The only overlap of both studies is the analysis of unilateral coopera-
tion, focussing on the final round. As we mentioned, we also extensively analyze the
pre-play and link it to the mutual and unilateral decision outcome of the prisoner’s
dilemma game. We additionally include variables describing communication, e.g.,
whether players shake hands or promise each other to cooperate, or lied before. Be-
cause of the independent construction of the data set, both studies differ with regard
to the definition and modeling of variables. Therefore our analysis and results differ
in various aspects.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. We start with a brief review
of the related literature, Section 2, followed by a description of the game show and
data set, Section 3. In Section 4 we explain the strategic considerations of the play-
ers and motivate our analysis. Sections 5 and 6 represent the main part of the paper,
including the empirical analysis and obtained results on cooperative behavior in the
prisoner’s dilemma as well as contestants’ voting behavior in the pre-play. Section
7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
In this section, we first review studies that are closely related to our paper in terms
of using television show data and/or in terms of considering a prisoner’s dilemma
with defection being the weakly dominant strategy. Secondly, we present studies
analyzing the effect of stake-size, anonymity, communication, and gestures on coop-
erative behavior in social dilemma games. Finally, we give a brief overview of results
about lying and discrimination in voting decisions.
Television Game Shows and Weak Prisoner’s Dilemma
Related studies that use television game show data are List (2006), Oberholzer-Gee,
Waldfogel, and White (2010), and Belot, Bhaskar, and van de Ven (2010). The first
two analyze “Friend or Foe”, a US game show, and the latter analyzes “Will (s)he
share or not?”, a show from the Netherlands. In both shows pairs of players build a
jackpot by answering trivia questions together. The teams have to decide about the
division of their accumulated jackpot by playing a prisoner’s dilemma with weakly
dominant strategies. In contrast, in “Golden Balls” stakes are built by a random
process and the two final players are selected on the basis of a two-round voting
procedure. In addition, “Golden Balls” provides the opportunity to analyze a game
with very high stakes, i.e., the average jackpot is more than three times as high
as the average jackpot in “Friend or Foe” and its median value is more than three
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times the median in “Will (s)he share or not”. All three studies find a very high
cooperation rate (around 50%), but only Belot, Bhaskar, and van de Ven (2010)
find an effect of the stake size.
Little empirical work has been done on cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma games
in which defection is a weakly dominant strategy.1 Ortmann and Tichy (1999) an-
alyze the game with respect to gender differences. They find an overall cooperation
rate of 46%, and that females cooperate more frequently than males. Studies related
to the idea of Rapoport (1988) show that the cooperation rate is higher in a pris-
oner’s dilemma with weakly dominant strategies than in one with strictly dominant
strategies.2
Stake Size, Anonymity, and Communication
The effect of the stake size on cooperation rates in dilemma games is widely debated
and no clear answer has been found so far. Some experiments show that there is no
significant effect, whereas others suggest that the cooperation or contribution rate
decreases with the stake size (e.g., Camerer and Hogarth (1999)).
Compared to experiments in the laboratory, contestants in “Golden Balls” do not
anonymously play the prisoner’s dilemma and are allowed to communicate with each
other before choosing their action. The relevance of anonymity in dictator games
is shown by Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994). If people feel observed
by the experimenters they are more altruistic than in a double-blind setting. In
addition, Rege and Telle (2004) showed that the framing of the instructions of the
game may raise the cooperation or contribution rate. Since the players in the game
under consideration are filmed and play in front of a large television audience, we
can expect a similar effect, i.e., a positive effect on cooperation. The cooperation
rate we observe is, however, not much different to the rate reported by Ortmann and
Tichy (1999), which might suggest that the effect of the audience is not as strong
as expected.
In addition, experimental studies have shown that communication increases the
cooperation rate significantly (for surveys see Sally (1995), Ledyard (1995)), al-
1There is a vast experimental literature on prisoner’s dilemma games in which defection is a
strictly dominant strategy. There the observed cooperation rate varies between 30-40% (see e.g.,
Shafir and Tversky (1992)).
2Rapoport (1988) finds that the cooperation rate in a prisoner’s dilemma without fear (=̂ payoff
difference between the mutual defector’s and unilateral cooperator’s payoff) is higher than in one
with fear and predicts a cooperation rate of 50% for a no-fear dilemma that corresponds to the
game analyzed in this paper. The prediction is independent of the stake size. Rapoport’s findings
are supported in experiments conducted by Ahn, Ostrom, Schmidt, Shupp, and Walker (2001) as
well as Ahn, Ostrom, Schmidt, and Walker (2003).
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though from a theoretical point of view in a prisoner’s dilemma communication is
cheap talk (see e.g., Crawford (1998), Farrell and Rabin (1996)).3 Bohnet and Frey
(1999) analyze the effects of face-to-face communication on cooperative behavior
and show that it is very effective, i.e., they observe an increase in the unilateral
cooperation rate up to 78%.
Apart from the effects of face-to-face communication, gestures such as a smile might
have an impact on cooperation. Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik, and Wilson (2001)
investigate the impact of a smiling face on people’s behavior in a one-shot trust
game. They find that subjects are significantly more likely to trust smiling counter-
parts. Manzini, Sadrieh, and Vriend (2009) address this issue in the minimum effort
game and test whether people’s propensity to choose high effort is increased if sub-
jects can send a “smile” to the other player instead of pressing an ordinary “ready
to play” button. They find that this simple device helps players to coordinate on a
higher effort even though players are not able to see or to talk to each other.
Furthermore, studies have shown that the effectiveness of communication differs
by the words that are used, for instance, when making a promise. Vanberg (2008)
finds that people have a preference for keeping a promise and are not driven by
concerns about their expected payoff. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) propose
that people have a preference for keeping their word per se. In contrast, Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006) develop the idea that people keep promises because of guilt
aversion.4 Belot, Bhaskar, and van de Ven (2010) investigate the effect of voluntary
vs. elicited promises and find that players are roughly 50% more likely to cooperate
if they made a voluntary promise.
Lying and Voting Behavior
As already mentioned above, guilt is experienced by subjects if they do not keep
a promise or in other words lied about their intention which strategy they plan to
play. Gneezy (2005) uses a cheap talk sender-receiver game and shows that people’s
evaluation of whether to lie or not in a situation depends on the consequences of the
lie in terms of payoffs. Thereby not only gains achievable through lying are consid-
ered but also possible losses that might occur to the other players. The fraction of
liars is largest if the resulting gains are high and the costs, i.e., losses for the other
3In laboratory experiments free-form written communication is often used instead of face-to-
face verbal communication to be able to disentangle the effect of facial expressions from the bare
content of communication. Roth (1995) provides a survey of bargaining experiments in which the
effect of face-to-face communication is tested. The results suggest that face-to-face communication
increases the chance of reaching an agreement even further than free-form messaging.
4In related work, Miettinen and Suetens (2008) show that players feel most guilty if they com-
municated their intention to cooperate, but then defect while the opponent cooperates. Charness
and Dufwenberg (2010), however, show that providing subjects merely the possibility of commu-
nication by sending the word promise or not has almost no positive effect on the cooperation rate
in a trust game.
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players, are low. If players have the opportunity to costly punish the other subjects
for playing selfishly, they punish much more often if the selfish action followed a
deceptive message (Brandts and Charness, 2003). Another approach to analyzing
lying is made by Fischbacher and Heusi (2008) who try to figure out under which
circumstances people lie. They find that the distribution of truthful, partially truth-
ful and untruthful people is more or less the same independent of the stake size, the
consequences of lying, learning, and the degree of anonymity.
Finally, the partner selection process taking place during the two pre-play rounds
in “Golden Balls” draws our attention to the literature on discrimination. There
exists a vast economic as well as psychological literature on racial and gender dis-
crimination usually with the focus on the labor market (for a comprehensive survey
see Altonji and Blank (1999)). Using the data of the US television game show “The
Weakest Link”, Levitt (2004) and Anonovics, Arcidiacono, and Walsh (2005) test
taste-based and information-based theories of discrimination, determining whether
contestants discriminate on the basis of gender, age, race, and skill level. While
Levitt (2004) finds some patterns consistent with information-based discrimination
and taste-based discrimination against older players, Anonovics, Arcidiacono, and
Walsh (2005) reveal taste-based discrimination by women against men.
To summarize, there are various reasons to observe a different cooperation rate
than the one predicted by game theory and the one observed in laboratory experi-
ments without communication, high stakes, and endogenous partner selection.
3 Game Show and Data Set
In this section we describe in detail the course of events in the game show (Section
3.1) and the data set (Section 3.2).
3.1 Structure of the Game Show
The game show “Golden Balls” consists of three rounds of play with the final round
being divided into two phases.
Round 1 The game show starts with four players5, usually two women and two
men, who are briefly introduced by the show host, i.e., the players provide some
information about themselves including their names, occupation and place of resi-
5Endemol UK ensured us that the four players do not know each other before the show, and
enter and leave the television studio separately (they cannot make any further arrangements after
the show).
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dence. Then the first round starts: 16 golden balls are mixed, twelve of them have
written a cash amount (in £) inside and four have written the word “killer” inside.
Killer balls are the worst for the players, because these may damage the jackpot
in the final round. The balls containing a cash value are drawn from a lottery of
100 golden balls with a minimum ball value of £10 and a maximum ball value of
£75,000.6 Each player arranges the closed golden balls in two rows of two balls in
front of herself. The two balls on the front row are opened by each player, and the
revealed cash values or number of killers is common knowledge to each player. The
content of the remaining two balls is private information to each player, i.e., the
players are allowed to secretly look inside but then have to close the balls again.
Afterwards the show host asks each player to state what is inside her hidden balls.
The order in which players are asked for their statements is exogenously determined
by the show host. Some time for discussion follows, in which the players express
their distrust about each other’s statements. The discussion ends with each player
secretly casting a vote against one of the other players. On the basis of the votes, a
player is eliminated from the show.7 After the player who has to leave is determined,
all players open their hidden back row balls and thereby reveal whether they stated
the truth or not. The four balls of the leaving player are out of the game, while the
remaining twelve are carried over to round 2.
Round 2 At the beginning of the second round, two new cash balls are drawn
from the lottery and one killer ball is added. These three new balls are mixed with
the remaining twelve from round 1, and are equally distributed to the three players
at random. Hence, there are at most five killers among the 15 balls. Again the
closed balls are arranged in two rows by each player, i.e., two balls are on the front
and three balls are on the back row. As in round 1 the two balls on the front
row are opened and are common knowledge, while the three balls on the back are
private information. This time the players determine themselves the order of making
statements about the content of their back row balls. Like in the first round, the
players then get some time for discussion and afterwards secretly choose a player
they want to vote off. After the player to leave has been determined all ball values
are revealed, the five balls of the leaving player are out of the game, and the final
two players are identified.
Final Round The 10 balls from round 2 are carried over to the final round and
one last killer ball is added. The maximal amount the players can gain is the sum of
6Players have only limited information about the lottery, i.e., they only know that there may
be doubles and they know the margins of the distribution. But they do not know the distribution
of the remaining 98 balls.
7The player who receives the highest number of votes has to leave the show. In case of a tie the
players having received no vote can decide which player has to leave. If all players received one
vote each, players discuss openly which player has to leave. If players do not reach a conclusion,
ties are broken arbitrarily. In round 2 it is proceeded in the same way.
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the highest five cash values out of the 11 balls. This amount is called the potential
jackpot and its size is announced by the show host.
In the first phase of the final round the two players successively select five of the
11 mixed and closed balls, and these five values build the jackpot. The player who
brought the highest amount of money from round 2 to the final round starts to select
one of the balls to “bin”, i.e., to be taken out of the game, and then chooses one
ball to “win”. The balls are not opened until they have been chosen. Then it is the
other player’s turn and vice versa until five balls have been selected for the jackpot.
If a player chooses a killer ball for the jackpot the accumulated amount up to that
point is reduced to one-tenth of the original value.
In the second phase of the final round the players play a prisoner’s dilemma in which
defection is a weakly dominant strategy (see Table 1).8
Table 1: Weak prisoner’s dilemma
Split (C) Steal (D)
Split (C) 12J ,
1
2J 0 , J
Steal (D) J , 0 0 , 0
C =̂ Cooperation, D =̂ Defection
Such a prisoner’s dilemma has three pure-strategy Nash equilibria, namely (steal,
split), (steal, steal), and (split, steal).9 Thus, each player has an incentive to defect,
because she is never monetarily worse off when doing so. Before the players have to
decide which strategy to play, they get some additional time, roughly 30 seconds,
to discuss with each other what they are going to do.
The dilemma game is played as follows: Each player is assigned two balls, one with
the word “steal” and one with the word “split” inside. Then both players choose
one of the balls and open it simultaneously. If both players chose the split ball, the
jackpot (J) is divided equally between the two players. If one player chooses steal
and the other chooses split, the former gets the whole jackpot and the latter receives
nothing. If both chose steal, both get nothing.
8The show host explains the different outcomes of the game in each episode with the same
neutral words (for the exact wording see Appendix A.1).
9Two of the resulting Nash equilibria involve one player to cooperate. Applying the method of
iterated elimination of weakly dominant strategies, however, leaves only the (steal, steal) equilib-
rium, which should be the only one observed.
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3.2 Data Description
“Golden balls” was first aired on June, 18th 2007 as a late afternoon (5pm) game
show and is still running today.10 In total, we have records of 222 episodes, with 203
regular and 19 special episodes. In the special episodes there are either (i) players
that have been on the show before and have “lost” or (ii) only players of the same
sex. The regular episodes always consist of two women and two men and all players
are on the show for the first time. Importantly, the first series (40 episodes) was
filmed prior to the show’s television premiere. Hence, all players in these episodes
had no chance to observe others playing the show.
For all episodes, we recorded variables describing the players (occupation, home-
town, gender, race, and age) and the game (all true and stated ball values in rounds
1 and 2, the order of making statements in both rounds, votes the players received
and submitted, the potential jackpot size, values of binned balls by each player,
the player’s intended strategy11, the jackpot size, interactions of players before and
in the final (handshakes, promises), and the final decision). Table 2 provides an
overview of the data.
4 Strategic Considerations of the Players
Following the structure of the game show, we analyze the player’s incentives to be-
have in a particular way. The final goal of each player has to be reaching the final
round with a jackpot as high as possible and, most importantly, facing a player who
intends to split, independently of whether the player herself prefers to steal or split.
Thus, the players have to trade off these goals against each other.
In the pre-play, players base each of their two voting decisions on exogenous as
well as endogenous criteria. We define exogenous criteria as characteristics of the
players that are determined previously to the show, e.g., the player’s age, gender,
race, or place of residence. In contrast, endogenous criteria evolve during the course
of the game, and are, for instance, the ball values dealt to the players, the order of
making statements in round 2, or whether a player lied or not. Besides, the latter
two criteria can be strategically used by the players. Players may be able to signal
trustworthiness, since they can decide whether to lie or not about the content of
their hidden back row balls. Making the statement first in round 2 may influence
10The show reaches up to 2.2 million people per episode which corresponds to a market share of
21% (“ITV strikes teatime gold”, guardian.co.uk, July 3rd, 2007).
11Before the show starts, the players are individually and privately asked to explain which
strategy they intend to play in the final. The recorded statement is only broadcasted to the
television audience, but not to the other players or the audience in the television studio.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
Occupation
Social Job1 (1 = social job) 0.14 0.34 0 1 887
Student (1 = student) 0.08 0.27 0 1 888
Pensioner (1 = retired) 0.03 0.17 0 1 888
Place of residence
England (1 = England, 0 = SCO, WAL, NIR, IRL) 0.85 0.36 0 1 886
Large City2 (1 = population ¿ 268,300 ) 0.30 0.46 0 1 886
London (1 = London) 0.13 0.34 0 1 888
Gender, race, and age
Gender (1 = male) 0.50 0.50 0 1 888
Race (1 = white) 0.92 0.27 0 1 888
Age3 (1 = above 40) 0.43 0.50 0 1 888
Average cash ball in the show 5619.55 10374.12 10 75000 3108
Strategy statement4 (0 = steal, 1 = split, 2 = other) 1.08 0.86 0 2 612
Round 1
Value of open balls (balls 1 and 2)5 8802.64 13858.91 0 104000 888
Value claimed for balls 3 and 4 14265.86 13908.53 0 83000 888
Value of closed balls (balls 3 and 4) 7852.88 12315.07 0 83000 888
Number of killers in open balls 0.47 0.58 0 2 888
Number of killers claimed 0.23 0.43 0 2 888
Number of killers in closed balls 0.53 0.60 0 2 888
Player lied at least about one ball 0.53 0.50 0 1 888
Player lied at least about one value 0.32 0.47 0 1 888
Player lied at least about one killer 0.28 0.45 0 1 888
Number of killers taken to round 2 2.59 0.76 1 4 888
Round 2
Value of open balls (balls 5 and 6) 9651.32 14275.73 0 103000 666
Value claimed for balls 7, 8 and 9 18421.19 16683.73 105 95000 666
Value of closed balls (balls 7, 8 and 9) 13352.47 16291.90 0 95000 666
Number of killers in open balls 0.44 0.58 0 2 666
Number of killers claimed 0.44 0.52 0 2 666
Number of killers in closed balls 0.75 0.69 0 3 666
Player lied at least about one ball 0.45 0.50 0 1 666
Player lied at least about one value 0.23 0.42 0 1 666
Player lied at least about one killer 0.28 0.45 0 1 666
Number of killers taken to final round 2.14 0.91 0 5 666
Value of balls taken to final round 23003.79 21134.80 150 143300 666
Final round (1st phase)
Potential jackpot 51238.36 31261.51 5000 168100 444
Average cash ball 6932.27 12030.86 10 75000 1122
Number of killers 3.21 0.94 1 6 144
Number of killers to bin 1.74 0.92 0 4 144
Number of killers to win 1.47 0.88 0 4 144
Jackpot/Pot. jackpot 0.25 0.28 0.0001 1 444
Final round (2nd phase)
Jackpot 13343.03 19247.56 3 100150 444
Decision (1 = split) 0.55 0.50 0 1 444
Outcome (0 = steal/steal, 1 = steal/split, 2 = split/split) 1.09 .75 0 2 222
Money taken home 4916.96 12000.86 0 100150 444
Money taken home (steal / split) 15693.11 20087.90 3 100150 94
Money taken home (split / split) 4783.64 8440.02 1.83 43950 148
Money left on the table 14426.34 20255.76 100 92330 108
Discussion (1 = starts discussion) 0.5 0.5 0 1 444
Handshake (1 = shake hands) 0.39 0.49 0 1 444
Mutual promise (1 = say promise) 0.25 0.43 0 1 444
1 Note that we defined a social job as a job in which people care for other people, e.g., doctors, nurses, child
minders, social workers, teachers, police officers, firemen, soldiers.
2 Large cities are cities with more than 268,300 inhabitants (based on the Mid-2008 Population Estimates published
by the Office for National Statistics).
3 We estimated by personal judgment whether a player is below or above 40.
4 Players secretly make this statement about the strategy they plan to play in the final before the show starts. It
was introduced in episode 19, series 1.
5 Killer balls are counted as zero for all value variables.
5 Analysis of Cooperative Behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 139
the other players’ statements, e.g., if one player confesses a killer, the others may do
the same. Further, during the discussions in round 1 and 2, they can, for instance,
state why they distrust a certain player and try to convince the other players to
vote this player off.
Once players reach the final round, they have to make sure that their opponent
chooses the split ball in the final decision. Players use the discussion in the final
round to reassure the opponent that they will cooperate, e.g., players promise each
other to share the jackpot and/or shake hands on sharing it.
To summarize, the final decision as well as the voting decisions are functions of
exogenous personal and endogenous characteristics of the players. Unfortunately, a
game-theoretic analysis of the game is not feasible because the game is too complex
and strategies are ill-defined. However, we will use the logic of backward induction
to analyze the decisions made in the game. Therefore we start with analyzing the
decision in the final round and then successively analyze the voting decisions made
in round 2 and 1.
5 Analysis of Cooperative Behavior in the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma
In this section we identify the influencing factors of cooperative behavior. We ob-
serve an average cooperation rate of 54.5%, which is higher than the one found in
weak prisoner’s dilemma experiments without communication, pre-play, and high
stakes (e.g., Ortmann and Tichy (1999)). The rate is also slightly higher than the
one observed in “Friend or Foe”, another television game show experiment, (e.g.,
List (2006)). Further, we observe mutual cooperation in 33.3% and successful de-
fection in 42.3% of the cases. Unilateral defectors take home three times as much
money as mutual cooperators, £15,693 versus £4,784, and the average amount of
money left on the table due to mutual defection is £14,426. Altogether 108 players
left £1,558,045 on the table.
We will start the analysis in Section 5.1 with a discussion of the data and the
variables that may have an influence on cooperative behavior. In Section 5.2 we will
test the derived hypotheses in an empirical analysis. In addition we briefly present
an alternative approach in Appendix A.2.
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5.1 Possible Determinants of Cooperative Behavior
As we already pointed out in Section 2, the prisoner’s dilemma under consideration
is different in various aspects from the ones usually analyzed in the literature. In
this section we will discuss the potential impact of those differences on the observed
degree of cooperation, and present first results. The section is divided into four
parts, (i) player characteristics, (ii) stake size, (iii) communication, and (iv) pre-
play, following the presentation of variables in the regression tables in Section 5.2
(i) Player Characteristics
In this category we discuss variables that are exogenously determined. These are
demographic player characteristics, which are also used to describe opponent- and
team-characteristics, and a variable expressing the player’s experience with the show.
Experience We define the players of the first 40 episodes (series 1) as unexperi-
enced players. They had no chance to observe other contestants playing the game. In
contrast, all later episodes have been filmed after the television premiere of “Golden
Balls”. Thus one could conjecture that the experienced players are more familiar
with the show and therefore better in assessing whether cooperation or defection
could be successful or not. But from the raw data, we do not observe a substantial
difference, neither in the cooperation rate nor in the distribution of outcomes.12
Demographics Player’s demographics are defined as exogenous characteristics of
a player such as gender, age, race, place of residence, or occupation (descriptive
results are reported in Table 8 and Table 9 in Appendix A.3). The relation between
demographic characteristics and social behavior seems to be rather ambiguous. De-
riving clear-cut hypotheses about the influence of these characteristics on the player’s
propensity to cooperate is therefore not possible.
Overall, there seems to be no difference between the cooperation rates of men and
women. Concerning the rate of successful cooperation we find that it is lowest for
female teams (28.6%) and highest for mixed gender teams (35.3%). The null hy-
pothesis of no difference between the overall cooperation rate of men and women
cannot be rejected (p=0.435) as well as the one for the mutual cooperation rate
(p=0.503). Players above the age of 40 cooperate significantly more than players
below 40 (p=0.001).13 There are only small differences in the success rates of co-
12A two-sided binomial probability test can neither reject the null hypothesis of no difference be-
tween the cooperation rate of experienced (52.5%) and unexperienced (54,9%) players (p=0.372),
nor the null hypothesis of no difference between the probability of mutual cooperation of experi-
enced (34,1%) and unexperienced (30,0%) players (p=0.481), see Table 8 and Table 9 in Appendix
A.3. This result is in contrast to the finding of Oberholzer-Gee, Waldfogel, and White (2010) who
find an effect of learning for players in later episodes of “Friend or Foe”. All tests used in this
paper are two-sided binomial probability tests, unless stated otherwise.
13However, gender conditional on age tends to have an effect on the cooperation rate, i.e., women
below 40 cooperate more than men below 40 and vice versa for men and women over 40. Note the
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operation, teams of players below 40 have the lowest success rate. Whites are more
likely to cooperate compared to non-whites, but the difference is not significant
(p=0.334).
Based on a player’s hometown, we construct variables indicating whether her place
of residence is England, London, a small or a big city (see Table 2). Players liv-
ing in England cooperate significantly less than players from other parts of Great
Britain (p=0.000). In addition, if neither player lives in England the success rate of
cooperation is 50.0% versus 32.5% if both players live in England, and 33.3% if it is
a mixed team. The failure rate is highest for mixed teams and significantly higher
than the one of English teams (p=0.002).14
Further, decisions made in the game might have implications beyond their immedi-
ate consequences, because the game is played in front of a large television audience
and is therefore possibly being watched by friends, family members and/or col-
leagues. Depending on the player’s occupation, it can be in her interest to appear
trustworthy. For instance, police officers act as role models for observing the law
and behaving correctly, or teachers are responsible for a moral education of children.
These players have an incentive to behave in a fair way, especially when it comes to
choosing the strategy in the prisoner’s dilemma. We identify roughly 15% of contes-
tants with an occupation for which their reputation is a valuable asset, and construct
a variable “social job”, including e.g., priests, policemen, firemen, childminders, and
teachers. Having a social job might influence cooperative behavior because of two
different reasons. On the one hand, players with a social job could be more coop-
erative because they want to show that they behave socially responsible. On the
other hand, the causality could be vice versa: Having a social job could be a sign for
being a cooperator itself, because a cooperative person chooses a job in which she
can behave according to her preferences. In that case cooperative behavior would
not be driven by the opportunity to appear trustworthy. Summarizing, it remains
unclear whether we will observe an effect of having a social job.
Social Closeness The sociological literature argues that the degree of similarity
between players has an impact on their social interactions. While some people
might be willing to cooperate without discrimination, others are highly suspicious
of people who are not like them and prefer to keep them at arm’s length. In many
social networks, e.g., friendships or business relations, one observes that individuals
associate disproportionately with others who are similar to themselves, i.e., people
are more likely to form social ties with others who are alike. This tendency of people
results concerning age should not be attached too much weight since the age categories are merely
assessed by personal judgment.
14The hypothesis of no difference between the success rates of not-English and English teams
(p=0.284), of not-English and mixed teams (p=0.454), as well as of English and mixed teams
(p=0.849) cannot be rejected. Neither can the hypothesis of no difference between the failure rates
of not-English and English teams (p=0.495) and of not-English and mixed teams (p=0.162) be
rejected.
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to relate to similar types is referred to as “homophily”, first defined by Lazarfeld and
Merton (1954).15 Such motivated, we construct an index for the closeness between
players by accounting for players’ age, gender, race, occupational status, and place
of residence (England). The index ranges from 0 to 1, weighting each component
by one-fifth. For instance, if both players in the final are male, white, have a social
job and live in England, the index takes a value of 0.8. Concerning the distribution,
we observe the majority of players to have an index-value of either 0.6 (44%) or 0.8
(32%).
(ii) Stake Size
Categorizing the jackpot in five divisions (see Table 8 and Table 9 in Appendix
A.3) we find that the cooperation rate decreases with a step-wise increase in the
jackpot size. But, surprisingly, the rate declines sharply from 73.6% for jackpots
below £500 to roughly 50% for jackpots above £500. The difference, taking the
cutoff £500, is highly significant (p=0.000). Concerning the mutual cooperation
rate, it is significantly higher if the two players face a jackpot below the level of
£500 (p=0.000). This result is even more remarkable if one bears in mind that a
stake size around £500 is already much higher than the one used in most labora-
tory experiments. At the same time, however, the cooperation rate rises with an
increase in the potential jackpot, i.e., the highest possible jackpot the players could
obtain after the first phase of the final round. Hence, the effects of the actual and
the potential jackpot operate in opposite directions. One might presume that the
players’ perception of the actual jackpot depends on the potential jackpot, i.e., two
actual jackpots equal in size will be judged differently depending on their difference
to the potential jackpot. In Table 3 we explore this issue further.
We depict the cooperation rate for the five different jackpot categories and within
each we split up the rate by the four categories of the potential jackpot, i.e., the
difference between the highest potential and the actual jackpot is increasing within
each category. Fixing the jackpot categories, we find that the cooperation rate
almost always increases with the size of the potential jackpot. This corroborates
the idea of a biased jackpot perception, that we will discuss in the following.
Expectation Players might build an expectation about the size of the actual
jackpot depending on the observed size of the potential jackpot. This expectation is
used to judge the size of the actual jackpot. But, computing the correct expectation
is a rather difficult task if no computer is at hand. Therefore, players need some
alternative method to calculate their expectation. As mentioned before, the first 40
episodes have been broadcasted before all other episodes were filmed. Henceforth,
15For a survey with respect to sociology see Jackson (2008) and with respect to cooperative
game theory see van den Nouweland and Slikker (2001). Homophily is usually based on a variety
of characteristics, including gender, race, age, region and education.
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Table 3: Relation between jackpot and potential jackpot
Jackpot Potential
Jackpot
Split
in £ in £ Row % N
[3, 500] [5000, 30000] 62.5 32
N=72 (30000, 45000] 85.7 14
(45000, 75000] 75.0 12
(75000, 168100] 85.7 14
(500, 2500] [5000, 30000] 41.2 34
N=100 (30000, 45000] 59.5 42
(45000, 75000] 44.4 18
(75000, 168100] 100.0 6
(2500, 10000] [5000, 30000] 50.0 30
N=102 (30000, 45000] 43.3 30
(45000, 75000] 66.7 18
(75000, 168100] 58.3 24
(10000, 30000] [10000, 30000] 38.9 18
N=116 (30000, 45000] 45.7 46
(45000, 75000] 52.9 34
(75000, 168100] 55.6 18
(30000, 100150] [30000, 45000] 50.0 6
N=54 (45000, 75000] 50.0 22
(75000, 168100] 46.2 26
Note, that the difference between the jackpot and the potential jackpot is increasing with an
increasing potential jackpot per jackpot category.
we assume players to take the observed average ratio between the jackpot and the
potential jackpot in series 1 as an estimate to roughly calculate their expectation.
The average jackpot in series 1 is £13,066 which corresponds to 27.5% of the average
potential jackpot of £47,526. This ratio is multiplied by the observed potential
jackpot in each episode, and determines the players’ expected jackpot.16 Depending
on whether the jackpot is above or below the player’s expectation, the propensity
to cooperate changes. The cooperation rate is significantly higher (p=0.002) if the
jackpot is below the expectation, and cooperation is much less successful if the
expectation threshold is taken, i.e., 18.4% versus 41.1% of mutual cooperation.
(iii) Communication
Apart from communication that takes place in round 1 and 2, and in the first phase
of the final round, players explicitly get some time to discuss the strategy they
16The ratio between the jackpot and the potential jackpot observed in the episodes following
series 1 is 25.7% which is very similar to the ratio observed in the episodes of series 1.
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intend to play in the prisoner’s dilemma. The players use this time to assure each
other their willingness to cooperate, i.e., to choose the split ball. As described in
Section 2, studies have shown that especially face-to-face communication, involving
a mutual agreement to cooperate, increases the cooperation rate significantly. We
observe that 24.8% of the players voluntarily promise each other to cooperate. In
addition to verbal communication, 39.2% of the players shake hands to corroborate
their intention to split, and 41.4% out of those do both, i.e., they shake hands and
promise each other to share the jackpot. We define dummy variables to control
for mutual promises, handshakes and for whether the contestant starts the final
discussion. We expect handshakes and promises to increase successful cooperation.
(iv) Pre-Play
The next three potential determinants of cooperative behavior evolve within the
pre-play.
Lying Lying is rather common during the pre-play rounds of the game show and
might be thought of as an inherent part of the game. Players are concerned about
maximizing the stake size, thus having low values or killer balls increases the prob-
ability of being voted off. Driven by the fear of being eliminated from the game
when having “bad” balls, the contestants bluff their way to the final. But a player
is revealed as a liar after each round, and might get a reputation of being not trust-
worthy, which possibly prevents her from lying. Analyzing our raw data, we find
that 43% of the players who reach the final lied about the content of their balls in
round 1 and 37% in round 2. A possible implication of lying could be that liars
may want to repay their “guilt” and therefore are more tempted to cooperate. But
a player who has not lied might perceive a liar as untrustworthy per se and thus is
less willing to cooperate. We control for the potential effects of lying by introducing
dummy variables for whether the player or her opponent has lied about a cash value
or a killer during the two rounds of pre-play, since we believe that the perception of
concealing a killer may differ from that about overstating a cash amount.
Kindness In addition, we include variables linked to kindness, experienced kind-
ness, and its repayment in our analysis. Firstly, we account for the impact of the
voting decision on the behavior of those contestants who remain in the show. After
each round of the pre-play, contestants need to secretly cast a vote against a cer-
tain player whom they want to leave the game. It can happen that a player in the
final has voted against her opponent during the pre-play. This might influence the
player’s behavior in the final: A player is less likely to cooperate, since she expressed
her dislike against the other player before. In this respect we construct a dummy
variable that identifies a player who voted against her opponent.
Secondly, we define a variable termed “should have left the game” in order to investi-
gate whether a player responds to experienced kindness. The variable is constructed
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as follows: First we rank the three players in round 2 with respect to their weighted
sum of cash values and killer balls. The dummy points at the player with the lowest
weighted sum. From a purely monetary perspective, this player should be voted off
the game. But if such a player nevertheless reaches the final round, she is aware of
owing her “survival” to her opponent.17 In this respect one could surmise that she
is more likely to split the jackpot in order to pay back her survival.
Luck At last, we want to focus on the first phase of the final round, in which the
jackpot is built by an alternating selection of balls. The player who starts to select
the first balls to bin and win is the player who brought along the higher sum of
cash values, i.e., contributed most to the potential jackpot. The mean difference
between the player’s contributions is £1,678 without accounting for the possible
damage caused by killer balls. The value of the resulting jackpot is determined
purely at random, but one player might be more lucky than the other, i.e., chooses
higher values or bins more killer balls. We control for those effects, constructing
three dummy variables: One for the player who contributes most to the potential
jackpot, one for the player who selects the highest values, and one for the player
who bins most killer balls. These players could feel entitled to a larger piece of the
pie and are therefore less likely to cooperate. This would be in line with the findings
on entitlement and fairness of Rutstro¨m and Williams (2000).
5.2 Regression Analysis
In order to explore the individual decision process when playing the prisoner’s
dilemma game, we estimate bivariate probits of the probability that player i chooses
split or steal as a function of own and opponents’ characteristics as well as variables
determined in the pre-play (see Table 4).18 Additionally, to analyze team coopera-
tion rates, we estimate ordered probits (see Table 5 and Table 10 in Appendix A.3).
17In order to rank the players we use the ex-post cash-killer-criterion which is described and
discussed in detail in Section 6. We assume that a player, who does have the lowest weighted
monetary amount is aware of this and does value her survival. Often the players address their pass
to the final round during the final discussion and thank their opponent for having taken her so far.
18In addition, we estimate the same probits including one additional dummy variable, namely
whether player i “voted against (her) opponent” in the pre-play which results in a significantly
negative effect on cooperation. We exclude the dummy in our main analysis, since including it
reduces the data set by 55 observations which is due to a voting result of 2:1:1:0 in round 1 or
1:1:1 in round 2 (in these cases it is analytically not possible to trace back the players’ individual
voting decision). Except for the episodes with a tie, the outcome of the voting decision is 2:1:0 in
round 2, such that none of the final players received a vote from their opponent. Thus, the control
variable only comprises of the voting result in round 1. Additionally, we can only control for the
voting decision made by the particular player herself, and not whether this player received a vote
by her opponent in the final, since after round 1 the players can only speculate who had cast a vote
against them. Therefore we can only identify 18 out of 390 players to have casted a vote against
her final opponent. Thus, the variable “voted against (her) opponent” has not much explanatory
power.
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We order the outcomes by coding the team outcome as equaling 0 if both players
choose steal, equaling 1 if one player chooses steal and the other chooses split, and
equaling 2 if both players choose split.
Results for Unilateral Cooperation
We estimate bivariate probits on the probability that player i chooses split (y = 1),
or steal (y = 0) as a non-linear function of exogenous demographic player character-
istics, D, and variables that evolved during the game, G, including a constant and
one interaction term, namely the interaction of “handshakes”, x1, and “promise”,
x2. The conditional probability that player i chooses split is
P (y = 1|x1, x2, D,G) = Φ(α + β1x1 + β2x2 + β12x1x2 +Dθ +Gν) = Φ(m),
where α, β, θ, ν are parameters to be estimated, Φ(·) is the standard normal cumu-
lative distribution function, and m denotes the index α + β1x1 + β2x2 + β12x1x2 +
Dθ +Gν.
The marginal effect for the k-th independent variable is computed as
∂P (y = 1|x1, x2, D,G)
∂xk
= φ(m)βk k = 2, ..., K
where φ(·) is the standard normal density function. The magnitude of the derivative
is proportional to φ(m)βk. A change in one of the independent variables results in
an effective percentage change in player i’s likelihood to cooperate.19
Table 4 reports the estimation results of four probit models, which differ with
respect to the included variables in the group of stake size and pre-play. Model
(1) and (3) include the continuous variables jackpot and potential jackpot, while
models (2) and (4) include the dummy variable describing whether the expectation
of the resulting jackpot is met or not. In addition to the controls for personal play-
ers’ demographics, stake size, and communication, in models (3) and (4) variables
determined in the pre-play are introduced.
Throughout, addressing demographics, we find that age, whether a player lives
in England, or whether both players live in a small city have a significant effect on
19If xk is a dummy variable, the marginal effect is computed as the discrete difference
△P (y = 1|x1, x2, D,G)
△xk
= Φ(m|xk = 1)− Φ(m|xk = 0), k = 2, ...,K.
Note that the marginal effect of the interacted dummy variable “handshakes” (x1) and “promise”
(x2) is equal to the discrete double difference
△2P (y = 1|x1, x2, D,G)
△x1△x2
= Φ(m)− Φ(β1 + α+Dθ +Gν)− Φ(β2 + α+Dθ +Gν) + Φ(α+Dθ +Gν).
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Table 4: Results from binary probit on unilateral cooperation (1)
y = 1 (Split) Marginal Effects
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Player Characteristics
Unexperienced -0.028 (0.069) -0.050 (0.069) -0.019 (0.074) -0.041 (0.073)
Male -0.018 (0.059) -0.017 (0.058) -0.019 (0.060) -0.018 (0.060)
Age (>40) 0.164*** (0.064) 0.161** (0.063) 0.174*** (0.066) 0.172*** (0.065)
White 0.117 (0.148) 0.113 (0.145) 0.052 (0.147) 0.046 (0.143)
England -0.269*** (0.078) -0.267*** (0.077) -0.274*** (0.082) -0.271*** (0.081)
London 0.001 (0.103) 0.003 (0.100) -0.059 (0.107) -0.066 (0.104)
Large City -0.054 (0.077) -0.051 (0.075) -0.024 (0.081) -0.018 (0.080)
Student -0.009 (0.096) 0.001 (0.095) -0.020 (0.095) -0.014 (0.095)
Pensioner -0.143 (0.160) -0.160 (0.163) -0.126 (0.164) -0.145 (0.167)
Social Job (Reputation) -0.017 (0.087) -0.032 (0.087) -0.016 (0.090) -0.033 (0.090)
Team Characteristics
Index (Social Closeness) 0.458 (0.309) 0.469 (0.306) 0.592* (0.322) 0.606* (0.318)
Team Male -0.147 (0.099) -0.152 (0.097) -0.183* (0.100) -0.184* (0.097)
Team Female -0.054 (0.095) -0.058 (0.095) -0.083 (0.097) -0.084 (0.097)
Team Age> 40 -0.011 (0.103) -0.009 (0.103) -0.007 (0.106) -0.001 (0.107)
Team Age< 40 -0.049 (0.091) -0.055 (0.090) -0.073 (0.095) -0.075 (0.093)
Team White -0.118 (0.122) -0.124 (0.118) -0.108 (0.124) -0.116 (0.121)
Team England -0.019 (0.093) -0.001 (0.093) -0.021 (0.097) -0.002 (0.096)
Team Large City -0.127 (0.101) -0.128 (0.100) -0.147 (0.101) -0.145 (0.101)
Team Small City -0.141** (0.067) -0.127* (0.067) -0.143** (0.069) -0.126* (0.068)
Opponent Characteristics
Opp. Student 0.087 (0.097) 0.095 (0.095) 0.107 (0.098) 0.111 (0.097)
Opp. Pensioner 0.067 (0.162) 0.049 (0.159) 0.053 (0.171) 0.032 (0.168)
Opp. Social Job 0.040 (0.085) 0.027 (0.085) 0.087 (0.086) 0.073 (0.086)
Stake Size
log(Jackpot) -0.057*** (0.014) -0.057*** (0.015)
log(Pot. Jackpot) 0.097** (0.048) 0.077 (0.050)
Jackpot < Expectation 0.162*** (0.056) 0.173*** (0.059)
Communication
Started Discussion -0.008 (0.048) -0.009 (0.047) -0.005 (0.049) -0.006 (0.049)
Handshakes -0.151** (0.067) -0.179*** (0.066) -0.167** (0.068) -0.196*** (0.067)
Promise -0.032 (0.108) -0.063 (0.107) -0.060 (0.109) -0.095 (0.108)
Handshakes*Promise 0.281** (0.139) 0.309** (0.170) 0.339** (0.142) 0.372*** (0.054)
Pre-play
Acc. Most Money -0.098* (0.058) -0.099* (0.057)
Selected Higher Values in Bin/Win -0.148* (0.079) -0.157** (0.077)
Binned Most Killers in Bin/Win -0.091 (0.090) -0.092 (0.088)
Lied About Cash Value -0.105* (0.059) -0.106* (0.059)
Lied About Killer -0.018 (0.055) -0.017 (0.055)
Opp. Lied About Cash Value 0.019 (0.058) 0.014 (0.058)
Opp. Lied About Killer -0.048 (0.056) -0.041 (0.055)
“Should Have Left The Game” 0.133** (0.062) 0.144** (0.061)
Wald X 2 61.23*** 55.18*** 74.06*** 69.14***
Log-Likelihood -273.26 -277.81 -264.75 -268.63
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.11
N 441 441 440 440
Number of Clusters 222 222 222 222
standard errors in parentheses are corrected for episode clusters; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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the likelihood to cooperate. If player i is above the age of 40, she is about 16%
more likely to cooperate, i.e., split. But, a player who lives in England, compared
to any other part of Great Britain, is roughly 27% more likely to be a defector, i.e.,
steal. Additionally, if both final players live in a small city, then player i’s likeli-
hood to cooperate decreases by up to 14%. All three effects are very robust with
approximately the same magnitude across the four models. The results on players’
gender, race, and occupational status, however, exhibit no significant effects. We
also find no effect for player i’s experience, i.e., the control for the first series has no
significant effect, indicating that players are not able to profit from a learning effect
if they could watch the game show on television before.
The results on stake size support our findings gained in Section 5.1: As suggested,
the higher the actual jackpot, the less likely player i cooperates; while, the higher the
potential jackpot, the more likely player i cooperates. In addition models (2) and
(4) highlight our descriptive finding that a player is more willing to cooperate if the
actual jackpot is below her expectation, i.e., her likelihood to cooperate significantly
increases by roughly 16%. All effects are independent of player’s characteristics or
communication, and are highly robust.
Addressing the controls for communication, we find that neither starting the final
discussion nor voluntarily promising each other to cooperate are significant deter-
minants. But, we find a negative effect of shaking hands: If both final contestants
shake hands during the final discussion, each player actually is more likely to defect.
Thus, handshakes seem to serve as an instrument to manipulate the opponent’s
attitude towards cooperation. Whether shaking hands is perceived differently de-
pending on a promise made at the same time, we interact both dummy variables.
As the results show, we find a positive significant interaction effect: Shaking hands
in combination with a promise actually increases the player’s likelihood to cooper-
ate. We will further explore whether these effects help cooperators to coordinate by
looking at team outcomes in the next subsection.
In models (3) and (4) we introduce controls describing pre-play determinants. We
find that a lie about a cash value is treated differently with respect to its influence
on cooperation. If player i lied about a cash value, she is roughly 10% more likely to
defect in the prisoner’s dilemma, but concealing a killer has no effect, neither does a
lie of her opponent. Regarding the control indicating that player i should have left
the game before, player i is roughly 14% more likely to cooperate. As hypothesized
a player who should have been voted off the game, but nevertheless made it to the
final, is likely to pay back the opponents’ confidence. Further, we find that both,
having accumulated more money as well as having selected the higher values when
building the jackpot, have a significantly negative impact on the players’ likelihood
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to cooperate. As suggested, a player might feel entitled to a larger piece of the
pie, since she contributed more to the stake size. Testing for any interaction effect
with respect to a player’s expectation, we find that a player who accumulated more
money to the jackpot and whose expectation is not met, is significantly more likely
to steal. This result suggests that a player’s perception of the jackpot is correlated
with her contribution to the potential jackpot.
Besides, the introduction of the pre-play controls results in two additional effects
regarding team characteristics. We find that a male player is significantly less likely
to cooperate with a male opponent, indicating that men are more competitive when
facing the same sex. Another significant determinant of cooperative behavior is the
index of social closeness between players. The more similar both final players are
with respect to their age, gender, race, and place of residence, the more likely player
i is to cooperate with her opponent. This finding suggests, that in-group biases may
be present.
Results for Mutual Cooperation
To understand why players arrive at different outcomes in the prisoner’s dilemma,
we estimate ordered probit models. We observe the discrete variable y that can take
on three values, i.e., it equals 0 if both players choose steal, it equals 1 if one player
chooses steal and the other chooses split, and it equals 2 if both players choose split.
The boundaries between the three cases are determined by the threshold (ξi), which
needs to be estimated along with the rest of the parameters. The probabilities of the
three events y = 0; 1; 2 are given by P (y = 0) = Φ(ξ1−m), P (y = 1) = Φ(ξ2−m)−
Φ(ξ1−m), P (y = 2) = Φ(m− ξ2), where m = α+β1x1+β2x2+β12x1x2+Dθ+Gν.
The marginal effect of dk (gk) for the j−th response is computed as
20
∂P (y = j|x1, x2, D,G)
∂xk
= [φ(ξj−1 −m)− φ(ξj −m)]βk.
20If dk (gk) is a dummy variable, then the marginal effect is computed as the discrete difference
△P (y = j|x1, x2, D,G) = P (y = j|(x1, x2, D,G) +△xk)− P (y = j|(x1, x2, D,G)).
Note that the marginal effects of the variables that are interacted involve the coefficient of the
interaction term. Therefore, the marginal effect of x1 (analog for x2) for the j-th response is
calculated as
∂P (y = j|x1, x2, D,G)
∂x1
= [φ(ξj−1 −m)− φ(ξj −m)](β1 + β12x2);
and the magnitude of the interaction effect for the j-th response is given by
∂P (y = j|x1, x2, D,G)
∂x1∂x2
= [φ(ξj−1 −m)− φ(ξj −m)]β12 − [φ
′(ξj−1 −m)− φ
′(ξj −m)](β1 + β12x2)(β2 + β12x1),
where φ′(·) denotes the first derivative of the normal density function w.r.t. its argument. Standard
errors are computed by the delta method.
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Table 5: Results from ordered probit on outcomes in the PD (1)
y = 0; 1; 2 Marginal Effects
Steal/Steal (0) Split/Steal (1) Split/Split (2)
Team Characteristics
Team Unexperienced 0.000 (0.063) 0.000 (0.013) 0.000 (0.077)
Team Male 0.091 (0.089) 0.006 (0.011) -0.097 (0.083)
Team Female 0.010 (0.064) 0.002 (0.012) -0.012 (0.075)
Team > 40 -0.068 (0.065) -0.023 (0.032) 0.091 (0.096)
Team < 40 0.103 (0.066) 0.012 (0.011) -0.115 (0.070)
Team England 0.121** (0.050) 0.041 (0.026) -0.162** (0.071)
Team Small City 0.079 (0.048) 0.016 (0.013) -0.095 (0.058)
Index (Social Closeness) -0.302* (0.162) -0.063 (0.635) 0.364* (0.195)
Pre-Play
Team Never Lied -0.046 (0.059) -0.013 (0.022) 0.059 (0.081)
Team Lying 0.028 (0.053) 0.005 (0.010) -0.033 (0.063)
Communication
Handshakes 0.078 (0.054) 0.016* (0.009) -0.094 (0.058)
Promise -0.081 (0.053) 0.127*** (0.016) 0.098 (0.064)
Handshakes*Promise -0.295** (0.129) 0.029 (0.046) 0.324** (0.137)
Stake Size
log(Jackpot) 0.051*** (0.013) 0.011 (0.107) -0.062*** (0.015)
log(Pot. Jackpot) -0.081* (0.043) -0.017 (0.178) 0.098* (0.051)
Wald X 2 36.90***
Log-Likelihood -219.55
Pseudo R2 0.08
N 54 94 74
Number of Clusters 222
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for episode clusters; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The results for the three different outcomes are presented in Table 5 and Table 10
in Appendix A.3.
Concerning team characteristics, Table 5 shows that teams of English players are
more likely to defect. But the more similar both team players are with respect to
their age, gender, race, and place of residence, i.e., the higher the index value, the
more likely they manage to successfully cooperate. Addressing the division of team
by gender, age or having lied in the pre-play, there are no considerable differences.
The results also highlight the significance of handshakes and promises. Teams that
shake hands or promise each other to cooperate, are more likely to miscoordinate.
In addition, handshakes in combination with a promise increase the likelihood of
mutual cooperation and decrease the one of mutual defection. As the analysis of
the raw data suggests, we find a highly significant and inverse effect of the actual
and potential jackpot. Both players are 5% more likely to defect when the stakes
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are large, and are 6% less likely to cooperate. In contrast, teams are almost 10%
more likely to cooperate when the potential jackpot increases. The results in Table
10 in Appendix A.3 support the discussed findings, highlighting that the players’
expectation about the stake size is also a significant influencing factor of mutual
cooperation. If both players’ expectation about the jackpot is above the actual one,
they are 17% more likely to cooperate, but 16% more likely to defect.
Summary We identify various player characteristics (e.g., age, living in England,
or social closeness), stakes size, and communication, as well as pre-play to be signif-
icant influencing factors of unilateral and mutual cooperation. Most noticeable we
find a robust and substantial negative effect of the actual stake size on cooperation,
i.e., the higher the jackpot the more likely players are to defect. Controlling for the
effect of handshakes and voluntarily stated promises we find that players who shake
hands are more likely to defect, while handshakes in combination with a promise are
likely to result in cooperation and successful coordination. Both effects are robust
and independent of player characteristics and pre-play determinants. We are not
aware of any other study having shown similar effects.
6 Pre-Play Decision Making: Voting Behavior
As the results from the probit regressions suggest, the opponents’ characteristics play
a decisive role for cooperative behavior. Therefore, we now draw our attention to
the pre-prisoner’s dilemma play, i.e., the selection of the two finalists. Starting with
four contestants, each player faces the decision for whom to vote to leave the game
in round 1 and 2. The players’ voting behavior will be a function of observable char-
acteristics and subjective criteria that maybe inconsistent with one another: Firstly,
players have powerful monetary incentives and would like to vote off the player who
has the lowest cash values or most killers in her golden balls. But, at the same time,
players need to evaluate the opponent’s character in view of the final round, i.e.,
assess her trustworthiness, sympathy, or susceptibility to manipulation. Finally, the
players need to vote in a way that increases their own survival, thus their optimal
action depends critically on the belief about how other players vote.
In the next three sections we will show how the players balance their voting
decision, bearing in mind the stake size, the opponent’s character and their own
survival. In Section 6.1, we discuss the expected voting behavior with the help of
three objective evaluation criteria. In Section 6.2 we briefly describe the impact of
personal player characteristics as well as round-specific determinants. Finally, in
Section 6.3 we empirically test the validity of the objective criteria.
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6.1 Objective Criteria
Each episode, before the players have to decide against whom to cast a vote, the show
host reminds the players to “keep in the cash, and kick out the killers”. Following
this prompt, we describe the player’s voting decision by means of three objective
criteria assuming that it is a player’s aim to maximize the potential stake size. Each
episode and round these criteria predict one particular player who should be voted
off: The cash- (CC) and cash-killer-criterion (CKC) are constructed on the
basis of the (weighted) monetary values of balls and declare the player with the
lowest amount of money to be voted to leave the game. While we count a killer ball
as a ball with zero value in the CC, we attach the killer balls a weight of 0.1 in the
CKC, i.e., one killer ball reduces the monetary value to one-tenth of the original
value, a second killer ball reduces it to one-hundredth of the original value and so
forth. The killer-criterion (KC) focuses on the number of killer balls per player,
and accordingly declares the player with the highest number of killers to be voted
off.
Further, within each criterion we distinguish three different time-dimensions, i.e., we
determine the prediction of each criterion separately taking into account (i) the two
opened balls on the front row (ex-ante), (ii) the two open balls and the statements
of the hidden back row balls (stated), and (iii) all revealed balls (ex-post21).
By means of these three, respectively nine criteria, we analyze to what extent
each criterion explains the player’s voting decision within and between round 1 and
2. Descriptive results are reported in Tables 11 to 13 in Appendix A.3.22
First we want to look at the proportions of players who are effectively voted off in
line with the three criteria (see Table 11 in Appendix A.3). Focusing on the time-
division of each criterion, in round 1 we find that most players vote in line with the
prediction of the ex-ante CKC and ex-ante CC, as well as of the stated KC. In round
2 instead, the ex-post CKC and the ex-post CC dominate, but the stated KC again
yields the best prediction. Overall the KC, especially when looking at the stated
values, fits best: In round 1, 81.1% of players who are voted off have the highest
number of killer balls both on their front row as well as stated on their hidden back
row balls; in round 2 this proportion slightly reduces to 70.3%, but still exceeds the
CC and CKC.
The findings are confirmed when considering for each criterion the proportions of
players who received a vote when predicted, additionally distinguished by gender
(see Table 12 in Appendix A.3).
21The ex-post criteria serve to test whether the players use the ex-ante criteria as a best estima-
tion of the true state.
22Note that we exclude those episodes which have a voting result of 2:1:1:0 in round 1 or a
tie in round 2, since it is analytical impossible to reconstruct the players’ individual decision.
Additionally, in Table 12 and Table 13 we restrict the sample to only those players who take part
in both rounds (with an almost equal share of males (48.5%) and females (51.5%)); thereby we
can compare the voting results for both rounds taking the same player’s decisions into account.
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As above, we focus on the time-dimension of each criterion and find that the
players most frequently vote in line with the ex-ante CKC and CC in round 1, but
in line with the ex-post CKC and CC in round 2. Concerning the KC, players vote
in line with the stated KC in round 1 and the ex-ante KC in round 2. Separating
these findings by gender, we observe that significantly more males than females vote
in line with the stated KC and ex-ante CKC in round 1 (p = 0.024 and p = 0.034)
whereas in round 2 more females vote in line with the ex-post CC (p = 0.021).
Most noticeable, in both rounds the players take the statements about killer balls
seriously, although one might argue that statements are only cheap talk and should
therefore be ignored. But a statement about a killer ball has to be treated different
from stating a particular value. In our setting, players have a strong incentive to
lie about a killer ball, since it threatens them progressing in the game. If players
nevertheless state to have one, this message is “self-signaling” and not cheap talk:
If a player states to have a killer ball it is the truth.
A first result is that players seem to base their voting decision on objective criteria,
but switch within the time-dimension of the criteria from round 1 to 2. This switch
maybe explained by the different amount of information a player has at a certain
time.
Information Based Separability of Players
In the two pre-play rounds the players have different information about the distri-
bution of values. In round 1, the players face a situation in which they base their
voting decision on an ambiguous distribution of outcomes, i.e., only the values of
the revealed front row balls are common knowledge. In round 2 the players have
additional information. After the voting decision in round 1, all contestants need to
reveal their true values on the back row. The twelve balls carried over from round
1 to round 2 are now common knowledge to all remaining contestants, and only the
two new added cash values are unknown. Hence, a player can be in two different
states: First, if both new values are within the revealed balls on the front row, or a
particular player has at least one new value on her hidden back row and the other
is observable on any other player’s front row, she knows the exact distribution of
values in play. From an informational point of view a player who knows all ball
values in play, makes her voting decision in a situation where only the precise allo-
cation of each value is uncertain. Second, if both new values remain unobservable,
a player again lacks information, but not as much as in round 1.23 Thus, using
23We also analyzed the case when only one of the new ball values is known to a player, termed
partial ambiguity (see Table 13 in Appendix A.3). But for the sake of clarity we limit the discussion
to the cases when both new values are either known or not. Naturally the extent of information
about a state’s probability influences the players’ willingness to bet on the state. Camerer and
Weber (1992) review the empirical and theoretical literature on ambiguity in decision making.
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the statements about the hidden ball values, the players are able to infer - up to a
certain extent - whether a contestant lies.
We expect that a player, who faces uncertainty about the allocation of balls makes
her voting decision in consideration of all “true” values, and weights the utility of
the outcome by the probability of obtaining it. These players tend to vote by means
of the ex-post criteria. This effect should be more pronounced compared to the
one observe for players in a situation of ambiguity. Here, they should vote most
frequently by means of the ex-ante criteria.
In what follows we refer to Table 13 in Appendix A.3 that presents proportions
of the players’ voting decision by means of the three criteria and its time-divisions
as well as player’s informational background. We restrict the data set to compare
the same 573 players in round 1 and 2, of which we identify 50 players to be in an
uncertain state, and 241 players to be in an ambiguous one in round 2. In round 1
all 573 players are in the same ambiguous situation.
As suggested, we find that the proportion of uncertain players who vote in line
with the ex-post CKC is significantly higher (p=0.004 and p=0.000) than of ambigu-
ous players. Additionally, the spread between proportions of players who consider
the ex-post or the stated prediction within the CKC is much larger for players facing
uncertainty than ambiguity.24 This indicates that those players are able to infer
which player overstates her hidden values on the back row, and in return cast a vote
against her. The KC is again special, firstly, due to the self-signaling message when
stating a killer ball, and secondly because the number of killer balls seem to be the
strongest determinant for player’s voting behavior.
Summary With the help of the time-dimension within the three criteria we find
a possibility to explain the decision making of more than two thirds of the players.
The players’ decision may origin in an objective evaluation of their opponents, giving
most weight to killer balls. Given the predictions of all criteria, we find contrary
voting patterns due to informational differences between both rounds of pre-play,
i.e., players switch from ex-ante criteria in round 1 to ex-post criteria in round 2.25
24For instance, in round 2 70% of all player facing uncertainty vote by means of the stated CKC,
but only 55% of all players in round 1, compared to 64% of players facing ambiguity in round 2.
The same holds for the ex-post CKC, as well as for males and females in both criteria. Besides we
find a different voting pattern for males and females facing uncertainty: A much larger proportion
of males votes in line with the ex-ante CC and CKC than females in round 2, while these are
almost equal when players are ambiguous, or in round 1.
25Over the whole sample, we find only 22 contestants (2.8%) who do not vote in line with neither
criterion, and only 65 contestants (8.3%) who never vote in line with an ex-ante criterion.
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6.2 Subjective Criteria and Pre-Play Determinants
Regarding players’ choice of their counterpart for the final round, besides the objec-
tive criteria, subjective personal valuations as well as observed behavior in the first
two rounds are likely to play a decisive role.
First, it is likely that people have different “tastes” for others. We find that women
are more likely to vote against men and vice versa. In round 1, males cast a vote
against females in 65% and females against males in even 75%. The difference to
vote against the opposite sex is highly significant (p = 0.000). In round 2 we find
that only females are more likely to cast a vote against males (52%, p = 0, 096),
but that males are significantly more likely to vote against their same sex (54%,
p = 0, 064). This finding suggests that in-group biases may be prevalent, especially
in round 1.26 Apart from gender differences, we find that non-whites reach the
final round significantly less frequently: 63% of non-whites do not reach the final
(p = 0.000).
Second, we ask whether the order in which players announce the content of their
hidden balls impacts on the players’ voting decision. The determination of the order
differs between rounds: In round 1, the show host calls on a particular player to
start telling what is on her hidden back row balls. Usually this is the player with
the weakest front row. Thus, in round 1 the order of statements is exogenously de-
termined by the show host. In round 2 instead it is endogenous. The show host asks
the players who wants to open up the round. On the one hand starting to report the
content of the hidden back row balls helps to state high values, especially if it is the
truth, and thereby turning the focus on the opponents’ balls. On the other hand, the
player who begins to state her hidden values cannot make her statement dependent
on her opponents’ statements, e.g., if all other players confess to have a killer ball
a player who states her values afterward might be more likely to confess a killer as
well. After round 2, we observe that only 26.1% of the players who announce first
are effectively voted to leave the game, but the second or third player is voted off
in 38.7% and 35.1%, respectively.27 Therefore, we expect that the order in round 2
has explanatory content in the sense that a player has a lower propensity to receive
a vote or is less likely voted off if she makes her statement first. In round 1 we do
not expect the order to have additional explanatory power, since the player is either
selected randomly or due to her weak front row. The effect of a weak front row on
the likelihood of receiving a vote is already captured by the objective criteria.
26In addition, we find that males receive a vote more frequently than females. In round 1, 55%
of males receive a vote (p = 0.000), in round 2 53% (p = 0.012).
27The test for the difference between the order of statements is highly significant between the
first and second player (p = 0.000), and the first and third player (p = 0.001). There is no difference
between being the second or third announcer (p = 0.241).
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6.3 Regression Analysis
In this section we determine which of the objective as well as subjective determi-
nants, explain the observed voting pattern best and thus affect a player’s survival
within the two rounds of pre-play. Addressing the objective criteria, which we
discussed in Section 6.1, we construct variables for each criterion and their corre-
sponding time-dimension. For each criterion the variables are composed of (i) the
sum of the two open balls, (ii) the sum of the stated values on the back row, and
(iii) a dummy indicating whether the player made a truthful statement about her
hidden back row balls or not.
We expect that the values or number of killers in the open balls on a player’s front
row affect the decision about whom to cast a vote against in both rounds. But, the
statements of the hidden back row balls are only considered in the voting decision
in round 2, since in round 2 the players have some information about their possible
content. More precisely, the higher the amount of cash in the two open balls, the
more likely a player survives the pre-play, but the more killer balls a player has, the
more likely she is eliminated from the game.
In addition, we control for whether it is a good strategy of players to tell the truth
about the content of their hidden back row balls. Although in round 1 the players
have no information about the distribution of balls in play, an honest player might
be able to convince the others that her statement is true, because she is e.g., not
nervous. Further, we control for the effect of lying by including a dummy “lied in
round 1” in the regression for round 2, i.e., the dummy indicates whether a player
lied in round 1. A player who lied in round 1 takes the risk of getting a reputation
of being untrustworthy, which she may suffer from in round 2. We observe that a
substantial amount of players lies in round 1 (53%) as well as in round 2 (45%).
The average overstatement is £6,413 in round 1, and £5,069 in round 2.
Concerning the subjective criteria and pre-play determinants (Section 6.2), we
control for the effects of players’ age, gender, race, and place of residence as well
as the effects of lying and the order of statements in the regression analysis. We
expect that voting incentives switch between rounds such that players attach more
weight to the objective criteria in round 1, and in round 2 shift weight to personal
judgment about the opponent’s sympathy or trustworthiness with regard to the final.
We estimate a probit on the likelihood that a player is voted off the game (see
Table 6) as well as an ordered probit where we look at the determinants impacting
on the likelihood a player receives 0,1,2, or 3 votes in round 1 (see Table 14 in
Appendix A.3), and 0,1, or 2 votes in round 2 (see Table 15 in Appendix A.3).
In all regressions we simultaneously control for the CC and KC (model (1)), and
separately for the CKC (model (2)), which is a mix between the other two. Again,
we present marginal effects instead of coefficient estimates.
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Table 6: Binary probits on voting behavior in round 1 and 2
yi = 1 (player i has to leave the show)
Round 1 Marginal Effects
Model (1) Model (2)
Player Characteristics
Male 0.040 (0.035) 0.040 (0.035)
Age > 40 -0.002 (0.035) -0.004 (0.034)
White -0.117* (0.067) -0.109* (0.066)
England 0.023 (0.044) 0.023 (0.043)
Order of Statements 0.024 (0.042) 0.028 (0.041)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
log(Value Open Balls) -0.068*** (0.010)
log(Value Stated Balls) -0.006 (0.014)
Truthful Statements -0.051 (0.037)
Killer-Criterion (KC)
No. Killers Open Balls 0.142*** (0.036)
No. Killers Stated Balls 0.040 (0.046)
Truthful Statements -0.091** (0.042)
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
log(Whgt. Value Open Balls) -0.074*** (0.006)
log(Whgt. Value Stated Balls) -0.003 (0.010)
Truthful Statements -0.068** (0.033)
Wald X 2 161.47*** 232.20***
Log-Likelihood -360.51 -364.04
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.23
N 842 842
Number of clusters 211 211
Round 2 Marginal Effects
Model (1) Model (2)
Player Characteristics
Male 0.027 (0.045) 0.026 (0.044)
Age > 40 0.051 (0.045) 0.055 (0.044)
White -0.123 (0.084) -0.110 (0.082)
England 0.050 (0.049) 0.051 (0.049)
Order of Statements -0.101** (0.046) -0.097** (0.046)
Lied in Round 1 0.057 (0.038) 0.055 (0.038)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
log(Value Open Balls) -0.031*** (0.011)
log(Value Stated Balls) -0.002 (0.017)
Truthful Statements -0.146*** (0.049)
Killer-Criterion (KC)
No. Killers Open Balls 0.052 (0.049)
No. Killers Stated Balls 0.071* (0.040)
Truthful Statements -0.147*** (0.049)
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
log(Wght. Value Open Balls) -0.034*** (0.008)
log(Wght. Value Stated Balls) -0.020* (0.012)
Truthful Statements -0.191*** (0.041)
Wald X 2 61.55*** 69.99***
Log-Likelihood -368.25 -367.39
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.09
N 631 631
Number of Clusters 211 211
standard errors in parentheses are corrected for episode clusters; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: 11 special episodes in which all players have the same sex are excluded.
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Results
Looking at model (1) and (2) in Table 6, we find a significant race effect in round
1. Non-whites are voted off more frequently than whites. In round 2, the race effect
disappears. But other personal player characteristics, as gender, age or place of
residence, have no impact on the likelihood that a player is voted off the game in
both rounds. Thus, the gender differences described in Section 6.2 seem to cancel
out each other.
Addressing the order in which players make their statements each round, making a
statement first has a significant impact on the likelihood to be voted to leave the
game in round 2: If a player decides to state the content of her hidden back row
balls first, the likelihood to stay in the game increases by roughly 10%. Thus our hy-
pothesis of making the statement first allows players to credibly state “good” balls,
is supported. As suggested, there is no significant effect of the order of statements
in round 1.
Apart from that, we find no significant effect on the probability of being voted off in
round 2 if a player lied in round 1, independent of the lie’s content (overstatement
or concealing a killer).
The variables representing the objective criteria have a strong explanatory power,
with the highest Pseudo R2 in model (2). As expected, concerning the open ball
values on a players’ front row, the higher the cash amount the lower a player’s like-
lihood to be voted off. The reverse it true when addressing killer balls. The higher
the number of killer balls in the open balls, the more likely a player is voted to leave
the game. The statements about the hidden back row balls have no effect in round 1,
and in round 2 only a statement about a killer ball is significant. This supports our
suggestion that statements about cash values are meaningless, but that statements
about killer balls are taken into account in the players’ voting decision: Confessing a
killer ball increases the likelihood of being voted off the game. Further, the variable
indicating whether a player stated the truth, either about her hidden back row cash
values or killer balls has a significant effect. In both rounds it is worthwhile to be
honest, stating the truth reduces the likelihood to be voted off by roughly 10%. In
round 2, the effect is even more pronounced, which might be due to the players’
informational advantage about the ball values in play. Although the players have
no information about the distribution of the hidden ball values in round 1, a player
who states the truth seems to be able to signal credibility.28
For a more detailed analysis of the voting process, we draw our attention to the
results from the ordered probit estimation, see Table 14 and Table 15 in Appendix
A.3. There we can identify the effects on the number of votes a player receives.
28From a psychological perspective, people may recognize a liar with the help of certain body
signals, for instance, avoiding eye contact, sweating, or blushing.
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Overall, the results provided by the probit estimation above are confirmed.29 In
addition, we find that whether a player lied in round 1 matters for the probability of
receiving zero or two votes in round 2. A player who lied before receives two votes
6% more likely than a player who made an honest statement.
Finally, we find that all effects are more pronounced in round 2 than in round 1.
But, the explanatory power of both models decreases sharply between both rounds.
In round 1, the cash- and killer-criterion in model (1) explain a 16% higher mass of
the variance than in round 2 (Pseudo R2=0.24 to Pseudo R2=0.008), and the cash-
killer-criterion in model (2) explains a 14% higher mass of the variance than model
(2) in round 2 (R2=0.23 to R2=0.09). This decline serves as a further indicator for
the switch between players’ voting behavior. It is likely that players decide on whom
to vote off the game by means of sympathy or trustworthiness. Unfortunately, we
are not able to directly control for those effects.
Summary Our conjectures regarding player’s strategy are largely confirmed in the
data. As we expected, in round 1 neither player takes into account the statements
about the hidden back row balls, and only decides on whom to vote by means of the
ex-ante criteria. However, players discriminate against non-whites. On the contrary,
in round 2 taste characteristics become meaningless, but players punish liars, i.e.,
liars have to bear the danger of being voted off more likely. Additionally, a player
who decides to state the content of her hidden back row balls first is more likely
to survive round 2. Surprisingly, the trustworthiness of players is highly valued in
both rounds. Hence, strategic considerations, such as accumulating a high jackpot
and selecting a cooperator as the final opponent, rather than player’s characteristics
appear to be the primary determinants of voting behavior in round 2.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze cooperative behavior in a prisoner’s dilemma game in the
presence of high stakes, communication, and two rounds of pre-play, involving two
voting decisions. Using data from 222 episodes of the British television game show
“Golden Balls”, we observe a unilateral cooperation rate of 55% and a mutual co-
operation rate of 33%.
Summarizing our main results, we find that stake size, communication as well as
pre-play have a significant impact on cooperation. Stake size is inversely related to
29The results on the probability of receiving two or three votes in round 1 or 2 are very similar to
the ones from the probit model on the player’s likelihood to be effectively voted off. This confirms
the results, since receiving two or three votes (likely) results in the player’s elimination from the
game.
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player’s likelihood to cooperate, i.e., the higher the jackpot the more likely players
are to defect. Further we can show that player’s expectation about the stake size
matters: If the jackpot is above (below) the player’s expectation, the propensity to
cooperate significantly decreases (increases), and mutual cooperation is less (more)
successful. With respect to communication, certain words and gestures are more
important than others. We test for the effect of handshakes and voluntarily stated
mutual promises, and find that players who shake hands are more likely to defect,
while handshakes in combination with a promise are likely to result in cooperation
and successful coordination. The effects of stake size and communication are robust
and independent of player characteristics and pre-play determinants.
The analysis of contestants’ behavior in the pre-play shows that players make their
voting decision dependent on objective criteria, i.e., their monetary contribution to
the stake size, as well as on subjective personal characteristics of their opponents.
We show that there is a strong link between the two rounds of pre-play and the
players’ decision in the prisoner’s dilemma. Whether a player lied in the pre-play or
contributed more to the stake size has a negative influence on cooperative behavior,
whereas whether a player enjoys her opponent’s goodwill has a positive one.
We are aware that there are potential drawbacks associated with the use of televi-
sion game show data. The first addresses anonymity: Players on the show interact
face-to-face and in front of large audience, including their family, friends, and col-
leagues. This might amplify cooperative behavior, e.g., a selfish-person might choose
to cooperate only to avoid embarrassment or punishment by her peer group. The sec-
ond addresses the selection of players for the show: Contestants are not randomly
selected, but have to apply to the show. But, with respect to players exogenous
personal characteristics, the sample can be considered, at least to some extent, as
representative of the underlying (British) population.
This paper has shown that decisions in the prisoner’s dilemma are influenced by
the stake size, the player’s expectation about stakes, and communication. We are
not aware of any other study using handshakes and promises, as well as a player’s
expectation about stake size to explain cooperative behavior.
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Appendix
A.1 Instructions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
The show host Jasper Carrott explains the “weak” prisoner’s dilemma in every episode
with almost the same words:
“It is time to split or steal. You have got two final golden balls left, you have
each got a golden ball with the word split written inside, you have got each
a golden ball with the word steal written inside. I will ask you to make a
conscious choice and you will choose either the split or the steal ball, neither
of you will know what the other has chosen. If you both choose the split balls,
you split today’s jackpot of £J and you both go home with £J/2. If one of
you splits and one of you steals, whoever steals goes home with all the money
£J , whoever splits goes home with nothing. If you both decide to steal and
you are very greedy, you both go home with nothing. Before I ask you to
choose, Player A, B just check the two balls to make sure you know which is
to split and which is to steal. Do not show to each other. It is very important
that you know which is which. [players check the balls] Are you happy
to know which is split and which is steal? Okay, before I ask you to choose, I
will give you some time to talk to each other about what has happened today
and how you feel. [players discuss] Okay, player A, B choose the split or
steal ball now. [players choose balls] Hold it up, make sure that when
you open it, the other player can see it. Player A, B split or steal? [players
open balls]”
A.2 An Alternative Empirical Strategy
In Section 5, we have shown which factors significantly influence cooperative behavior. In
this section we present an alternative approach. Before the show starts, contestants are
individually asked to make a private statement about the strategy they plan to play in
case they reach the final round (see Section 3.2). These filmed statements are broadcasted
to the television audience, but cannot be observed by the contestants.
We observe an unambiguous strategy-statement by 59% of the final players. Given these
individual statements, we can infer whether contestants stick to their announced strategy,
i.e., behave consistently or not. If players are either defectors or cooperators, independent
of the situation and their opponent, we should neither observe switching strategies nor
significant effects of any explanatory variables.
In Table 7 we depict the average cooperation rate depending on the players’ strategy-
statement.
Interestingly, the raw data show that contestants more often state to steal than to split
(33,3% versus 25,7%). But we find that players switch their strategy significantly more
often (p=0.008) if they initially planned to steal (35.3% split) than if they planned to
split (22.9% steal). Addressing the players who do not explicitly state their strategy, we
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Table 7: Relation between commitment and the cooperation rate
Decision
Statement N % Steal (%) Split (%)
Steal 136 33,3 64.7 35.3
Split 105 25,7 22.9 77.1
Ambiguous 167 43,1 43.1 56.9
Total 408a 100 45.1 54.9
a Note, that the strategy-statement is not filmed in the first 18
episodes. This reduces the data set to 204 episodes (408 players).
find that 56.9% actually split. The difference between those and the observed average
cooperation rate (54,5%) is not significant (p=0.587).
Thus, one could surmise that a substantial fraction of players are of a certain type, either
cooperators or defectors. The ones that change their strategy make their strategy depen-
dent on the events in the game as well as on opponent characteristics. We therefore can
conclude that at least 17.6% of the players have situation dependent social preferences.
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A.3 Tables
Table 8: Cooperation rates by gender, series, demographics, and stake size
Split
Men Women All
(N=207) (N=237) (N=444)
Row % Row % Row % N
Experience
Unexperienced (Series 1) 44.4 59.1 52.5 80
Experienced (Series 2-4) 55.0 54.9 54.9 364
Age
≤ 40 44.3 53.1 49.2 260
> 40 64.1 59.8 62.0 184
Race
Non-White 46.2 42.9 44.4 27
White 53.6 56.5 55.2 417
England
Not from England 73.3 70.7 71.8 71
From England 49.4 52.3 50.9 371
Jackpot in £
[3, 500] 71.4 75.7 73.6 72
(500, 2500] 50.9 55.6 53.0 100
(2500, 10000] 56.0 50.0 52.9 102
(10000, 30000] 43.2 51.4 48.3 116
(30000, 100150] 43.5 51.6 48.1 54
Potential Jackpot in £
[5000, 30000] 46.3 51.7 49.1 114
(30000, 45000] 49.3 58.5 53.6 138
(45000, 75000] 52.3 58.3 55.8 104
(75000, 168100] 72.2 53.8 61.4 88
Expectation
Jackpot < Expectation 58.3 59.5 58.9 292
Jackpot ≥ Expectation 41.3 49.4 46.1 152
Total 53.1 55.7 54.5 444
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Table 9: Mutual decision outcomes by series, demographics and stake size
(steal, steal) (steal, split) (split, split)
Row % Row % Row % N
Experience
Unexperienced (Series 1) 25.0 45.0 30.0 80
Experienced (Series 2-4) 24.2 41.8 34.1 364
Gender
Male Team 35.3 32.4 32.4 68
Female Team 16.3 55.1 28.6 98
Mixed Team 24.5 40.3 35.3 278
Age
Old Team (> 40) 11.8 50.0 38.2 68
Young Team (≤ 40) 23.6 48.6 27.8 144
Mixed Team 28.4 36.2 35.3 232
England
Not English Team 25.0 25.0 50.0 8
English Team 28.6 39.0 32.5 308
Mixed Team 14.3 52.4 33.3 126
Jackpot
≤ £500 8.3 36.1 55.6 72
> £500 27.4 43.5 29.0 372
Expectation
Jackpot < Expectation 23.3 35.6 41.1 292
Jackpot ≥ Expectation 26.3 55.3 18.4 152
Total 24.3 42.3 33.3 444
Average Winnings (0, 0) (15693, 0) (4784, 4784) 444
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Table 10: Results from ordered probit on outcomes in the PD (2)
y = 0; 1; 2 Marginal Effectsa
Steal/Steal (0) Split/Steal (1) Split/Split (2)
Player Characteristics
Team Unexperienced 0.015 (0.066) 0.003 (0.010) -0.018 (0.075)
Team Male 0.094 (0.088) 0.005 (0.011) -0.099 (0.082)
Team Female 0.020 (0.064) 0.003 (0.010) -0.023 (0.074)
Team > 40 -0.065 (0.067) -0.021 (0.030) 0.086 (0.097)
Team < 40 0.104 (0.065) 0.012 (0.011) -0.116 (0.069)
Team England 0.109** (0.051) 0.034 (0.023) -0.143** (0.070)
Team Small City 0.069 (0.049) 0.013 (0.012) -0.082 (0.058)
Index -0.332** (0.165) -0.065 (0.047) 0.397** (0.197)
Pre-Play
Team Never Lied -0.055 (0.059) -0.016 (0.023) 0.070 (0.081)
Team Lying 0.029 (0.052) 0.005 (0.009) -0.035 (0.061)
Communication
Handshakes 0.097 (0.097) 0.019 (0.015) -0.116 (0.110)
Promise -0.062 (0.101) 0.125*** (0.021) 0.075 (0.119)
Handshakes*Promise -0.327*** (0.109) 0.035 (0.085) 0.361*** (0.134)
Stake Size
Jackpot < Expectation -0.161*** (0.055) -0.013 (0.015) 0.174*** (0.056)
Wald X 2 28.98**
Log-Likelihood -223.65
Pseudo R2 0.06
N 54 94 74
Number of clusters 222
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for episode clusters; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 11: Voting decision by means of objective criteria
After round 1b After round 2
Criteria to predict a player in out in out
who should be voted to leavea Row % Row % Row % Row %
Cash-Criterion (CC)
ex-ante
stay 87.2 12.8 72.3 27.7
vote to leave 38.3 61.7 55.4 44.6
stated
stay 76.7 23.3 70.0 30.0
vote to leave 69.8 30.2 59.9 40.1
ex-post
stay 83.0 17.0 74.8 25.2
vote to leave 50.9 49.1 50.5 49.5
Killer-Criterion (KC)
ex-ante
stay 92.0 8.0 83.6 16.4
vote to leave 23.9 76.1 32.9 67.1
stated
stay 93.7 6.3 85.1 14.9
vote to leave 18.9 81.1 29.7 70.3
ex-post
stay 86.6 13.4 80.9 19.1
vote to leave 40.1 59.9 38.3 61.7
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
ex-ante
stay 87.7 12.3 73.2 26.8
vote to leave 36.9 63.1 53.6 46.4
stated
stay 83.3 16.7 74.1 25.9
vote to leave 50.0 50.0 51.8 48.2
ex-post
stay 83.2 16.8 74.5 25.5
vote to leave 50.5 49.5 50.9 49.1
N 666 222 444 222
a We take into account that the prediction might not be unique per episode, i.e., more
than one player might have a prediction to be eliminated.
b Each round, 222 contestants are eliminated. In round 1 (2) 55.4% (52.2%) of the elimi-
nated players are men.
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Table 12: Voting decision per player by means of objective criteria
Players voted by means of
all (%) men (%) women (%)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
ex-ante
Round 1 72.4 74.5 70.5
Round 2 66.5 67.3 65.8
stated
Round 1 36.0 38.5 33.6
Round 2 64.4 62.6 66.1
ex-post
Round 1 55.3 55.4 55.3
Round 2 70.2 66.9 73.2
Killer-Criterion (KC)
ex-ante
Round 1 82.1 83.0 81.3
Round 2 81.9 84.9 79.1
stated
Round 1 83.6 85.5 81.8
Round 2 78.9 80.2 77.6
ex-post
Round 1 70.9 72.7 69.2
Round 2 76.3 77.0 75.6
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
ex-ante
Round 1 71.0 74.1 68.1
Round 2 65.8 67.3 64.4
stated
Round 1 55.0 58.3 51.9
Round 2 63.5 61.9 65.1
ex-post
Round 1 60.4 61.5 59.3
Round 2 66.8 65.5 68.1
Na 573 278 (48.5%) 295 (51.5%)
a Note: For purpose of comparability, we restrain the sample to 573 observations including
only those players, who are not being eliminated in round 1. Further we consider only
those decisions for which we can trace back for whom a player voted, i.e., we exclude
episodes with a voting of 2:1:1:0 in round 1 and 1:1:1 in round 2.
168 Chapter 4: Determinants of Successful Cooperation in a Social Dilemma
Table 13: Voting decision per player under risk or ambiguity (by means of objective
criteria)
Round 2 Round 1
Players vote by means of Uncertainty Partial Ambiguity Ambiguity Ambiguity
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
ex-ante
all 64.0 66.3 67.2 72.4
men 82.4 64.9 67.7 74.5
women 54.5 67.6 66.7 70.5
stated
all 58.0 67.7 61.8 36.0
men 52.9 65.7 60.6 38.5
women 60.6 69.6 63.2 33.6
ex-post
all 74.0 70.2 69.3 55.3
men 70.6 66.4 66.9 55.4
women 75.8 73.6 71.9 55.3
Killer-Criterion (KC)
ex-ante
all 84.3 79.8 84.0 82.1
men 82.4 81.3 89.1 83.0
women 85.3 78.4 78.3 81.3
stated
all 84.0 75.9 81.3 83.6
men 94.1 76.9 81.9 85.5
women 78.8 75.0 80.7 81.8
ex-post
all 78.0 75.2 77.2 70.9
men 88.2 76.9 75.6 72.7
women 72.7 73.6 78.9 69.2
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
ex-ante
all 60.0 64.9 68.0 71.0
men 76.5 62.7 70.9 74.1
women 51.5 66.9 64.9 68.1
stated
all 70.0 61.7 64.3 55.0
men 70.6 59.0 63.8 58.3
women 69.7 64.2 64.9 51.9
ex-post
all 76.0 66.3 65.6 60.4
men 88.2 64.9 63.0 61.5
women 69.7 67.6 68.4 59.3
Na 50 282 241 573
a Note: The sample is restricted to the same 573 players in round 1 and 2.
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Table 14: Ordered probit regression results on the number of votes (round 1)
yie = 0; 1; 2; 3 (Number of votes a player receives in round 1 per episode)
Marginal Effects
No. of Votes Variables Model (1) Model (2)
0 Player Characteristics
Male -0.051 (0.035) -0.051 (0.035)
Age > 40 0.012 (0.034) 0.015 (0.034)
White 0.135** (0.058) 0.126** (0.059)
England -0.009 (0.045) -0.002 (0.046)
Order of Statements 0.021 (0.042) 0.016 (0.042)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
log(Value Open Balls) 0.097*** (0.010)
log(Value Stated Balls) -0.025 (0.019)
Truthful Statements 0.111*** (0.036)
Killer-Criterion (KC)
No. Killers Open Balls -0.159*** (0.040)
No. Killers Stated Balls -0.007 (0.050)
Truthful Statements 0.148*** (0.037)
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
log(Wght. Value Open Balls) 0.110*** (0.007)
log(Wght. Value Stated Balls) -0.011 (0.012)
Truthful Statements 0.138*** (0.036)
1 Player Characteristics
Male 0.007 (0.005) 0.008 (0.006)
Age > 40 -0.002 (0.005) -0.002 (0.005)
White -0.005 (0.005) -0.008** (0.004)
England 0.001 (0.006) 0.000 (0.007)
Order of Statements -0.003 (0.006) -0.003 (0.007)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
log(Value Open Balls) -0.013*** (0.002)
log(Value Stated Balls) 0.003 (0.003)
Truthful Statements -0.011*** (0.004)
Killer-Criterion (KC)
No. Killers Open Balls 0.021*** (0.007)
No. Killers Stated Balls 0.001 (0.007)
Truthful Statements -0.012*** (0.003)
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
log(Wght. Value Open Balls) -0.017*** (0.003)
log(Wght. Value Stated Balls) 0.002 (0.002)
Truthful Statements -0.022*** (0.007)
2 Player Characteristics
Male 0.025 (0.017) 0.024 (0.017)
Age > 40 -0.006 (0.016) -0.007 (0.016)
White -0.064** (0.027) -0.060** (0.028)
England 0.004 (0.022) 0.001 (0.022)
Order of Statements -0.010 (0.020) -0.008 (0.020)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
log(Value Open Balls) -0.047*** (0.006)
log(Value Stated Balls) 0.012 (0.009)
Truthful Statements -0.053*** (0.018)
Killer-Criterion (KC)
No. Killers Open Balls 0.076*** (0.020)
No. Killers Stated Balls 0.003 (0.024)
Truthful Statements -0.071*** (0.019)
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
log(Wght. Value Open Balls) -0.052*** (0.005)
log(Wght. Value Stated Balls) 0.005 (0.006)
Truthful Statements -0.066*** (0.018)
3 Player Characteristics
Male 0.020 (0.014) 0.019 (0.013)
Age > 40 -0.005 (0.013) -0.005 (0.013)
White -0.066* (0.036) -0.058* (0.034)
England 0.003 (0.017) 0.001 (0.017)
Order of Statements -0.008 (0.016) -0.006 (0.015)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
log(Value Open Balls) -0.037*** (0.005)
log(Value Stated Balls) 0.010 (0.007)
Truthful Statements -0.046*** (0.016)
Killer-Criterion (KC)
No. Killers Open Balls 0.061*** (0.016)
No. Killers Stated Balls 0.003 (0.019)
Truthful Statements -0.066*** (0.019)
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
log(Wght. Value Open Balls) -0.041*** (0.004)
log(Wght. Value Stated Balls) 0.004 (0.004)
Truthful Statements -0.051*** (0.013)
Wald X2 284.59*** 390.05***
Log-Likelihood -875.00 -870.64
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.19
N 842 842
Number of clusters 211 211
standard errors in parentheses are corrected for episode clusters; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: 11 special episodes are excluded (all players have the same sex)
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Table 15: Ordered probit regression results on the number of votes (round 2)
yie = 0; 1; 2 (Number of votes a player receives in round 1 per episode)
Marginal Effects
No. of Votes Variables Model (1) Model (2)
0 Player Characteristics
Male -0.002 (0.037) -0.002 (0.037)
Age > 40 -0.030 (0.035) -0.033 (0.035)
White 0.039 (0.074) 0.031 (0.076)
England -0.045 (0.041) -0.047 (0.042)
Order of Statements 0.175*** (0.046) 0.170*** (0.045)
Lied in Round 1 -0.065** (0.031) -0.062** (0.031)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
log(Value Open Balls) 0.036*** (0.009)
log(Value Stated Balls) 0.005 (0.015)
Truthful Statements 0.177*** (0.047)
Killer-Criterion (KC)
No. Killers Open Balls -0.047 (0.040)
No. Killers Stated Balls -0.044 (0.033)
Truthful Statements 0.014 (0.054)
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
log(Wght. Value Open Balls) 0.040*** (0.007)
log(Wght. Value Stated Balls) 0.017* (0.010)
Truthful Statements 0.182*** (0.034)
1 Player Characteristics
Male 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Age > 40 -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)
White 0.002 (0.008) 0.001 (0.006)
England 0.002 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004)
Order of Statements -0.014* (0.007) -0.013* (0.007)
Lied in Round 1 -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
log(Value Open Balls) -0.000 (0.001)
log(Value Stated Balls) -0.000 (0.000)
Truthful Statements 0.004 (0.003)
Killer-Criterion (KC)
No. Killers Open Balls 0.000 (0.001)
No. Killers Stated Balls 0.000 (0.001)
Truthful Statements 0.000 (0.001)
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
log(Wght. Value Open Balls) -0.000 (0.001)
log(Wght. Value Stated Balls) -0.000 (0.000)
Truthful Statements 0.004 (0.003)
2 Player Characteristics
Male 0.002 (0.037) 0.002 (0.037)
Age > 40 0.030 (0.036) 0.034 (0.036)
White -0.041 (0.082) -0.032 (0.082)
England 0.043 (0.037) 0.044 (0.038)
Order of Statements -0.161*** (0.039) -0.157*** (0.039)
Lied in Round 1 0.066** (0.031) 0.062** (0.031)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
log(Value Open Balls) -0.036*** (0.010)
log(Value Stated Balls) -0.005 (0.015)
Truthful Statements -0.181*** (0.049)
Killer-Criterion (KC)
No. Killers Open Balls 0.047 (0.040)
No. Killers Stated Balls 0.044 (0.033)
Truthful Statements -0.014 (0.055)
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
log(Wght. Value Open Balls) -0.040*** (0.007)
log(Wght. Value Stated Balls) -0.017* (0.010)
Truthful Statements -0.186*** (0.036)
Wald X2 102.47*** 110.81***
Log-Likelihood -634.79 -633.74
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.09
N 631 631
Number of clusters 211 211
standard errors in parentheses are corrected for episode clusters; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: 11 special episodes are excluded (all players have the same sex)
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